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In historiographical terms the most significant contribution of
this study is to demonstrate that English medieval history cannot be
written solely from the standpoint of the king. The history of the North
from 1000 to 1135 shows that court-centered history obscures the conti-
nuity and importance of regional problems and gives too much prominence
to the king as a causative factor. Both before and after the Conquest,
in fact, northern history proceeded from the interaction between the
northern nobility and the king. Prior to 1080, it was dominated by a
clash between the two parties. Politically, the northern nobility con-
sisted of two groups, the men of York and the Northumbrians, and both
groups had become distrustful of the king by 1065 because of royal
attempts to govern the North through unpopular earls who threatened
local privileges. The northerners' attempts to resist these earls
led
to conflict wnich culminated in the great northern revolt of 1065
and
which seriously undermined the unity of the Anglo-Saxon kingdom.
More-
over, this conflict did not end in 1066. As a result of
his initial
dealings with the North, William the Conqueror appeared to
pose the same
threat as his predecessors, and the northerners resisted
him accordingly.
The general northern revolts of 1067-1070 and the
Northumbrian revolts
of 1074 and 1080 were a direct extension of
pre-Conquest northern resis-
tance to the king, and the only novel element
in these events was the
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solution that William ultimately imposed, the destruction of the native
nobilities of Yorkshire and Northumbria in 1069-70 and 1080 respec-
tively.
These measures ended northern opposition to royal government, but
they did not give William the Conqueror or Rufus control of the North
because their power above the Humber was directly limited by their own
nobles. Much of northwestern England and southwestern Scotland was
unattractive to the Conqueror's barons, and they would not settle there.
This factor restricted Norman settlement to Yorkshire, Durham, and
southern Lancashire, and even in these shires the Normans either
destroyed the manorial regime of the North or imposed new burdens on the
peasants in an attempt to increase the value of their new estates. The
limited extent of Norman settlement put the Normans in a weak position.
Both the Conqueror and Rufus had to deal with the Scots through diplo-
macy and demonstrations in force because there were no local Norman
landholding classes in Cumberland and Northumberland, and the Normans
already in the North had difficulty redeveloping Yorkshire and settling
above the Tyne because they had little protection against raids from the
West, Indeed, this situation did not improve until after 1100 when
Henry I brought to England a new group of nobles who were willing to
take lands in the Northwest, Their settlement in Cumberland and in
Gal-
loway under Earl David provided the basis for the security which
allowed
the spread of Norman settlement along the east coast plain
into Northum-
berland and Lothian and the subsequent development of the
Anglo-Norman
society which characterized both the North and southern
Scotland during
the High Middle Ages,
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CHAPTER I
THE DANES OF YORK AND THE HOUSE OF HAMBURGH
One of the basic problems in the history of the Norman Conquest is
why the Northumbrians and the men of York resisted the Normans with such
self-destructive tenacity, and despite the importance of this question,
it has not received much attention in this century. The reasons for
this are obscure. It may be partially the result of the conviction that
the South is the only really important part of England. Also a close
study of the northern resistance to William the Conqueror inevitably
discloses that he made at least two blunders in dealing with the North
and that he only rescued himself from the results of these mistakes by
genocide. Such discoveries fit poorly into the current picture of
William's efficiency. Finally, it may be true that the behavior of the
northerners in the face of the Conquest actually reveals a distressing
exception to the "precocious" unity of Anglo-Saxon England. The idea of
backwoods Northerners being so impertinent as not to appreciate the
splendid unity offered them by the West Saxon kings with their shires,
fyrd, and Danegeld is undoubtedly as unpalatable to some historians as
the picture of William the Bastard making mistakes is to others. In any
case, in most accounts of the Norman Conquest, the men from beyond the
Humber come on stage long enough to "revolt" a few times. They do this
out of conservatism, fail miserably, and are heard from no more.
Such will not be the case in the following pages. The behavior of
the Northumbrians and the Yorkshire men during the reign of William the
Conqueror is inexplicable if it is separated from their pre-Conquest
2Map 1. Political Divisions of the North in 1000
3political experience. William won Hastings, but his victory did not
wipe out the past. The men of the North in the 1060 's and 70 's acted as
much in response to past realities as to the new reality of the Normans.
This chapter will begin the investigation of their past. The basic
question which must be answered is whether there was a political side to
the cultural regionalism of the North in Anglo-Saxon times. Put in
another way, the question is: Was northern separatism a political
force? To answer this question, this chapter will discuss the more
inqjortant aspects of northern geopolitics and reconstruct the history of
the North from the second period of Danish invasions to the beginning of
the reign of Edward the Confessor. It is necessary to go back this far
because the history of the North during this period has never been prop-
erly understood, and some important insights of earlier scholars have
been largely ignored."^
The first question concerns the extent of the North. What were the
bounds of this region? To the unwary this may seem an easy enough ques-
tion. In the eleventh century the North consisted, more or less, of the
present counties of Yorkshire, Durham, and Northumberland on the east
plus Lancashire and the southern parts of Cumberland and Westmorland on
the west. With one exception, the northern parts of the latter counties
2
were included in the kingdom of Strathclyde or Cumbria.
This definition is fairly accurate in a political sense, but it is
necessary to go beyond politics to adequately define the North. In few
parts of Anglo-Saxon England was geography more important than in this
region. This was true largely because of its negative effects. North-
ern landforms hindered internal communications, limited agricultural
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5possibilities, and left what good land there was open to invasion.
Indeed, in only one direction did the North have imposing natural
defenses: towards the south. The Humber has been said to mark a line
of very ancient division among the Anglo-Saxons,"^ and a concrete example
of this is the fact that prior to the Danish invasions, the power of the
Bretwalda did not usually cross the Humber unless this position was
occupied by the Northumbrian king.^ The importance of the Humber as a
dividing line probably came from the fact that for most purposes the
North was nearly a separate island during this period. The Humber comes
far inland before turning north towards York, and its function as a bar-
rier to land travel was taken over west of the turn by the swamps along
the lower Ouse. West of the mountains, the peatmoss bogs along the
Mersey formed an effective barrier between Lancashire and Cheshire.^
The only good land routes to the Midlands were between the Ouse swamps
and the Pennine foothills on the east and through the Manchester area on
the west, but both these passages are crossed by transverse rivers and
were easily defended against an invading army. Moreover, it is known
that these roads north were very bad in the early twelfth century, even
for small groups of travellers, and that York's main connection with
southern England was by ship either up the Trent to Lincoln or down the
6
east coast.
The North was, therefore, cut off from easy communications with the
South. It was, unfortunately, more cut-up internally. Beginning in
the south, the Pennines run north between the Humber and the Mersey and
continue all the way to the Tyne Gap. In Cumberland they are flanked by
the Lake District, the highest and wildest area in northern England.
6
7The Tyne Gap runs from the head of the Solway Firth to the North Sea,
but north of it rises another range of hills which merge into the South-
em Highlands of Scotland. These highlands stretch from Galloway on the
west all the way across southern Scotland and reach the North Sea
between Lothian and Tweeddale.
Although these upland regions are not of awe-inspiring height and
can be crossed by a number of routes, they effectively divided the North
into three areas: the east coast plain, the west coast plain with the
Vale of Eden, and the uplands themselves. These mountains and hills
functioned as a serious barrier to communications between the coastal
plains and were agriculturally marginal. Except where pierced by river
valleys such as the Vale of Eden or the Tweed-Teviot system, much of the
uplands was only useful as summer pasture for the settlements in the
valleys. Consequently a big slice of the North running from top to bot-
tom was lightly exploited, nearly empty land. Unfortunately in the Mid-
dle Ages, the usual corollary of low settlement density, pastoralism,
and poor communications was a "free-zone," that is, an area which was
normally beyond the control of local forces of law and order and became
the refuge for the peasant's primeval enemy, the wolf, and his societal
enemy, the outlaw. Such was certai-nly the case in the North of England,
as will be seen later.
Thus the North was rather different from its outlines on a politi-
cal map. It was cut off from the South and had a dangerous and unpro-
ductive "free-zone" running up its middle. In fact, for most purposes
the North consisted of the two coastal plains, and of these the one on
the east was by far the more important. It runs north through the Vale
8of York, eastern Durham and Northumberland to Tweeddale. Above this
rich area (the Merse) it is broken by the Lammermuirs
, the eastern end
of the Southern Highlands, but reappears in Lothian and broadens into
the Midland Valley of Scotland. West of the Pennines, there was a
poorer, smaller plain which reached from the Mersey bogs north through
western Lancashire, around the Cumberland coast to the Vale of Eden, and
finally west into Galloway south of the Southern Highlands.
The east coast plain, which was the most developed part of northern
England, was a land of moderate rainfall, indifferent to good soils, and
village agriculture, and potentially it could carry a large peasant pop-
ulation. The western plain was smaller and wetter. Its inhabitants
practiced mixed agriculture and usually lived in hamlets. Both these
areas were dangerously open to invasion from the north and the sea. The
Southern Highlands of Scotland could be crossed in the west either by
Annandale or Nithsdale, routes which linked Clydesdale with the Galwegian
plain and thence to Cumberland. In the east there were two routes
between Lothian and Tweeddale: by Lauderdale or the coast road. Lothian
itself had no natural frontiers except to the south. Finally, the long
coasts of the North had traditionally stood open to sea-borne invasion,
pre-eminently by the Tyne and Humber-Ouse system, but also from the Irish
Sea up the rivers sind creeks of the West.
The North was not a single natural region. Its geography divided it
into three regions and left the most important of these open to invasion.
This emphasis on the negative aspects of the subject may seem to some
excessive, but it is appropriate given the history of the lands beyond
the Humber. In reading most accounts of the Norman Conquest, one gets
the vague impression that Anglo-Saxon England was an ancient kingdom.
In fact, it was not in the North. Prior to the Danish invasions of the
ninth century the kingdom of Northumbria had existed above the Humber.
It was one of the original Anglo-Saxon kingdoms and had stretched from
the Humber north along the eastern plain across the Lammermuirs into
Lothian, probably all the way to the Firth of Forth. During their days
of greatest power, the Northumbrian kings had also extended their rule
over the Pennines into Cumberland, Lancashire, and the Galwegian coastal
plain. In the ninth and tenth centuries, however, there occurred a
series of changes which were catastrophic from a Northumbrian point of
view. These can not be considered in detail, but their main outline is
necessary for a clear understanding of the North. What happened was not
without irony. The Northumbrians, once sea-borne invaders, were unable
to withstand the attacks of the Danes who conquered Yorkshire and proba-
bly much of the land between the Tyne and the Tees and set up their own
kingdom. The Northumbrians living above the Tyne kept their indepen-
dence but were militarily at a disadvantage against their northern
neighbors after the loss of Yorkshire. In the tenth century, their for-
tunes continued to decline. From at least 900, the Strathclyde Britons
(the Cumbrians) expanded south over the Southern Highlands and gained
control of Cumberland and probably Lancashire.^ Sometime during the
same century, probably^. 973, the Scots took control of Lothian, and
g
perhaps Tweeddale, the northernmost provinces of the defunct kingdom.
Meanwhile the Danish kingdom of York had been replaced by a Norwegian
kingdom, and the rump of Northumbria, the lands between the Tyne and the
Tweed with the northern part of Durham, endured—perhaps because it was
10
the most worthless part of the eastern plain. In 954, all this turmoil
finally stopped; after several abortive attempts the king of Wessex
annexed York and Northumbria (the land between the Tees and the Tweed).
This was only a little over a century before the Norman Conquest.
The question is to what extent the kings succeeded after this date in
incorporating the North into their kingdom despite the rather major dis-
tractions of the second wave of Danish invasions, the period of Danish
kings, and the political crises of Edward the Confessor's reign, and
although there are several points of view from which this question could
be approached, the initial requirement is precise language. The North
was not a homogeneoiis region either geographically or ethnically. None-
theless, the term "!Sorthumbrians" is usually used to refer to the inhab-
itants of the modem counties of Yorkshire, Durham, and Northumberland.
Sometimes, however, it only means the inhabitants of any one of these
areas. This usage reflects the original meaning of "Northumbrians" and
also southern English usage in the twelfth century; it also leads to
unwarranted vagueness and false conclusions. Hereafter northern usage
will be followed. "Northumbrians" will refer to the people living
between the Tweed and the Tees. If it is necessary to single out the
people between the Tyne and the Tees, they will be called the "men of
St. Cuthbert," the "men of Durham," etc. The inhabitants of Yorkshire
will be called the "Yorkshire men." "Northerners" will refer to all the
peoples between the Humber and the Tweed. These terms may seem somewhat
ponderous, but they will clarify the following discussion. It will also
be best to consider Yorkshire and Northumberland separately.
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Yorkshire was a large, complex area which ran roughly from the
Humber to the Tees with a substantial extension south of the line of the
Humber on the southwest. The shire also contained a great deal of the
Pennines, and the northern part of Lancashire (the part above the Ribble)
was linked administratively to York.
It is an easy enough task to point out the cultural peculiarities
of Yorkshire east of the Pennines. The dialect spoken by the natives
was unintelligible to men from southern England.^ In the Pennine foot-
hills on the west remnants of both the Northumbrian aristocracy and the
traditional social structure of the North survived the Danish inva-
sions.''"^ Most scholars would add that these invasions and the subse-
quent Danish settlement had produced a distinctive society in the east-
ern part of the shire. This point will be discussed later. For the
moment it can be safely said that at least a Danish aristocracy had been
created in Yorkshire, and that the area was part of the Danelaw. Indeed,
miscellaneous examples of Danish influence can be cited, such as its
distinctive body of customary law, its system of monetary reckoning, and
the names of the agricultural tenements of its peasants.''"'^ The fact
that many of the Yorkshire peasants were relatively free and that the
manor (in a southern sense) was not common in the county has also been
12
ascribed to Danish influence, but even though this attribution is doubt-
ful, the basic phenomenon is not.
The political position of Yorkshire within the kingdom was also
somewhat unusual. In particular, the power of the king appears to have
been less in this shire than south of the Humber. He had demesne lands
in Yorkshire, but they were small in comparison with those of the earl
12
who also had the hoisage of most of the small thegns.-"-^ These two fac-
tors limited the kiu^'s authority, but he still had important rights.
The king appointed the earls of the shire and the archbishop; these pre-
rogatives were exercised. He also received the pleas of the crown and
, ,
-
. 14heriots of important thegns, and despite the fact that his power of
enacting new laws was supposedly limited by Edgar's grant of legal
autonomy to the northern Danelaw in 962 in return for their loyalty, it
is doubtful if later kings felt bound by this provision. "^^ In conclu-
sion, it has been said that the king's power in Yorkshire was essen-
tially that of an c^rerlord,"''^ but this is an understatement. The Anglo-
Saxon kings had important rights in the shire and tried to exercise
them. What is uncertain is how well they succeeded."''^
Northumbria (Bernicia) was as exotic as Yorkshire in its own way.
The earldom stretched from the Tees to the Tweed between the central
hills and the North Sea. This area had been spared significant Danish
settlement and had an Anglian population similar to the one in Lothian
18
across the Tweed. Perhaps as a result of these factors, the structure
of the society of these people was somewhat archaic and rather peculiar.
It is becoming increasingly clear, in particular, that their culture had
a definite resemblance to the cultures of both the Lowland Scots and the
19
Welsh, and some of the details of this social organization will be
discussed later. For the moment, however, it is enough to say that in
this area the demands of lordship were not as extreme as in southern
England and still had something of a public character. The nobility
does not seem to have been numerous, and the peasants were lightly
13
exploited. In fact, Northumberland was so peculiar that it stood out-
side the recognized three-fold division of English law.^°
This last point raises a very important question: In what sense
was Northumberland part of the kingdom? If it really had been regarded
as being part of the kingdom in a normal sense, one would expect to find
scholars speaking of a four-fold law system in Anglo-Saxon England.
This may seem a pedantic point, and it would be if other evidence did
not point in the same direction. Either during or shortly after Earl
Mowbray's rebellion in 1095, Rufus granted some charters to the St.
Albans monks at Tynemouth. In one of these he confirmed all their pos-
sessions and customs In nort de Tyne et in suth de Tyne et in Anglia
("to the north and to the south of the Tyne and in England").^"*" This
phrase draws a clear distinction between "England" and the lands above
the Tees (Northumbria)
.
If the charter is a forgery, this usage would
still be significant. If the phrase is a formula, it represents Anglo-
Saxon conditions. In some sense there was a distinction between
Northumbria and England.
This idea is strikingly confirmed by Domesday Book which literally
stops at the Tees; no part of Northumbria is described in its folios.
This fact has never been adequately explainedo Scholars have suggested
that it was left out either because it was too devastated to be worth
22
anything to the king or because the natives were hostile, but neither
of these explanations will do. Yorkshire was surveyed, yet it had been
devastated very thoroughly. At the time of the survey, Northumberland
had both a Norman earl and bishop who could have given adequate protec-
tion to the judges if such had been necessary. In fact, Domesday
14
confirms in a negative sense the distinction drawn in Rufus's charter:
England and Northuui^erland were different.
The same idea is found in the Dialogue of the Exchequer
. It says
that the counties wiiich belonged to the king "of ancient right" paid
their dues to the king by blanched farm but those acquired "through some
incidental cause" paid by tale. This second group comprised Sussex,
Shropshire, Cumberland, and Northumberland.^^
It would be possible to attempt to explain the difference between
England and Northuicoria by inferences drawn from the supposed purpose of
Domesday or similar types of logic based on the Dialogue of the Exche-
quer
,
but this is tannecessary because there is safer evidence which
requires no long line of sequential reasoning. The difference amounted
to the fact that north of the Tees the king was literally the overlord
and had no direct powers. There is no evidence, for instance, that the
king had any demesme lands in Northumberland prior to the suppression of
the earldom, and before the reign of William the Conqueror, there were
no royal mints or burghs in the area. It was unshired and, as mentioned
earlier, stood outside the recognized bodies of law. No royal writs or
charters survive which relate to Northumberland, and it is clear that
24
the kings did not have the power to make them. Finally, and this is
the crucial point, the king lacked the power of appointment beyond the
Tees until very late. No bishop of Durham was chosen by the king until
Siward was earl; au-d, even after this, the choice seems to have lain
with the earl more than with the king. Twelfth-century Durham tradition
suggests that befoiDE: this the bishop was elected by the clerks of the
25
church. With one possible exception, the earls of Northumberland were
15
also not chosen by the king. From at least 954 they were all members of
one family, the house of Bamburgh; and the family itself probably goes
further back into the tenth century. The house of Bamburgh to all
intents and purposes ruled Northumberland, and it will be suggested later
that they paid no tribute to the king.^^
This is an interesting discovery: Royal power was very limited
above the Tees. In Yorkshire it was somewhat stronger but still weak in
comparison to the South. This situation undoubtedly went back to the
submission of the North to King Eadred in 954; perhaps it was the price
of Danish and Northumbrian submission. If so, the earls of Northumber-
land got a far better deal than the Danes of York. The important fact,
for the purpose of this discussion, is that royal weakness in the North
persisted well into the eleventh century. Politically the North had not
been well-integrated into the rest of the kingdom. It must have been
difficult for the king to exercise control in York, and nearly impos-
sible for him to do so in Northumb ria.
The real question is whether this was politically important. Was
there political expression of the regional identity of the North? Did
the Danish aristocracy of York want out of the kingdom or did the house
of Bamburgh resent the overlordship of the house of Wessex? If neither
of these situations existed, royal weakness in the North only meant that
the kings received less money from the area than they might have and
there was no northern separatism. Actually, the question of Northumber-
land can be dismissed for the moment. Prior to 1016 there is no sign
that the earls were uxihappy with their position within the kingdom.
Northumberland had had a bad time before 954 when it was caught between
16
the Vikings of York, the Scots, and the Cumbrians, and the earls must
have valued royal support.
In Yorkshire things were different. There are some signs that the
inhabitants cherished memories of independence, but unfortunately, there
is no contemporary evidence on this question which is very explicit. A
thirteenth-century chronicle does say that the Yorkshire men disliked
the idea of Athelstan being their king and taking tribute and that in
966 Edgar feared a separatist movement in the North. This chronicle
is not, however, particularly trustworthy, and these statements, found
nowhere else, are doubtful evidence. They are not, on the other hand,
at all inconsistent with certain other things known about Yorkshire
after 954. All of the archbishops of the city after Wulfstan I, in the
mid-tenth century, came from south of the Humber, most of them from the
eastern Danelaw, and this should be understood as an attempt to provide
archbishops able to deal with the Danish inhabitants but unlikely to
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work for local independence. A number of these men also held a south-
ern bishopric in plurality, and this may have been another way to ensure
their loyalty, although the poverty of York could also have been a
30
reason.
This same lack of trust in natives is found with respect to the
earls of Yorkshire, Before 1016, two of the earls, Osulf and Uhtred,
were members of the Bamburgh family; and two others, Oslac and iELfhelm,
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were from south of the Humber. Only Thored may have been a local man,
but it is equally possible that he was Oslac 's son. These appointments
of archbishops and earls indicate that the kings feared giving the York-
shire men local leadership, and there are signs that even outsiders
17
could not necessarily be trusted beyond the Humber. In 975 Earl Oslac
was banished from the kingdom. In ca. 992 Earl Thored disappeared with-
out explanation, and in 1006 Earl /lllfhelra was killed at court and his
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sons blinded. No reasons for any of these events are given in the
Chronicle, but it was certainly a suspicious mortality rate.
The impression that the men of York could not be trusted is
strengthened by certain aspects of the second period of Danish inva-
sions. In particular, the North and the Danish Five Boroughs just to
the south were left almost untouched through thirty-six years of raids.
Furthermore, on the one occasion when the Danes did trouble the North,
the men of York behaved rather suspiciously. In 993 when the Danes
sacked Bamburgh and, after entering the Humber, plundered Lindsey (the
northern part of Lincolnshire) and the East Riding of Yorkshire, the
northerners did raise an army, but it would not fight the Danes. The
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle says that this happened because the leaders of
33
the army fled, and Florence of Worcester adds that they fled "because
34they were Danes on the father's side." Probably Florence was right.
After 993 the Danes did not return to the North until 1013, and this
twenty-year interval oould not have been the result of chance. Swein
must have thought that the inhabitants of the northern Danelaw were
already sympathetic to his cause for otherwise he would have raided them.
He might, of course, have been deceiving himself, but the event proved
otherwise. When he sailed up the Humber and Trent to Gainsborough in
1013, the North immediately subnoitted to him. Uhtred of Northumbria led
the way, and he was followed by the Danes of the Five Boroughs, tliose of
Lindsey, and finally all Danes living north of Watling Street. Sweiu
18
then moved south and only began to harry the countryside after he passed
Watling Street. The men of York had not fought one battle to oppose
himo
It is difficult to be sure how much to make of thiso The submis-
sion of 1013 is not particularly significant; by then the kingdom was
falling apart. Swein's sparing of the northern Danelaw means more, and
it fits quite nicely with the Anglo-Saxon kings' lack of trust in the
Yorkshire men as shown in their appointments to the archbishopric and
earldom. Probably the correct conclusion is that the Danish aristocracy
was separatist, although it is possible that they may have been simply
unreliable against the Danes. At least they do not seem to have
actively aided the invaders.
This second suggestion probably gives the Danes of York too much
credit, however, because Ethelred had strong political support in the
North. Earl Uhtred of Northumbria was loyal to the king until 1013, and
he may have kept the Danes quiet. Indeed, this was probably why Ethelred
had advanced him in the world. Uhtred was the son of Earl Waltheof of
Northumbria of whom nothing is known other than the bare fact of his
existence and that he was an old man by 1006. In that year, Malcolm II,
king of Scots, invaded Northumbria and, after the usual harrying,
besieged the newly founded episcopal city of Durham. This was clearly a
serious situation for the Danes were raiding southern England at the
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time and Ethelred could send no help. Earl Waltheof, who stayed in
Bamburgh, did nothing, and Malcolm may have been well on his way towards
taking the city. At this point, however, Uhtred, who had some interest
the matter, intervened. He had married Bishop Aldhun's daughter andin
19
held, as a result, a nuniber of estates belonging to the church of Durham.
It would seem, in fact, that he was the bishop»s insurance policy, and
the bishop's prudence was rewarded. Uhtred called together an army from
both Northumbria and Yorkshire and defeated the Scots.
The sequel gives some interesting insights into northern culture
and politics. Uhtred was proud of his victory and brought trophies home
with him. The heads of the Scots were cut off, washed and neatly
groomed, and put up on poles around the city walls. The women who had
cleaned the heads were each given a cow for their services. He also
received a reward for his victory. Ethelred was pleased and allowed him
to succeed his father as earl, even though the latter was still alive.
Furthermore, the king also gave Uhtred the earldom of Yorkshire which he
38had just made vacant by killing Earl iElfhelm. Ethelred apparently
felt that Uhtred was more reliable than iElfhelm. Soon after receiving
this honor, Uhtred dismissed his first wife, the daughter of the bishop
of Durham, and married Sige, the daughter of a rich citizen of York,
Styr, son of Ulf. This incident is usually used to show the loose mar-
riage customs of the northerners, but it has a second meaning. By the
marriage, Uhtred was trying to gain local political support south of the
Tees. This is made quite clear by the fact that the bishop of Durham
sent Uhtred' s ex-wife south also and married her to an important York-
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shire thegn. Bishop Aldhun and Uhtred were still working together,
and the object was to make sure that Uhtred could successfully rule
Yorkshire.
He must have been able to do this, although there are no details.
The De Obsessione Dunelmi does say that Uhtred was quite successful in
20
war after becoming earl, but it does not name his enemies. The only
information it does give is a story, somewhat confused in its details,
about how Uhtred refused to desert Ethelred in favor of Swein,^° and
this was apparently true for Ethelred gave Uhtred his ovra daughter,
Elfgiva, in marriage. "^-^ This is a sure sign that the king valued
Uhtred' s support. Little else is known about Uhtred after this except
that in 1013, he submitted to Swein, but by then everyone was going over
to the Danes. When Swein died in 1014, Uhtred did not support his son
Cnut. Rather, he seems to have gone back to Ethelred' s side for the
king's expedition into Lindsey in 1014 would have been very dangerous if
42Uhtred were hostile. Perhaps the earl took part. In any case, he
campaigned with Ethelred' s son, Edmund Ironside, in 1016 in Cheshire and
the surrounding shires. This was Uhtred's only known campaign in direct
support of the royal house, and it is probably significant that it
occurred the year after the two chief Danish thegns of the Seven Bor-
oughs had been killed. Edmund had installed himself in their place,
and this change probably freed Uhtred for operations to the south.
Unfortunately, in the middle of this campaign Cnut moved north and
invaded Yorkshire, and he was too strong for Uhtred to fight: Wessex
had already submitted to him and Earl Eadric was his ally. Uhtred "sub-
mitted then out of necessity," but he was assassinated when he went to
meet Cnut who then made a Norwegian, Eric of Hlathir, earl of York-
shire.
This is the end of the story as it is usually told. The sources
for Cnut's reign in general are bad, and for the North they are almost
nonexistent. There is, however, one curious tale which does come out of
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these years; and, if properly understood, it throws a great deal of
light on both Uhtred's role as earl of York and on Northumberland after
1016. This is, of course, the famous Northumbrian blood feud. In its
baldest form the story goes as follows. Uhtred obtained his second
wife, the daughter of Styr, son of Ulf, at a price: He had to kill
Styr»s enemy Thurbrand. Uhtred, however, was not able to do this,
although he must have tried. At least Thurbrand came to hate Uhtred and
killed him when the earl arrived to submit to Cnut in 1016. Eadulf
Cudel, Uhtred's brother, then became earl of Northumberland and ruled
for a short time^ He was followed by Earl Ealdred, Uhtred's son by
Bishop Aldhun's daughter. Ealdred avenged his father's death by killing
Thurbrand, but he was later killed in a particularly underhanded fashion
by Thurbrand's son Carl. The two had made peace and promised to go to
Rome together, but when their departure was delayed by a storm, Carl
took Ealdred to his hall and, after entertaining him, killed the North-
umbrian earl in the woods. This criiae was not avenged by Ealdred 's half
brother Eadulf, who next became earl of Northumberland, apparently
because he was killed in 1041 by Siward, and justice waited until the
1070 's when Siward 's son Waltheof, grandson of Earl Ealdred through his
mother, had his soldiers kill most of Carl's sons and grandsons who were
assembled for a banquet near York.*^^
All this is very curious even as it stands, and few historians have
been able to omit the story from their accounts of the North. Usually
it is employed to show the barbarity of the Northumbrians, but it actu-
ally has a significance beyond this point. The story was not written
down until around 1100, by which time its general meaning had been
forgotten and only the memory of the major events remained/^ its
details, however, suggest that the original events were not a straight-
forward blood feud at all, and Thurbrand is the starting point of this
interpretation. On the face of the matter, he is a suspicious figure
because, in addition to being a rich and powerful Dane who lived in
York, he bore the title of "hold." in northern law the Danish equivalent
of a king's high-reeve, and this point raises the possibility that he
was the leader of the Danes of York. Thurbrand is also said to have
been the enemy of Styr, son of Ulf, a rich citizen of York,"^^ and
although it has been generally assumed that this was some personal
rivalry, such was not the case. A source, distinct from the blood feud
sources, records Styr's gift of some land to Bishop Aldhun, and the
details of this transaction clarify what was actually happening. Styr
made the grant when Ethelred was in York. Part of the land had belonged
to Styr, and he gave it to Durham with the king's permission. The rest
Styr purchased. In the course of the transfer Styr is described as
unius de melioribus suis (i.e. of Ethelred)
. He was, then, an
important supporter of the king; this turns things around. When Uhtred
married Styr's daughter, he was not simply trying to gain political sup-
port in Yorkshire; rather, he was allying with Styr, another supporter
of Ethelred, against Thurbrand. This was the meaning of Uhtred 's prom-
ise to kill Thurbrand, and the probability is that Thurbrand was the
local Danish leader in York. Moreover, Styr's "gift" of land to Aldhun
supports the idea that Aldhun was working with Uhtred„ The Northumbrian
"blood feud" actually had its origin in Uhtred's attempt to control the
Danes of Yorkshire who were sympathic to Swein and Cnut.
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Uhtred's death proves the point. The fullest account of this i
the Be Obsessione
_Dunelmi. It says that Uhtred was ambushed by Thurbrand
as he was on his way to make peace with Cnut, but the details of the
story give the event a different appearance. For the deed, Thurbrand
used some of Cnut's soldiers whom he hid behind a curtain in the hall
which must have been the meeting place between Cnut and Uhtred. Upon
Uhtred's entry, the soldiers jumped out and killed him."^^ Thi
than a personal feud. The use of Cnut's soldiers implies his consent
does the fact that the killing was done literally under Cnut's nose with
no ill effects for Thurbrand-despite the fact that Cnut had given
Uhtred a safe-conduct. Furthermore, the De Primo Saxonum AdvPn^n says
the killing was done per voluntatem Cnutonis re^i...^^ Cnut clearly was
as responsible for the killing as Thurbrand. Finally, the idea that
this was a feud is reduced to absurdity by the fact that Uhtred was not
the only man killed that day: Forty important Northumbrians who had
come with him were slaughtered. The incident was, in fact, an attempt
by the Danes of York and Cnut to destroy Ethelred's main political and
military support in the North by annihilating the nobility of Northumber-
land. The implications of this are clear. The Anglo-Saxon kings had
not mistrusted the Danes of York without reason. They could not be
trusted in the face of a Danish invasion and were probably a center of
plots and intrigues in peaceful times. In this sense northern separatism
existed by 1016. What this reconstruction shows with equal clarity is
that until 1016 the earls of Northumberland were loyal to the kings
despite the small power which the kings had above the Tees. They were
not separatist, and this Is not surprising given the enemies they faced
on all sides.
The next n^jor problem- is to detennine what happened in the North
between 1016 and 1041. It is not even clear who was earl of York for
part of this period. In 1016 Cnut appointed one of his generals. Eric
of Hlathir, earl; but his last genuine signature as dux is found in
1023. There is then a ten-year interval between this date and 1033 when
Earl Siward first witnesses a charter, and it is not known who was earl
between these dates in York.^^ Northmnberland the situation is about
as unclear, despite the fact that the names of the earls are known.
After Uhtred was killed, his brother Eadulf Cudel became earl. He lived
only a short time and was followed in turn by Ealdred and Eadulf. sons
of Uhtred. These earls supposedly ruled in subordination to the York-
shire earIs, but what little is known about them makes this idea ques-
tionable,
Eadulf Cudel, the first earl, is said to have been lazy and timid,
but this is probably a monk's reconstruction of his character based on
his only known act, the cession of Lothian. After becoming earl he is
said to have given Lothian to the Scots because he feared that they
would take revenge on him for Uhtred 's victory over them. In return for
Lothian, Eadulf received a "firm peace" with the Scots. The meaning
of this story is far from clear for two reasons. First, King Edgar sup-
posedly had already given Lothian to King Kenneth of Scotland in cao973,
and second, in 1018 Malcolm II again invaded the North and annihilated a
Northumbrian army drawn from between the Tees and the Tweed at Carham, a
ford over the Tweed. Since the account of Edgar's cession of Lothian
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s ces-
has been generally accepted,^^ and since the accounts of Eadulf
'
sion of Lothian and the battle of Carha. deserve quite as much credence
as it, the problem is to fit the stories together without arbitrarily
dismissing one or more of them. One way of doing this is to assume that
Uhtred recovered part of Lothian after defeating Malcolm II in 1006 and
that Eadulf Cudel ceded this land to the Scots. M. 0. Anderson, who sug
gested this solution, which is quite possible, also believed that Eadulf
had gone over to the Scots and that this was the reason he gave up the
land, but there is no evidence to support this idea. In fact, there
was a tradition in Durham in the early twelfth century that a North-
umbrian earl had led the defeated northern army at Carham,^^ and this
suggests the less elaborate idea that it was Eadulf who lost the battle
of Carham and, after the defeat, "ceded" Lothian to the Scots. Presum-
ably, the land which he gave up was either some part of Lothian recov-
ered by his brother or a section of the province (perhaps Tweeddale)
which the Scots had not obtained in 973.
Earl Eadulf gave up some land to the Scots because they had beaten
him badly. This solution is probably correct as far as it goes, but the
incident still raises questions. Why should the earl have been particu-
larly fearful after his defeat? He ought to have been able to expect
royal help in this circumstance, but it is known that Cnut did not make
a countermove in the North for at least nine years. Why did he delay?
In any case, how could Eadulf give up land without the king's agreement?
Finally, why was there no contingent from Yorkshire at the battle of
Carham? It was foolish for the men of Northumberland alone to fight the
Scots if they could avoid it.
27
These are serious questions. Their innnediate implication is that
some important aspects of the northern political situation after 1016
are still hidden, and this impression is strengthened by the next known
incident. After Eadulf Cudel's death, his nephew Ealdred became earl.
He killed Thurbrand, his father's killer, and was killed in turn by
Carl, Thurbrand's son, in 1038. This is the blood feud story again. It
was shown earlier that the origins of this affair lay in the contest
between Thurbrand and Uhtred for control of Yorkshire, and the question
now is whether these killings (the second and third) represent a blood
feud or whether the original contest continued under Carl and Ealdred.
Again the details of the story combined with outside evidence show
that the latter was the case. This is initially suggested by the fact
that the slaughter should have ended with Ealdred' s killing of Thurbrand
He had taken an eye for an eye and ought to have been content; the same
should have been true of Carlo This was emphatically not the case for
the level of murderous activity increasedo Not only did Carl attempt to
kill Ealdred, but Ealdred tried to kill Carl. The conflict is described
in terms which sound like guerilla war. They plotted against each
other, harassed each other with tricks, and lay in ambush for each
61
other. This apparently went on for quite some time until Carl suc-
ceeded through the stratagem mentioned earlier. Eadulf, Ealdred 's half
brother, then became earl.
It might be objected, of course, that Northerners took their feuds
very seriously and that this explains both the continuation of the kill-
ings and the intensity of the attempts, but such an objection could not
be sustained. For this incident to be regarded as normal in northern
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society, one would need to cite other exainples of the same sort of
thing, and other examples do not exist. Furthermore, it is clear that
Carl's true identity had been forgotten by the time the story was writ-
ten down. As mentioned earlier, there is a ten-year gap between Earl
Eric, who last witnessed a charter in 1023, and Earl Siward.^^ It hap-
pens, however, that a certain Karl minister began to witness in 1024,
the very next year after Eric's disappearance, and continued to witness
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until 1045. This man was undoubtedly identical with the Carl who
fought Ealdred, and he was Cnut's earl or sheriff of York until Siward
superseded him in 1033. After that, he seems to have occupied a subor-
dinate position for he continued to witness charters—almost always in
the company of Siward-until 1045. The fact that he is not named in the
Northumbrian earl-lists is not significant. They do not deign to mention
any earl of York between Oslac and Siward. If this identification is
accepted, the "feud" between Ealdred and Carl becomes a feud between the
earl of Northumberland and the earl of York. One wonders what Cnut
would have thought.
Actually, once charter evidence is brought into the discussion the
whole problem vanishes. Carl probably was earl of York. The most inter-
esting thing however, is that Eadulf Cudel, Ealdred, and Eadulf did not
witness royal charters. None of them signed as earl or anything else.
It may be objected that not enough charters survive for this to be valid;
but this is groundless. The earls of York as well as Carl witnessed a
substantial number of charters during this period, and the immediate
predecessors of Eadulf Cudel witnessed surviving charters. Earl Waltheof
witnessed one, and Uhtred witnessed five despite the Danish invasions.
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come to
The only explanation for this is that these three earls did not
court; if they did not come to court, they were in revolt. The plotting
and ambushing between Carl and Ealdred was a minor war between Cnufs
representative in the North and the earls of Northumberland. There was
no northern blood feud.
This conclusion greatly clarifies the history of the North after
1016. By this date there was probably already hostility between the
Northumbrians and the northern Danes, and the murder of Uhtred and the
nobles of Northumberland plus the prospect of a Danish monarchy produced
a revolt beyond the Tees. The term revolt, however, must be used with
caution. Uhtred»s successors probably refused to make a formal submis-
sion to Cnut and, given the tenuous bond between Northumberland and the
king, the earls may not have viewed their action as a revolt at all. In
the long run, of course, this was a hopeless policy because Northumber-
land could not stand alone.
On the one hand, they faced the hostility of Carl. On the other,
they had to withstand the Scots who were all too ready to take advantage
of the situation. When Malcolm II invaded in 1018, Eadulf Cudel had to
fight him without support from the South and lost badly. Because of the
revolt, Eadulf could expect no avenging expedition and had to give up
"Lothian," He may even have made some submission to Malcolm—but there
is no proof of this.^^ The defeat at Carham also put the clerks of St.
Cuthbert (of Durham) in a difficult position. Bishop Aldhun died of
shock after learning of the slaughter, and the clerks were unable to
elect a successor for over two years. The traditional explanation for
this is that none of them wished to become a monk, a requirement for
was
is con-
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being bishop of Durha..67 f,,,^ ^.^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^
whether Carl or the earl of Northumberland was more dangerous. In the
end they chose a man from outside their circle, an obscure priest named
Edmund who could take the blame for the false moves which appeared inev-
itable while the clerks rode out the storm.^^ ^^^.^^ ^.^^^^
forced on him, and he was sent south to get Cnut's approval for h
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secration. He was the first bishop of Durham known to have sought
royal approval.
Edmund proved to be a good bishop, but the clerks' fears had not
been imaginary. After Eadulf Cudel's death, Ealdred and Carl fought for
some years. Probably Carl made occasional forays into Northumberland,
and Ealdred hid in the hills until he went home. This lasted until an
unspecified date when the two became "sworn brothers, supposedly at
the urging of friends. Swearing brotherhood, it should be pointed out,
was the northern equivalent of a peace treaty. The most likely explana-
tion for this reconciliation was Cnut's northern expedition. This is a
shadowy affair, but at some time between ca. 1027 and ca. 1031, the king
came north and received the submission of Malcolm II and two northern
sub-kings.^"'' No one is likely to have been eager to fight Cnut at this
time, and Ealdred probably also submitted to him and became Carl's sworn
brother. While the king was in the North, he gave Edmund some land;^^
he would hardly have done so if Ealdred was still in revolt. There was
then a period in the 1030 's when Ealdred acknowledged Cnut's overlord-
ship. It ended in 1038 with Carl's murder of the earl.
His brother Eadulf then became earl and went back into revolt. The
immediate results of this were similar to those faced by Eadulf Cudel in
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1018: The Scots took advantage of the weakness of the earl, m 1040
(?) King Duncan invaded the North, and this time the Northun^rians did
not try to meet him in the field. The Battle of Carham was not to be
repeated. They probably retreated to their fortified places, church-
yards, and into the hills. Duncan moved south and besieged Durham, but
he was defeated by the Northumbrians who had taken refuge in the city
and fled losing many men.^^ Eadulf probably had directed the defense of
Durham, and after this success he was "exalted with pride" and ravaged
the land of the Galwegians who had undoubtedly taken part in Duncan's
expedition. Still, his pride notwithstanding, he must have been aware
of the weakness of his position because he opened some sort of negotia-
tions with Hardacnut, the English king, and went south to see him in
1041 under the king»s safe-conduct. Unfortunately for Eadulf, however,
Hardacnut's promise was no better than Cnut's had been for Uhtred. The
king betrayed Eadulf, and he was killed by Siward, the earl of York.'^^
Thus died the last earl of the house of Bamburgh through the male line-
betrayed by a Dane and killed by a Dane in circumstances remarkably sim-
ilar to those in which his brother and father had died.
The family itself was not extinct for there was one more son of
Earl Uhtred alive, Cospatric, and he may have proclaimed himself earl,
although the northern earl-lists say that he did not. They assert that
upon the murder of Eadulf, Siward became earl of all of Northumbria from
the Humber to the Tweed, thus adding Northumberland to Yorkshire.
A
hitherto ignored source, however, shows that Siward 's acquisition of the
land between the Tees and Tweed was not that simple or immediate. The
defiance of the Northumbrians continued for another year or two, probably
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under Cospatric's leadership. The murder of Eadulf was no more effec-
tive in reducing Northumberland than had been the murders of Uhtred and
Ealdred. Finally in 1042 or 1043, Siward had to invade Northumberland
and waste the countryside to gain control of the province. This
worked, and Cospatric probably fled to Scotland.
The conclusions to be drawn from this reconstruction of northern
history up to 1043 are startling. It is clear that it is a mistake to
assume that the North was in any sense united by this date or to talk of
some generalized northern "separatism." Separatism there certainly was,
but its content varied between Yorkshire and Northumberland. Its seri-
ousness depended upon who was king and who, if anybody, was invading the
kingdom. Ultimately these political feelings probably went back to cul-
tural differences and past political experience. The men from above the
Tees certainly hated and feared the Danes, and they had good reason to
feel this way. The Yorkshire Danes, for their part, had not been loyal
to the West Saxon kings during the invasions of Swein and Cnut. They
had only been kept within the kingdom by Earl Uhtred. There was a Danish
separatism which was important—at least when Danes were invading.
Finally, at the beginning of Edward the Confessor's reign, Northumber-
land was a conquered province. This cannot be explained away. The
Northumbrians had gone into revolt when Uhtred was killed. Two more of
their earls had been killed by Danes, and they had only been brought back
within the kingdom by conquest. Separatism above the Tees existed by
1043, and it is very doubtful if the accession of Edward did anything to
quiet it. He may have been a member of the royal house of Wessex, but
Slward was their aarl. He undoubtedly loo^d larger, and he was a con-
quering Dane.
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CHAPTER II
EARL SIWARD AM) THE SCOTS
Earl Siward was the last great earl of the North before the debacle
of the 1060's, and there is consequently a strong temptation to picture
him as a primitive monolith which stood for the traditional order of gov-
ernment above the Humber. But such a treatment of the earl would be
false for Siward cannot be used as a general symbol for the old politi-
cal arrangements of northern England. He was in reality originally an
outsider, and the years of his power brought no real solution to the
problems of the North. At best, in fact, he only kept his earldom quiet
while in some ways he created new difficulties.
This was the case because Siward was hardly an ideal earl from the
English king's point of view. There is, of course, no direct evidence
which discloses what Edward the Confessor thought about northern prob-
lems in the 1040's, but the following reconstruction seems to be in
accord with the facts. At the beginning of Edward's reign, the politi-
cal and military situation in the North could not have appeared promis-
ing. The history of the region before 1042 had shown that three basic
problems existed. The most serious of these was the fact that the Danish
section of the population of Yorkshire was not loyal to Ethelred, and it
was doubtful if Edward could expect any greater devotion from them should
the kingdom be threatened by renewed Danish invasions. In Ethelred 's
days, these Danes had only been kept in check by the power of Uhtred,
earl of Northumbria and York, but Edward could expect no such support
for Northumbria was a conquered and hostile province in 1042. The king
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could not balance Danes with Northumbrians and loyal elements within
Yorkshire. Thurbrand, Carl, and Siward had made this impossible.
Finally, the Scots were becoming a serious threat to the peace and pros-
perity of northern England. They had invaded three times since 1000.
On each occasion they had been able to take advantage of English dis-
traction which stemmed from either the Danish invasions or the rebellion
of the Northumbrian earls. The ultimate aim of these incursions was the
annexation of Northumbrian lands, and this hope was not beyond possible
fulfillment.
Viewed in this context, Siward was something of an embarrassment to
the king. He was a Danish parvenu similar to Earl Godwin of Wessex and
had risen to power under Cnut and his sons. Siward had become earl of
Yorkshire in ca. 1033 and had added Northumberland to his earldom by
conquest in ca. 1042. When Edward became king in 1042, Siward, along
with the other great earls, was one of the political realities which the
king had to accept. It was beyond the king»s power to remove him, even
if such a course of action seemed desirable, and on the level of high
politics, it probably did noto If Siward could have been dispossessed,
his fall would only have increased the power of the other earls, a most
undesirable result. The difficulty with keeping the northern earl, how-
ever, was that there was only a partial correspondence between his self-
interest and that of the king. He was both an ambitious new nan and a
Dane who was mainly interested in maintaining his own position. Being
Danish and a holdover from Cnut's reign, he was undoubtedly popular in
York and perhaps found it easier to govern that shire than had most of
his predecessors. This might seem to be to his credit except that this
aptness itself raised a question: How would Siward react if a Danish
fleet sailed up the Humber? Such an occurrence was not at all impos-
sible, and it is hard to see any reason for believing that Siward would
have been loyal to Edward in this circumstance. Furthermore, a wise
counselor could have pointed out to the king that it would be prudent t
give the Northumbrians an earl from their native house and thus reestab
lish the traditional relationship with the province, but this was impos
sible. Siward could not be deprived of a major portion of his earldom.
The only point, in fact, at which there was any real correspondence
between the king's interest and the earl's was on the Scottish problem.
Siward was determined to keep the Scots out of his earldom and devoted a
sustained effort to this end.
Given these factors, it should not be surprising that Siward made
no significant contribution to solvin- the major internal political
problems of the North. Probably they were beyond solution in any case,
and there were some advantages in the situation from the standpoint of
court politics—provided there were no Viking attacks. Siward 's unpopu-
larity above the Tees meant that the earl was not as powerful as the
extent of his lands suggested and that one of his main concerns was to
keep Northumbria quiet. This limited his freedom of action and was the
reason he was not too deeply involved in southern politics. It was not,
as has been suggested, that he was "uninterested" in southern affairs.'''
Siward faced serious problems in the North and, as a result, was usually
loyal to the king.
Put in terms of policy, the requirements for governing the North
must have been clear. Siward had to keep watch on the Danes of York,
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-ke sure that the Northu^rian rebellion did not flare-up again, and
thwart Scottish raids. To accon^lish these tasks, it was necessary- that
he be strong. This meant in concrete tem^s that Siward had to be rich
enough to xaaintain a large band of professional warriors (housecarls) ,2
and apparently the resources of the earldom were not sufficient for this
because the king gave him extra lands in the South. Siward held North-
amptonshire from (probably) the early 1040's, and he acquired the neigh-
boring shire of Huntingdon in the early 1050's.^ Although the posses-
sion of this Midland earldom may have been intended in part to insure the
earl»s loyalty, the additional revenues which these shires yielded
allowed him successfully to dominate the North. How close and how obvi-
ous to the northerners this relationship was will be seen later.
Fortified with a private army which may have contained as many as
two to three hundred housecarls, Siward governed his earldom success-
4fully. In Yorkshire the nobility was presumably receptive to his rule.
In Northumbria he may have had more difficulties, but there he made an
attempt to appease local feelings by marrying iElfleda, a daughter of
Earl Ealdred.^ The latter, who had been Uhtred's eldest son, had him-
self only begotten daughters, and since Northumbrian women could inherit
land, it is nearly certain that by his marriage Siward acquired part of
6the lands of her family. More than this, he also probably obtained
some legitimacy as earl in the eyes of the Northumbrians, although there
is a possibility that the Northumbrian earls followed the Scottish rule
of succession by which brother succeeded brother.^ If this was the
case, Cospatric, Uhtred's youngest son, would have had a better claim to
be earl than Siward.
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may
It is even possible that Slward's attests to reconcile the North-
u^rians went so far as to concede to Cospatrlc a subordinate position
m the government of the earldom for evidence certainly exists that the
latter was important In local affairs, perhaps before 1056; and he
have worked In conjunction with Slward. This question will be dis-
cussed later; but whatever the truth, Slward clearly did attempt to ally
himself with the native house of Ba*urgh. He had by^lfleda, who was
evidently his second wife, a son whom he named Waltheof In honor of the
boy's maternal great-grandfather, and some fifty years later there was a
tradition at Durham that Slward had given to Waltheof, presumably as a
child, the earldoM of Northumbria with the boundaries which it had had
m Ealdred's day.^ If this story Is true, Slward may have Intended that
his eldest son, Osbeorn. should become earl of York which Ealdred had
not controlled, and this would amount to a tacit admission that it was
proper for a Dane to rule York and a Northumbrian to rule Northumbria.
The division never seems to have occurred, but it is Indisputable that
Waltheof thought he was a member of the house of Bamburgh by the time he
Q
reached maturity.
The success of Siward's attempts to identify himself with the Bam-
burgh family is difficult to establish. He faced only shadowy opposi-
tion in Northumbria, but this can be explained as easily on the basis of
his military strength as on the basis of his marriage. From 900 years
after the event, his marriage seems prudent; to Northumbrians at the
time, on the other hand, it may have appeared the brash move of a
parvenu bent on acquiring a local name.
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The sensibiUties of the Northu^rian nobles are unfortunately lost
beyond recall, but in another area it is quite clear that Siward's
actions struck the natives as being highhanded and aroused resentment.
He offended the nxost powerful body of .en in the North, the clerks of
St. Cuthbert, and their feelings are part of the historical record.
These clerks constituted a privileged corporation which tended to con-
trol the bishopric of Durham in most respects. They elected the bishop,
who was usually one of their number, and carried out the more important
functions of the cathedral church. Being also essentially secular can-
ons who held property and married, they occupied a unique position in
Northumbrian society which insured their inordinate prestige. Some of
these clerks were known descendants of the original porters of the holy
body of St. Cuthbert. This uncorrupted corpse was the most precious
relic in the North and the most powerful talisman between the Humber and
the Orkneys. During the original Danish invasions, these porters had
cared for the body after the destruction of Lindisfarne and had trekked
all over the North with it before finally reestablishing the bishopric
at Chester-le-Street.-"-^ The clerks were thus not only rich and power-
ful; they were also a direct link with the pre-Viking past of the North.
Siward offended these men in two ways. First, he appropriated some
of their lands. Earlier in the century Bishop Aldhun had given Uhtred
several of the church's villages when the latter had married his daugh-
ter. After becoming earl, Siward claimed these villages in the name of
1 ohis wife who was an offspring of this marriage. The clerks were angry
over this act, but there was little they could do to oppose it. Other
northern earls had taken church lands o What was far more serious was
that Siward and Edward threatened the ancient privileges of the clerics
theo^elves. Hitherto they had elected their bishop who traditionally
had been either one of their number or at least a northern cleric, but
this changed in 1042. In that year Bishop Edmund went south to visit
King Hardacnut at Gloucester. The reason for the visit was not recorded
although it was probably connected with Siward's recent conquest of
Northumbria. The Durham church is unlikely to have come through the
complicated politics of the years after 1018 uncompromised; and, no
doubt, Edmund needed to explain some of his past actions. During the
early eleventh century, however, it had become risky for important
Northumbrians to go south, and this turned out to be true again for
Edmund died while visiting the king.^^ The sources do not suggest any
foul play, but certainly Bishop Edmund»s death was exceedingly conve-
nient for Hardacnut and Siward in that it opened the way to the estab-
lishment of royal control over the bishopric of Durham. The clerks may
have gone through the usual election process to choose a new bishop, but
the sources do not explicitly say this. Rather, they report that Eadred,
the principal clerk, bought the bishopric from the king with the church's
money, and apparently ^^ts was an innovation. '"^ The first step in the
clerks* downfall had been Edmund's trip south in 1020-21 to seek Cnut's
approval for his consecration. This was the second step: The clerks
now had to pay for the privilege of electing their bishop.
The end followed quickly
—
perhaps suspiciously soon. Eadred sick-
ened after purchasing the bishopric and died within ten months. """^ This
time the clerks did not select his successor. It is possible that they
lacked the money to buy the freedom to elect a second bishop after such
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a short interval. In any case. King Edward and Siward used the opportu-
nity Of Eadred's death to control the selection of his successor and to
install Durham's first non-northern bishop, m 1020-21, Bishop Ed.und
had brought north so.e
.onks fro. Peterborough to instruct hi. in the
monastic vows which he had taken to beco.e bishop, and^thelric, the new
bishop, was one of these monks. One source says explicitly that Edward
appointed him bishop.^^ m a way it was a reasonable choice since
^thelric had lived at Durham for twenty years and was familiar with
northern customs and men. But on the other hand, the method of his ele-
vation was bound to arouse resentment.
Indeed, his appointment was a frontal attack on the privileges and
freedom of the clerks, and they viewed it as such. They despised him
both for being an outsider and for having been elected against their
will, and^thelric in turn made the situation worse by extending the
"
attack on the clerks' powers. He directly reduced their administrative
role by granting the most powerful position in the church government
after his own to his brother ^thelwine, who had also been a monk at
Peterborough and had come to Durham during Edmund's episcopate. Not
surprisingly these innovations were too much for the clerks to bear, and
in 1045 or 1046 they rebelled against ^thelric and drove him out of Dur-
ham. But this did not restore their freedom for long because the bishop
sought out Siward and obtained his support against the clerks. The earl
then forced the latter to take back the bishop, a reconciliation not
accomplished through negotiations and compromise. Instead, the clerks
yielded only through fear of Siward's power, and iEthelric remained their
18bishop until after Siward's death. To this extent the policy had been
successful, but its vasdo» U debatable. Fro. this tl.e on. si„ard cer-
tainly could count on the support of the bishop 1„ governing Northu^rla,
and this must have been his main concern. Yet the clerks were unrecon-
ciled to their loss of power and their do^naticn by southern „onks; and
Slward, who was responsible for this situation, must have been very
unpopular at Durham. Furthermore, he had left the clerks with their
local prestige undiminished, and this was a dangerous oversight because
they were destined to use it to overturn his successor who continued
Siward*s church policy.
While Siward lived, however, his control over both the church of
Durham and the house of Bamburgh remained firm, and this left him free
to deal with the threat posed by the Scots to the North. In fact, this
was probably his major concern, and to understand this aspect of his
rule, it must be realized that the necessity of keeping the Scots out of
Northumbria was not a traditional problem of northern government.
Rather, the threat from the Scots had greatly increased during the first
three and one-half decades of the eleventh century as the result of a
basic shift in northern power relationships which was one of the funda-
mental steps in the formation of the Anglo-Scottish border.
Siward was confronted by a novel and dangerous situation. For per-
haps one hundred and twenty years, the main threat to the North had lain
in the West. Throughout the tenth century the lands between the Huraber
and the Forth had had a dangerous western border which had come into
being early in the tenth century with the expansion of the British king-
dom of Strathclyde or Cumbria. This development has been traditionally
either ignored or not dealt with as part of the general history of
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northern Britain even though Its general outlines, at least, are fairly
clear. Around the year 900 the Cumbrians (as they called the^elves)
began to expand out of Clydesdale toward the south. They crossed the
southern Highlands of Scotland and took control of the Galweglan coastal
plain on both sides of the Solway Firth and the Vale of Eden. At its
height, their kingdom apparently reached from the head of Loch Lomond at
least to the Rere Cross of Stalnmore In the North Riding of Yorkshire/'
and there is some evidence that it may have stretched as far south as
20the Mersey. Thus there suddenly appeared a western kingdom in north-
em Britain which comprised all of the west coast plain and a large por-
tion of the uplands. The established political powers which were
located on the east coast plain, the Danes of York, the house of Bam-
burgh. and the Scots, would probably have found this development suffi-
ciently bothersome since there is no reason to believe that the Cum-
brians were any better neighbors than their southern cousins the Welsh;
but in fact, the expansion of the Cumbrians represented only the initial
disintegration of society on the west coast plain for during this same
period Norwegian Vikings from Ireland began to settle along the eastern
shores of the Irish Sea from Galloway as far south as the Wirral Penin-
sula below the Mersey. The results of this invasion on the Cumbrians
as a people and on their kingdom itself are exceedingly obscure. The
Norwegians had been subject to Irish influence before settling in Britain
and ultimately merged with the native Britons to produce the people
known in the twelfth century as the Galwegians. It is clear, never-
theless, that the kingdom of the Cumbrians survived the influx of Vikings
to soEie extent and that the Cumbrians continued to maintain a line of
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kings of their own who are intermittently recorded down to 1018.
although we cannot be sure how real their power was. What is certain is
that the Norwegians of the Irish Sea region freely used the Tyne Gap,
the Vale of Eden-Stainmore route, and the Wirral Peninsula-all theoret-
ically within Cumbria except perhaps the latter-as passages by which to
plunder the Northumbrians, the Danes of York, and the English Midlands.
Ultin^tely they were even able to overwhelm the Danish kingdom of York
and set up their own state there.
The significance of these developments in the present context is
that the incursions from the West became so serious that it was neces-
sary f.or any ruler wishing to control the North's eastern plain to domi-
nate the invasion routes through Cumbria which these marauders used, and
one of the ways of doing this was to obtain the alliance or submission
of the Cumbrian kings themselves. Their cooperation was useful against
the Irish Sea Vikings, although it is unclear whether this was because
they had enough power partially to control the movement of the Vikings
through their kingdom or whether it was simply desirable that they not
come raiding through the hills in alliance with the Vikings. Be this as
it may, the direct rel?Monship between security in the East, on the one
hand, and the control of the invasion routes from the West coupled with
the submission of the Cumbrian kings, on the other, is clear in tenth-
century Anglo-Saxon sources. When the Norwegian incursions first
assumed serious proportions in the early tenth century, the powers of
the Morth tried to meet the threat by banding together. ^Ethelflaed of
Mercia allied with the Cumbrians and the Scots against these new Vik-
ings, and even the Danes of York sought her protection. In addition to
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dresses at
aiding these allies actively, ^thelflaed also built forti
Chester. Eddisbury, and Runcorn to protect her northwestern frontier,
and after King Edward took direct control of Mercia in 918, he followed
a similar policy. He built a nu.ber of boroughs in Cheshire and Derby,
including the ones at Manchester, Bakewell, and Thelwell, fortresses
which seem clearly designed to secure the invasion routes from the Irish
Sea littoral into the Midlands and to dominate the southern routes east
into Yorkshire, and he also attempted to gain the same ends by diplo-
matic activity. After he had built Bakewell in 920, the king of the
Strathclyde Welsh (the Cumbrians), the king of Scots, and the rulers of
York and Bamburgh all came to him and "chose him as father and lord."^^
Presumably this meant that they would cooperate in maintaining the peace
of the North and deny passage through their lands to the Irish Sea
Vikings
.
The same sequence of events was repeated under Athelstan during the
920's and 930's. After he took control of the Viking kingdom of York in
927, he moved immediately to secure the western borders of his new prov-
ince by crossing the Pennines. Athelstan met the kings of the North at
"Eamont" in the Vale of Eden, which apparently marked the eastern border
of the Cumbrian kingdom, and there the kings of the Cumbrians, the Welsh,
and the Scots plus the rulers of Bamburgh made peace with him.^^ This
agreement did not last for long, however; and in 934 Athelstan invaded
Scotland. On this occasion, the chronicles concentrate their attention
on his war against Constantine, the Scottish king, but it is clear that
this expedition also included operations against the Cumbrians because
in the same year Athelstan purchased Amounderness , a large section of
Lancashire above the Ribble, fro. the Vi.ings and gave it to the arch-
bishop of York. 26 A^ounderness doMnated the western end of the Aire
Gap, the easiest passage between the Irish Sea and York, and control of
this route was necessary for the defense of York. Later, when the
ascendancy in the North which Athelstan won by the campaign of 934 and
his victory at Brunanburh in 937 ended with his death, his successor
Edmund had to retrace the latter's steps, and his attempt to do so pro-
vides perhaps the clearest example of the importance of pacifying the
West. In 944 Edmund came north and drove out the Norwegian kings of
York. Then in the next year he crossed the Pennines into Cumbria, rav-
aged the countryside, and gave the kingdom of the Cumbrians to Malcolm,
the king of Scots, on the condition that the latter be his ally.^^ This
ambitious attempt to solve the problem of the North's western border
unfortunately seems to have led to no permanent results for there is no
evidence that Malcolm's control over Cumbria was anything more than nom-
inal, and the native line of Cumbrian kings was in power again within a
28generation. Indeed, well before that in 954 Eric Bloodaxe, the last
Norwegian king of York, was killed in battle on the heights of Stain-
more, the gateway to Yrt-k from the head of the Vale of Eden, and
although the account of this event does not disclose whether Eric was
retreating or trying to regain his lost kingdom, neither possibility sug-
gests that there was much reality in Scottish control over Cumbria.
After this date, the power of the Vikings of the Irish Sea littoral
began to decline. This was a slow process, however, which lasted into
the twelfth century, and incidents still continued to occur which show
that the western border had not yet lost all its threat. In 966, for
instance, a Yorlcshire noble ravaged Westmorland, undoubtedly In response
to raids over Stain.ore,30 3ix years later Kenneth II harried C^-
bria all the way to its southern border. The sequel shows that the
mechanics of the western border had not changed. Kenneth's expedition
presumably gave hi. some control over the northern end of the western
frontier; and, probably as a result. King Edgar "granted" hi. Lothian a
year later.^^ ^^.^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^
order to hold the eastern plain. In fact, another incident which
occurred in 973 confirms this fact. During the summer King Edgar
brought his navy north to Chester where he received the submissions of
six northern kings including the Cumbrian monarch,^^ and it should also
be noted that even at this date Edgar may have been on the border of Cum-
bria when in Chester. The Scottish chronicle which describes Kenneth's
invasion of the year before says that he ravaged Cumbria all the way to
the Dee, the river upon which Chester stands, and if this statement is
correct, Cumbria still included Lancashire. Finally, in the year 1000
King Ethelred harried Cumbria while his fleet wasted the Isle of Man.
Given the threat from the Danes which Ethelred faced, this expedition is
again proof that the western Vikings were still dangerous and had been
raiding the North. Moreover, it may also be significant that the earli-
est indication that the English held southern Lancashire comes from the
will of Wulfric Spot which dates from 1002-1004, at most four years
later than Ethelred' s invasion of Cumbria. "^^
The existence of this dangerous western border was a crucial ele-
ment in the relations between the Scots and the English during most of
the tenth century because the Scots were themselves threatened by the
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Cumbrian kings and the western Vikings. Even as late as 971, fo,
pie, Kenneth II's predecessor was killed by the Cumbrians, aid Kenneth's
invasion of their kingdom was apparently launched in revenge.^^ The
corollary of this threat was that throughout most of the tenth century,
Anglo-Scottish, or at least Northumbrian-Scottish relations, were usu-
ally good. The only exception to this is the reign of Constantine II
(903-43) who certainly invaded the North once in alliance with the Vik-
ings, and perhaps three times. But even his credentials as a militant
opponent of "Englishmen" are diminished by the fact that during the
910's he had defended the Northumbrians against the Irish Sea Vikings
and submitted to Edward. The usual relationship was in fact one of
friendship. The submissions of the Scottish kings to Edward, Athelstan,
Edmund, and Edgar were essentially alliances against the extension of
Viking power through the "kingdom" of Cumbria or against the Cumbrians
"
38themselves. There were no invasions of the North by the Scottish
kings after Constantine* s death, nor were there Anglo-Saxon expeditions
into Scotland.
This situation changed radically after 1000 for between this date
and the 1060 's most of the elements which were to characterize the
northern border during the High Middle Ages came into being. The first
sign of this transformation took place in 1006 when Malcolm II invaded
NorthuEibria and tried to take Durham. This was the first Scottish inva-
sion of the North in over fifty years, and it probably came as a shock
to the aging Earl Waltheof who was unable to deal with the situation. "^^
Why Mal<:olm invaded is problematical, but the general political context
which made his attack possible is clear. The Cumbrians and the western
Vikings, while not without power, were no longer the ove..hel.ing threat
that they had been. Furthermore, both the Northund,rian earl and the
Anglo-Saxon king were now completely distracted by the Danish invasions.
These factors gave Malcolm II a freedom of action which his predeces-
sors had not had, and he used it to try to take over Northumbria. Fur-
thermore, after the invasion of 1006 failed, Malcolm did not give up the
new policy, which is a clear indication that his invasion had not been
the result of whim. In 1018 he moved south again, this time presumably
m alliance with the Cumbrian king, and won the battle of Carham; and
the results of this victory were grave in the long run because they pro-
duced a further shift in the power relationships in the North/^ Carham
perhaps resulted in the advance of Malcolm's frontier in Lothian as was
suggested earlier, but its real importance lay in the West for Owen the
Bald, king of Strathclyde (Cumbria) died in the battle. He was the last
of his line. With his death, Malcolm was able to extend his rule over
at least the eastern part of the Cumbrian kingdom, and it is likely that
he installed his brother as ruler of the area.^^ This must have
involved fighting and explains why Malcolm did not exploit his victory
at Carham by further raids in Northumbria after 1018. The stakes in the
West were ultimately higher because, with control of Cumbria, Malcolm
would have access to at least three important routes between west and
east (that from the upper Clyde down the Tweed, the Tyne Gap, and the
Stainmore passage) and a host of secondary routes which in effect turned
the flank of the North of England. Scottish control of the West thus
offered the hope of control of the East, and the first attempt at the
fulfillment of this hope was not long delayed. Malcolm's grandson
Duncan was the first king of Scots to utilize his position as king of
the Cun^rians to attack Northumbria when he invaded and besieged Durha.
in 1040. The fact that he had led the Cumbrians over the border, in
addition to his own Scots, is shown by Earl Eadulfs reprisal: He rav-
aged Cumbria after Duncan's defeat/^
This was the basic geopolitical problem which Siward faced. With
the Scots in control of Cumbria, their king could lead an army over the
Tweed in a frontal attack on the earldom while sending the Cumbrians
east through the hills to raid and disrupt communications, and such tac-
tics could place the Northumbrians in an extremely perilous position.
Indeed, ultimately they could lead to Scottish control of Northumbria.
Consequently, the possibility that Duncan's invasion of 1040, the first
of this type, might be repeated had to be forestalled, and Siward applied
his energies to the task. Apparently he followed a two-fold policy
which consisted of expansion in the West to close the major invasion
routes combined with an attempt to put the Scottish king in a dependent
position. No chronicler, of course, says that these were Siward'
s
intentions, but his recorded actions indicate that this was the case.
To a certain extent, moreover, this was an opportunistic policy; for as
a result of circumstances which he had had no hand in creating, Siward
possessed the perfect means with which to interfere in Scottish affairs:
He could make use of Malcolm Canmore, the son of King Duncan.
That this possibility existed was a direct result of the imperfec-
tions of the Scottish political system and specifically of the succes-
sion crisis which followed the death of Malcolm II, the great-grandfather
of Malcolm Canmore. Malcolm II (1005-1034) had been a very powerful
king. He had invaded the North twice, and after 1018 his rule, which
encon^assed Lothian as far as the Tweed and Cumbria in addition to Scot-
land, had stretched further south than that of any of his predecessors.
During his later years, moreover, neither the earls of Bamburgh, who
were usually in revolt against Cnut, nor the great Danish king hi^elf
made any serious attempt to push back his power/^ Nevertheless, the
last part of his reign was filled with turmoil and battle, and although
it is impossible to be certain of the reason for this, it seems likely
that the basic difficulty stemmed from the fact that Malcolm had no male
heir. However, his only daughter, named Bethoc ("Birchtree")
, had mar-
ried Crinan the thegn, the abbot of Dunkeld, by whom she had two sons,
Duncan and Maldred.^"* This situation led to trouble, but Malcolm's role
in it is uncertain. It is possible that he desired that his grandson
Duncan should succeed him, and if this was the case, he was violating
customary practice for it was usual in Scotland for a king to be suc-
ceeded by his brother or his cousin. What seems more likely, however,
is that Malcolm's potential successors by the traditional rule were
encouraged by his lack of an heir to hasten his death. Since he had no
son, he could be killed without fear. There would be no one seeking
vengeance and the throne ten or twenty years after the deed. But if
this second hypothesis is true, Malcolm's relatives gravely misjudged
him; by the time of his death in 1034 he had managed to exterminate
nearly all of the possible claimants to the throne aside from his own
grandsons. The king had had either a brother or a second cousin named
Boite of whom little is known except that he seems to have predeceased
Malcolm, but he left behind a son and a daughter. In 1032 the
daughter's husband. Gillaco.gain, the ™r of Moray, was burned to
death, probably by Malcol. or his agents, and a year later Malcol. bin.
self killed Boite's son/^ These two incidents neutralized the descend-
ants of Boite, but Malcol. was still not secure for in 1034 he died after
defeating an unnamed enemy. This event is very obscure, but an Irish
Chronicle records that Suibne, son of Kenneth, king of the Galwegians,
also died in the same year. Given the events of 1032 and 1033 and the
common patronymic of Malcolm II and Suibne, this was not coincidence.
Suibne, who was probably a brother of Malcolm II and who had ruled Cum-
bria for the king, must have died in battle against his brother in
1034. ^ In any case, Malcolm II's murderous ways were quite successful.
By 1034 only his own grandsons and Groch, Boite's daughter, were still
alive; and Duncan, his eldest grandson, was therefore able to become
king without opposition. He then reigned until 1040 when, after his
unsuccessful invasion of Northumbria, he was killed by Macbeth, the
mormaer of Moray, who himself had married Groch. Once he was in
power, someone, probably Crinan, Duncan's father, sent the dead king's
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sons out of the country.
Thus Malcolm fell into Siward's hands, and he may not have been
alone. A late source says that at this time Siward received a number of
other refugee Scottish nobles, and certainly Duncan's younger brother
Maldred could not have felt secure in Scotland and probably came south.
This is particularly likely because he had married a daughter of Earl
Uhtred and would have been among relatives south of the Tweed, and, as
a matter of fact, in later years Maldred's son, Cospatric, seems to have
thought of himself as a Northumbrian which would be understandable if he
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had been reared among Ms mother's people while his father was in exile.
It is even possible that Crinan himself came south although there is no
direct evidence for this. At any rate, the usefulness from Siward's
point of view of Malcolm, Maldred, and whatever other Scots were in
Northumhria was two-fold. Ultimately either Maldred or Malcol. could be
used for direct intervention in Scotland since they both had clai^ns to
the throne. Short of this, Siward could use their presence in Northum-
hria to control Macbeth simply by threatening to allow them to come over
the border with a Northumbrian army if Macbeth caused trouble. It was a
comfortable position for the earl of Northumhria to be in, and Siward's
ability to threaten Macbeth was perhaps the reason why the latter failed
to imitate his two predecessors by launching a major invasion of the
North. Macbeth only raided the North, and his relative restraint was
certainly not due to his insecurity within Scotland itself. No matter
what one may think of the validity of his claim to the throne, he feared
no rivals when he made his pilgrimage to Rome,^^ and this security could
only have been possible if he had reached some understanding with
Siward
.
In addition to the diplomatic leverage which Maldred and Malcolm
supplied, there were other possibilities in the situation which were
perhaps more important. Malcolm must have been a boy in the early
1040 's and consequently of little immediate use to Siward in the diplo-
matic game. Maldred was older and his claim to the throne undoubtedly
took precedence over his nephew's, but Malcolm had another importance.
Fordun says that Duncan had given Cumbria to Malcolm, and this statement
may have some basis in fact~Fordun' s general unreliability on Cumbrian
affairs notwithstanding." piorence of Worcester refers to Malcolm as
the son Of the Icing of the Cumbrians, and this is a suspicious title to
apply to Duncan.^^ The latter had been, of course, their king, but
"king of Scots" or some equivalent would have been a more appropriate
title for him. In fact, Florence's choice of this unlikely title to
describe Malcolm's father probably represents what seemed important
about him to the English. If Duncan had been king of the Cumbrians,
then Malcolm was his heir from an English point of view. This was sig-
nificant because there is evidence that Siward had taken over Cumber-
land, the area south of the Solway. If Siward felt the necessity for a
legal title to these lands, Malcolm could grant it as the "heir" to the
Cumbrian kingdom. This may, in fact, have been Siward's price for sup-
porting the cause of Malcolm and Maldred.
The evidence that Siward expanded into Cumberland comes from a
unique charter which dates certainly from 1041 X 1065 and probably from
1041 X 1055.^^ The charter was granted by Cospatric, the third son of
Earl Uhtred, to Thorfinn mac Thore and concerns certain property rights,
judicial privileges, and fiscal exemptions in Allerdale, roughly the
northwestern section of the modern county of Cumberland. The address of
the charter contains the most significant piece of information.
Cospatric greets the men "dwelling in all the lands that were Cum-
brian, "^^ and this establishes that by the time of the grant, the lands
south of the Solway were no longer part of the kingdom of Cumbria. The
ture of the charter is in accordance with this; and indeed, this change
lordship must have been the occasion for the making of the charter.
Apparently it is a confirmation of rights already held by Thorfinn and
na
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Lrms and
probably held by his father Thore before hi..^^ ^^^^^^^.^ ^^^^^
perhaps extends Thorfinn's holdings. This is just the type of document
one would expect to find relating to lands which had been transferred
from one kingdom to another for the local landholders would naturally
want the new rulers to recognize the legitimacy of their tenures. It is
also clear that the ultimate lord of this area was the English king.
Although Cospatric was a great lord in Cumberland and confirms Thorfinn'
possessions without mentioning anyone else's permission. Earl Siward had
granted peace, i.e. protection, to Thorfinn,^^ and this establishes that
Siward had the general lordship of the area. Furthermore, Cospatric was
geldfree as were a number of other local landholders, and he extends the
same privilege to Thorfinn and his retainers.^^ Such a concern with not
paying geld is only explicable if the English king was the ultimate lord
of Allerdale, and this is an important point because it negates any sug-
gestion that these lands were held by Cospatric under the Scottish
1,-f 60king.
It has also been thought that this charter contains evidence that
Anglo-Saxon control of this area dated from before Siward' s time because
it mentions rights which Thore and two other men had had "in the days of
Eadred." "Eadred" has been identified with Earl "Ealdred," but there is
no real justification for this hypothesis on linguistic grounds. In
any case. Earl Ealdred spent most of his time in rebellion against Cnut,
and it is very unlikely that he was able to wrest this land from the
Scots. Siward was the first earl in the eleventh century who had the
power to make this transfer. Perhaps taking advantage of Earl Eadulf's
ravaging of this area and of his control over Malcolm, Siward had pushed
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through Che I^^e Gap and annexed Cu^erland. The area was then UnUed
ecclesiastically to England. Archbishop Kynsige of York (1051-60) is
said to have ordained two bishops of "Glassow" while at York, and the
sphere of operations of these bishops
.ust have been in Siward's newly
won lands in the West.^^ ^^.^ ^^^^^.^^ ^^^^^^
^^^^^^
closed the two best invasion routes fro. the West, Stain.ore and the
Tyne Gap. This was an important rectification of the northern frontier
and meant increased protection for both Yorkshire and Durham. T^e acqui-
sition of Cumberland also had a secondary advantage. The Cospatric who
granted the charter seems to have been identical with Earl Uhtred's
youngest son." Siward had apparently put him in charge of the area and
thereby paid off, at least partially, old grievances.
These were important gains. They offset the Scottish annexation of
the old kingdom of Cumbria and perhaps blunted the resentment of the
house of Hamburgh. It is regrettable that the charter cannot be more
closely dated than 1041 X 1065. It only shows that Siward had con-
trolled Cumberland at some time and does not disclose when he took it
over. As a result, the chronological position of Siward's westward
expansion in the development of his Scottish "policy" cannot be deter-
mined. The general direction of his relations with Scotland is quite
clear from the mid 1040 »s, however; and the charter may well come from
these years. Control over the invasion routes from the West would seem
to be a precondition for any active intervention inside Scotland, and
Siward led his first army over the Tweed in 1045 or 1046.^^ This expe-
dition is not described in detail in the chronicle which mentions it,
but it seems to have been an exact parallel of the famous invasion of
1054 e.cep.
.ha. it failed. Siward had apparently decided to
.alee his
king Of Scotland, a policy which would theoretically insure good
relations with the northern kingdom and peace for the North. The
account of the expedition, however, does not na.e Siward's candidate for
the Scottish throne, although it was probably Maldred, Duncan's younger
brother,^^ and the sequence of events is also difficult to reconstruct.
It would see. that Siward had the support of a party of Scots led by
Crinan, the father of Duncan and Maldred, but it is unclear whether
Crlnan invaded Scotland from Northumberland, or whether he was already
in Scotland and rose in revolt against Macbeth. Probably the latter was
the case, and the revolt was to be coordinated with Siward's invasion.
But if this was the hope, it failed, for Crinan met Macbeth in battle
and was slain. Siward subsequently led an army into Scotland and drove
out Macbeth according to the chronicle, and probably this means that
Macbeth fled into Moray in the face of Siward's advance. The earl then
raised Maldred to the throne and returned to Northumberland.^^ He may
have thought that he had accomplished his aim, or he may have found it
impossible to stay above the Tweed. Successful invasions of Scotland
nonnally required a supnly fleet because it seems that it was all but
impossible for an English army to live off the Scottish countryside for
long, and there is no indication that Siward had one on this occasion.
In any case, once he was gone, Macbeth returned and recovered the king-
aom. The fate of Siward 's king is unrecorded.
The likelihood is that this king, who was probably Maldred, was
killed because Siward waited some eight years before he invaded again.
If Malcolm had been born in £a. 1031, he would have reached the age of
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twenty-three hy this ti.e (1054), a pri^ age to try for a throne whi
had to be won through battle. Certainly relations with Scotland did not
in,>rove during these years. Scottish border raids on the North either
began or continued after 1046.^° There
.ust then have been a period of
quiet around 1050 during which Macbeth is said to have gone to Ro.e, but
this peace did not outlast his pilgrimage for in 1052 Macbeth received
the Normans who had been expelled from England as a result of Earl
Godwin's restoration and took them into his own service. Macbeth's
eii,>loyment of mercenaries who could only be profitably used against
Siward shows that the situation was becoming serious again, and it prob-
ably means that he was raiding the North. This, at least, is implied by
the events of 1053. In that year Siward went to Scotland and made some
agreement with Macbeth, and it is even possible that this was a full-
scale invasion although the evidence for supposing so is not very satis-
factory. In any case, Macbeth soon broke the agreement and continued to
raid the North.
Thus the stage was set for Siward's famous invasion of Scotland.
In 1054 the earl collected an army from the North which was reinforced
by a group of King Edwr- j's housecarls and by a contingent from Cumber-
land led by Dolfin, Thorfinn's son, and he also obtained a fleet which
7
could bring supplies to the army. The object of the expedition was to
put Duncan's son Malcolm on the Scottish throne, and both Edward and
Siward must have hoped that once king he would end the hostility which
had characterized the northern border since 1006. To achieve this end,
Siward moved north and defeated Macbeth on the Day of the Seven Sleepers
(July 27). The encounter was apparently a pitched battle in which many
Scots and all of Macbeth^s Norman mercenaries were killed. On his side
Siward lost a number of his own and the king^s housecarls/^ and even
though Macbeth hi:.elf escaped to Moray where he managed to survive for
three anticlimactic years, Siward's victory had been complete enough for
Malcolm to become king. The oldest accounts say no more; in fact, they
even omit any mention that Malcolm replaced Macbeth. Florence of Wor-
cester, however, says that King Edward had ordered Siward both to make
the expedition and to establish Malcolm as klng.^^ Both statements are
undoubtedly true in a simple descriptive sense, but it is inaccurate to
give them a twelfth-century "feudal" meaning. The Normans would do
this soon enough. Malcolm was king of Scots by inheritance and battle;
his obligation to King Edward rested solely on gratitude.
After defeating Macbeth, Siward returned to England carrying with
him a great amount of booty and probably under the impression that his
"
expedition had been a success. The next year he died at York and was
buried there in the monastery which he had built and dedicated to St.
Olaf
.
His bones were thus to be protected down through the ages by a
fellow Scandinavian, an arrangement which suggests that the earl had
remained at heart a Dar- to his death. The stories of his physical
prowess which are based on this aspect of his character supported by
Shakespeare's version of his war against Macbeth give Siward heroic
stature. He stands out as the last great earl of the North; in the
hands of the romantic he becomes one of the last Vikings. All this
makes it very difficult to reach an accurate appraisal of his importance.
If one's view is limited just to his lifetime, Siward must be portrayed
as a successful earl because he ruled Yorkshire without any known
problem fro„ ca. 1033 to 1055 and because he ended the .evoU of the
house Of Ba^urgh. The period of his strong rule gave the North a
Chance to recover fro. the turmoil of the preceding period and perhaps
resulted in the creation of so„e bonds with the South. This was cer-
tainly the case with the church of Durha. where Siward had curtailed
traditional liberties and Installed Its first southern bishop. Further-
more, he ^de concrete moves to blunt the growing threat from the Scots
by the annexation of Cumberland which provided protection to Yorkshire
and Durham from hostile raids out of the West and by his support of
Malcolm Canmore which seemed to promise a period of good relations with
the Scots.
This is an impressive list of accomplishments, but it must be noted
that according to later tradition Siward was descended from a line of
bears. The attribution of this ancestry to the earl may be a direct
'
reference to his physical strength. Indeed, this was almost certainly
the original intention, but Siward's descent from bears can be inter-
preted in another way; Siward ruled like a bear. He was formidable but
lacked insight, and most of his policies depended on force or its
threat. He had imposed an outsider on the clerks of Durham, and they
resented it. He had become earl of Northumbria by wasting the country-
side, and neither his marriage into the house of Bamburgh nor his accom-
modation with Cospatric, the heir of this family, won the goodwill of
the Northumbrians. According to later tradition they revolted against
Siward while he was invading Scotland in 1054, and while this story
should probably not be accepted as literally true, it does rest ulti-
mately on the memory of his unpopularity above the Tees.^^ Siward's
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com-
rule did nothing to end dissatisfaction in North™bria; i„ fact, his
actions fed it.
Much the same thing can be said with respect to Anglo-Scottish rela
tions. Siward's policies did not lead to a stabilization of the border.
The Situation deteriorated as a result of his acts. Even though Macbe
may ha.e been a threat to the North, he was a peaceful neighbor in
parison to the ruler whom Siward had raised up in his place. Malcolm
Canmore's loyalty to his English benefactors lasted exactly as long as
he potentially needed their help. After this need had passed, he became
a greater threat to the North than any of his predecessors had been, and
during the next forty years he repeatedly led armies over the border.
If Siward's support of Malcolm is judged by its results, it turned out
to be a grave mistake. It brought no security to the North, only Scot-
tish armies which pillaged and enslaved the northern peasants.
Finally, the defeat of Macbeth had been won at a high price. In
the battle had died Dolfin, Thorfinn's son; Siward, earl Siward's sis-
ter's son; and Osbeorn, the earl's eldest son.^° With their deaths
three potential leaders of the next generation had been removed; and, in
particular, the losses of the younger Siward and Osbeorn seriously
threatened the future of Siward's family. When the old earl died in the
following year, he left no adult heir to become earl and defend the hold-
ings and position of his family. This not only threatened the interests
of Siward's one surviving son, the young Waltheof, but it also opened
the way for a disastrous experiment in the governing of the North, an
experiment which ultimately culminated in the harrying of the North by
William the Conqueror in 1069.
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CHAPTER III
THE STRUCTURE OF NORTHERN SOCIETY
The obstacles involved in forming a picture of northern society
prior to the Norman Conquest are great in general and on some points
insurmountable. There are few pre-Conquest charters, and they are not
very informative. Domesday Book would seem to offer an unexampled win-
dow into the last phase of Anglo-Saxon society in the North, but it is
in reality a treacherous glass. The survey was made twenty years after
the Battle of Hastings by foreigners who did not understand everything
which they were recording and whose interest in conditions TRE (i.e. in
1066) was strictly limited to the question of who held what "manor" at
that date. As a result, Domesday only provides a one-dimensional pic-
ture of landholding under King Edward and hides what, if any, arrange-
ments the Anglo-Saxon landowners had made with respect to their lands.
Because of the terms of the inquest, then, Domesday can contribute lit-
tle to the discussion of whether "feudalism" existed in the North prior
to the Conquest, and on other basic questions, which one might legiti-
mately ask, it is almost as uncooperative. The description of Yorkshire
is terse and uninformative; there are few double entries and no impor-
tant statement of local customs of the sort which are so informative for
other parts of England. Worse than this, beyond Yorkshire Domesday
fails by degrees. Southern Lancashire is described in general and
unsatisfactory terms while the sections on northern Lancashire are lit-
tle more than a geld list, and Northumbria is not described at all.
Aside from the light cast by occasional charters, conditions above the
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Tees are obscure until the compilation of Boldon Boole, a custu^l of the
lands of the bishop of Durha. ^de in 1183, and the beginning of the
inquisitions post Mortem in the thirteenth century.
These are rather unpromising materials, but they have been the
object of a long tradition of scholarship devoted to the explanation of
northern society and the Norman Conquest's impact on it. While part of
this research has been a reflection of local antiquarian interest, it
has also attracted the attention of scholars of the stature of F. W„
Maitland, J. E. A. Jolliffe, and Sir Frank Stenton in addition to the
more recent work of G. W. S. Barrow and William Rees.^ The principal
reason for this interest concerns what may be termed the "survivals."
In general, survivals are strange tenures such as thanage and drengage,
unusual renders like cornage, and distinctive traditions of peasant cus-
tom, which have few clear parallels in the rest of England after the
Conquest. They first appear in Domesday's description of southern Lan-
cashire and then in more detail in Boldon Book and the various thirteenth-
century surveys. It is usually assumed that these survivals represent
direct fragments of pre-1066 northern society and that, if only they can
be put together correctly, they will yield at least a general picture of
this society. This assumption may well be correct; certainly the method
of arguing backwards from the known to the unknown is a tool commonly
used by Anglo-Saxon and other historians. Still it is somewhat disqui-
eting since in any such argument it is the presuppositions which govern
both the selection of the survival and its meaning. These are usually,
of course, both clear and logical—if perhaps subject to debate—but
often in the North they include basic ethnic suppositions such as, for
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Saxon, o. Oan.sH. X.eas o. .Ms „a.„. p„.,.„,3.., „ coup..
With the endless hypotheses of pUce-na:.e studies, can easll, ta.e a
hlstotlan fto. the sutveys of the twelfth and thirteenth centuties hac.
-t .etel, to the state of notthe.n society on the eve of the Conquest
'
but into fat eaniet ti.es when the M.les and Celts wete sttu,,lin, fot
-stet. Of the province of Upper Britain in the post-Ro„a„ period or in
one notable case, hack to the days before the Celts themselves ca.e to
Britain. m the face of such ^jestic chains of reason and supposi-
tion, one can only say that this chapter will be principally concerned
with the investigation of the structure of northern society during the
last years of the Anglo-Saxon kingdo. and wiU venture into the years
before the Venerable Bede only under duress.
The inquiry must begin with Mai.land. In 1890 he published an
important article dealing with the survivals and argued that the thanes
and drengs who could be found In Lancashire and Northumbrla in the
twelfth century and later were lineal descendants of pre-Conquest mlnls-
tri and eaultes similar to Bishop Osvald's ridingmen and that the confu-
sion of tenurial custom which existed in the North after the Conquest
was the result of the imposition of knight service on the old Anglo-
Saxon tenures.^ Although these conclusions have not been completely
accepted, they were extremely important because they pointed in the
right direction for further research and stijmlated the labyrinthine
mind of Jolliffe. He. in turn, created, for all practical purposes
single-handedly, the current picture of Northumbrian society. But
before he could do this, another ingredient was necessary besides the
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existence of survivals above
.he Tees and west of the Pennines
; this was
What .ay be called the Yorkshire ^at. m a very real sense, the York-
shire .oat in its various guises, has .ade possible the world of North-
umbrian scholarship, and Sir Frank Stenton began its excavation in 1910.
in that year he published a very good essay entitled "Types of Manorial
Structure in the Northern Danelaw." Pro. the title one would assu.e
that the work covered the Five Boroughs and Yorkshire, but such was not
exactly the case. Stenton did use Yorkshire Do.esday for some important
pieces of evidence for his construct of Danelaw society, but on the sec-
ond page of his essay he cut Yorkshire loose with the assertion "that
the harrying of Yorkshire in 1069 makes it impossible to argue with
security from 1086 to the conditions of the Confessor's day.
. .
."^
Stenton was later to change his mind and fill the moat with Danes, but
the essential principle with respect to Northumbria did not change.
Whether basically unknowable or populated by Danes, Yorkshire did not
have to be studied with the lands to the north and west. This meant in
practice that any reconstruction of Northumbrian society based on the
twelfth and thirteenth-century survivals did not have to be squared with
Yorkshire Domesday.
The importance of this freedom was immense for Jolliffe. In 1926
he devoted forty-two pages of his most abstruse prose to explaining the
nature of Northumbrian institutions both before and after 1066. This
essay, although very hard to follow at points, covered most of the rele-
vant evidence and was brilliant in its arguments and conclusions. The
general effect which it makes is monumental, and it has never been seri-
ously challenged. The reason for this is probably his method of
79
investigation,
.olliffe purposed to sta.t at the botto. of society and
work up. This .eant that he submerged hi^elf in the disjointed details
of the twelfth and thirteenth-century surveys and custu.als, where no
one was li.ely to follow, isolated the survivals, and co^ined the. in
a convincing picture of Northumbrian society. To do this, he assumed
that peasant custo. was functional in terms of the society within which
It existed and that one could deduce the general structure of a
-primi-
tive" society from its body of custom.^ Thanks to the Yorkshire moat,
he could do this without worrying about the intractable folios of York-
shire Domesday which, if nothing else, are an embodiment of the opposite
principle that society is organized from the top down.^
Beyond questions of methodology, Jolliffe's main supposition was
that the
-manor" did not exist in Northumbria and Lancashire prior to
the Conquest and that the vill was the basis of northern society. By
the "manor," Jolliffe meant a village held by a mense tenant which con-
tained an internal demesne worked by the local peasants for the benefit
of the holder of the village.^ He investigated the subject of peasant
custom from the Mersey to the Tweed and found that the obligations borne
by the peasants were inadequate for demesne cultivation on a large
scale. The northern bonder, a term which may have meant no more than
"villager," did indeed owe agricultural labor to his lord, but it was
light and seasonal in character, designed to supplement the lord's
demesne farming at critical times during the agricultural year. The
bonder would usually be required to do one or two days' ploughing, per-
haps some harrowing, and almost invariably three or four boon-days in
autumn. In addition, the peasants commonly helped cut the hay, carted
hay, grain, an^
.he oilstone when necessary, and did specified amounts
of structural ^rk around the lord's hall and the Mil. These obliga-
tions were by ^ans trivial, but they did not include week-work and
left the northern peasant free to do his own work for most of the year.
The real burdea of the peasants, at least on the east coast plain, lay
in their renders of grain, malt, and chickens and their "payments,"
originally in kl.d, for feasts, pannage, and comage (a cattle render).
^
These renders a^d services were forinsec (outside) in the sense that
they were rendered, not to a demesne or to a manor house within the vill,
but to a lord's faall with an attached demesne which was exterior to the
vill. That ±s to say. groups of these bondage vills were dependent upon
a lord's hall. They supported a central demesne with their labor ser-
vices, intercoms^ned on the waste, and formed a jurisdictional unit.
Such an aggW3ration of unmanorialized, bondage vills around a central
demesne and hail, Jolliffe called a "shire," and he argued that this
type of organisation (hereafter called the "shire system") was general
throughout all the lands of the old Northumbrian kingdom in 1066 except
for the bulk of Yorkshire where it had been destroyed by the Danes.
^
He further thought that the renders and services by which the peas-
ants supported rhe lord of the shire were originally (and inferentially
as late as 1066) communal responsibilities, and that they were more like
renders to a pre-feudal prince than payments of rent to a landlord. The
bonder's obUg;a.tions were originally "public" duties. He owed them as a
member of the community, and they did not depend on the amount of land
which he held* Jolliffe held that prior to 1066 Northumbria lacked a
well-developed theory of ownership (by which he seems to have meant
mense o^ershlp.) and that the Inter^dlate tenures of thanage and
drengage were Mnisterlal in nature." To the Nonnan., the thanes and
drengs. who were sometimes associated with bondage viUs, seemed to
stand between these vllls and the lord of the shire, to hold the vills.
as it were; but Jolliffe was at pains to argue that before the arrival
of the Normans the thanes and drengs did not hold the vills or Intercept
any of the bonders' dues and services. They held land within the vill,
not the Whole vill, and were responsible for supervising the collection
of the renders in kind and the performance of the forinsec labor ser-
vices." aey were thus essentially stewards, necessary for superintend-
ing the widely dispersed villages to the shire, but persons of no great
consequence who could not be considered proto-feudal nobles as Maitland
had done.
Such was Jolliffe's picture of Northunibrian society. Above the
Tees and west of the mountains the countryside was filled in 1066 with
shires, large numbers of bondage vills dependent upon a central caput
.
These shires were inhabited by a very small number of great nobles, a
ministerial lower nobility composed of thanes and drengs, and a peas-
antry which consisted of bonders who still possessed many of the attri-
butes of freemen. Thanks to Jolliffe's mastery of the evidence and
his arguments, this is a convincing construct, but it must be emphasized
that it is just that, a logical construct. With the ambiguous exception
of the Domesday description of Lancashire which the Normans clearly bun-
gled, it touches no evidence from before the coming of the Normans.
This does not mean, of course, that it is incorrect (and Jolliffe's
treatment of northern peasant custom seems unassailable), but it does
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-an that Ms theo^ needs two things to he convincing which a simple
direct argument fro. a hody of evidence does not need:
.olliffe required
theories which would explain the origin of these institutions and their
decline. The first he provided in the closing pages of his essay where
he noted a nu^er of parallels between Northu^rian and Welsh custo. and
suggested that the unique nature of Northu:^rian society had its origin
in an extensive Angling of Celt and Angle during the early Middle Ages„
Indeed, he thought that in the West this was probably the result of the
direct annexation of Celtic principalities by the conquering Angles.
This theory of Celtic influence on the fonnation of Northumbria would
adequately explain why the North of England was not like the South where
all the Celts had supposedly fled or been killed, but his picture of
northern society still needed a theory of decline which would put it in
direct contact with the evidence from after the Conquest upon which all
his arguments backwards were ultimately based. This was necessary
because few examples of functioning shires are found in the surveys and
inquisitions. They are, however, filled with groups of villages which
rather look like sections or fragments of vanished shires, and to con-
nect these shire-segments with the hypothetical functioning shires of
1066, Jolliffe developed a theory of "truncation." Baldly put, the Nor-
mans truncated the shires. Although they did this in a number of ways,
two stand out. The Normans had a well-developed sense of mense owner-
ship; and, therefore, grants of the old dependent vills by the tenants-
in-chief to their vassals disrupted the traditional system of forinsec
works and dues within the shires. ''"^ Later, the growth of demesne farm-
ing during the twelfth century prompted lords to concentrate their
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energy on parts of the old shires and to liquidate their i^ediate hold
on the
.ore^re.ote villages whose services and renders were no longer
profitable.l^ These two
.echanls^ were largely responsible for the
fragmentation of the shires and connect lolliffe^s
.odel of Northu^nbrian
society before 1066 with the evidence of the later Middle Ages.
Given the nature of the evidence, Jolliffe's delineation of North-
und,rian society is brilliant. His argument fro. the High Medieval sur-
vivals back to the Anglo-Saxon period are convincing, and his theory of
truncation is certainly plausible. Eis conclusions have not, however,
become common in the textbooks, and this is rather curious. One would
think, on the face of the matter, that the more interesting parts of his
work would be his general picture of Northumbrian society and his ideas
on the impact of the Normans on this system since both are unusual in
comparison with southern England, but this has not been the case. There
has been only one serious attempt to test Jolliffe's ideas in the light
of the history of an individual shire (Blackburnshire)
, and for the
rest, the attention of scholars has been turned elsewhere. In particu-
lar, they have been interested in pursuing Jolliffe's theory on the ori-
gin of Northumbrian institutions. He thought that the Celts of northern
Britain had played a significant part in the formation of Northumbrian
society because of a number of parallels which he saw between Northum-
brian and Welsh customs in the High Middle Ages and which he believed
could not have been the result of the independent development of the two
societies. He suggested a number of specific examples of such parallels,
but he did not argue his point in detail, probably because he thought
19the similarity obvious. That it certainly should have been obvious—
at least
..o. a c.„ai„ po.„
^^^^ ^^^^^^
worUe. o« the po.„e.
,oXW. ^e.e appea. scewHa.
.a„sen-
txal to .he s.yec. of oortheo. society, but the ,uest for Celtic u„l-
versals has becoim so involved u-i ^-ux wxth the question of Northumbrian insti-
tutions that these comparisons must be discussed.
They are, in fact, i^ressive. The bondmen of the Welsh commotes
owed their prince renders and services which were strikingly similar to
those owed by the northern bonders to the lord of the shire. They gave
renders of food for feasts (the ^westfa) twice a year as did the north-
ern bonders on the east coast plain. They had to support the local ser
jeants of the peace (the cais) by giving them lodging and food (the
czlch cais). This same duty lay on many of the bonders of the northern
counties where a very similar system of serJeants of the peace existed.
The Welsh bondmen and a nui^er of the peasants in Durham owed virtually
identical structural works for the building of the lord's hall, chamber,
and auxiliary buildings, and in both places they often had to feed the
lord's horse and dogs. Finally, at least in certain lordships in east-
em Wales, the inhabitants were burdened with commorth, a cattle render
paid every second or third year, and this custom is said to have been a
nearly exact parallel to the cornage and other allied cattle payments
which were made in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries by many of the
bondage vills, Norman mense lordships, and even baronies in the lands
north of the Tees and the Ribble.^^ These points of comparison do
indeed establish fee marked similarity between Northumbrian and Welsh
custom which JolMffe originally pointed out. In fact, aside from the
northern bonder's obligation to help maintain the Mil of the shire, the
only significant segment of his burdens which has found no place in the
comparison with Welsh custo. is his seasonal agricultural works, but it
now see^ possible that even these should be included. Jolliffe thought
that the Welsh ^aerdref
,
that is, the prince's demesne land within the
commote which was cultivated by the bondsmen of the dependent hamlets,
only developed in the course of the thirteenth century. Glanville R.
J. Jones, however, has argued with great determination and some force
that the development of both agricultural bond hamlets and of the
prince's maerdref took place much earlier in Wales than has been com-
monly thought; and, if he is correct, the shire and the commote become
nearly identical institutions through which a dispersed peasantry sup-
ported a prince by renders in kind and seasonal works.
Such a conclusion would not be a matter of mere antiquarian inter-
est. If the shire and the commote are essentially the same institution
as the parallels between the two seem to indicate, one would think that
the shire must have been originally a Celtic institution. And, whether
or not one accepts Jones's further argument that this institution, the
discrete estate, actually goes back to pre-Roman times, one can at
least no longer continue picturing the Anglo-Saxons as exterminating
every last Celt who did not flee to the hills and mountains of western
Britain. This, of course, is the intellectual prize to be won by the
rather tedious comparisons of peasant customs. If the method is valid,
it offers the possibility of modifying the idea that in its origin
England was purely Germanic and uncorrupted by any Celtic "element."
The potential importance of this conclusion, in turn, explains why
historians have concentrated on the first part of Jolliffe's theory with
out really questioning his basic picture of Northumbrian society. The
latter is altogether too convenient, not to mention too complex, to be
tinkered with in this day when the professional Celts, or in the case o
Jones, the pre-Celts, are demanding their due in the making of England.
Recently, moreover, the scope of this discussion has been enlarged
by the inclusion of Scotland, and here the object is the same: To clar
ify the nature of ancient Celtic institutional arrangements by the iso-
lation and comparison of survivals. Hitherto, this land has been
largely protected from such comparisons, even when they seem quite obvi-
ous, by the assumption that Northumbria was entirely Germanic in its
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structure. This idea is, however, unwarranted, and G. W. So Barrow
has recently been able to point out a number of specific parallels
between Scottish and Northumbrian institutions as a result of the van-
tage point which he has acquired from his work editing the charters of
Malcolm IV and William the Lion. With respect to eastern Lothian and
the Merse, of course, this is not basically surprising. Both had been
part of the Northumbrian kingdom, and Jolliffe himself thought that
their institutional make-up was the same as that to the south. Thanes
and drengs formed the nobility in this area, and the tenure of the
drengs, at least, was ministerial. The thanes of Lothian held shires,
and the few examples of early peasant custom which survive from this
region show a system of works and renders nearly identical with that
25found in Northumbria. In addition to re-emphasizing these points,
Barrow's contribution has been the observation that the similarities did
not stop on the borders of ancient Northumbria. In West Lothian,
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eastern Stirling, and throughout eastern Scotland generally up to Ross,
the native nobility below the earls consisted of thanes in the twelfth
and later centuries. These thanes held areas called "shires" from the
king by a tenure which seems to have closely resembled the feudal tenure
of fee-farm, and their shires were often identical with the parish.
These points are revealing because in Northumbria the thanes were also
classed by the Normans with the tenants in fee-farm, and the shires had
apparently once been identical with the parish. Barrow further noted
that a substantial number of the naaies of the shires above the Forth
were of an early type; and, although the evidence on the thanes is admit-
tedly not very detailed, he was unable to find significant differences
between them and the Northumbrian thanes discussed by Jolliffe.^^ There
was, then, an apparent structural similarity, at least on the upper lev-
els, between eastern Scotland and Northumbria, and the possibility that
this was due to common origins is supported by certain revenues of the
Scottish king. He had traditionally the right to collect two nearly
universal tributes which were the mainstay of his government and which
seem to have their parallels both in the North of England and in Wales.
Throughout Scotland north of the Forth and the lands of the defunct
kingdom of Strathclyde, the king received cain either every year or once
every several years. The cain was a food render which in the West con-
sisted of cows, pigs, and cheese; and Barrow argued that it was the
Scottish equivalent of cornage, the cattle render which many of the
Northumbrian bondage vills owed. The second great tribute of the Scot-
tish king was coneveth. It was found in eastern Scotland, including
Lothian, and consisted of feasts owed to the king by the populace. Not
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surprisingly, Barro„ saw 1„ i. . p^.^,,
^^^^ ^ ^^^^
of the bondage vxlls and drengages In Northu.i>rla and Lothian owed under
the name of waiting,
Barrow concluded his discussion of these points by suggesting that
the king of Scotland's cain and coneveth, the king of England's cornage
and waiting, and the Welsh prince's c™h and gwestfa-not to mention
the king of Man's pecunia (cattle) and acconeuez (coneveth? )-repre-
sented a co^non system of renders and by asking what the relationship
was between these hospitality dues which appear to have been so wide-
spread in highland Britain. He did not formally answer this question-
just as he did not answer similar questions, which he posed, about the
relationships between the Scottish thanes and the Northumbrian thanes,
between cain and cornage, or between the system of Serjeants of the
peace in Scottish Strathclyde and its counterpart in the North of
England~but the general terms of his discussion would seem to make one
answer inevitable: A theory of radical Celtic origins for the institu-
tional structure of the highland zone.^^
What began as a fairly harmless discussion of the survivals of pre-
Conquest Northumbrian society has in the end produced some rather sweep-
ing conclusions. One is being asked to see in the survivals the fag end
of an old royal support system which remained in operation in Wales and
Scotland as late as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and which sur-
vived in Northumbria in a recognizable form as late as the Norman Con-
quest. Up to this date, the structure of society in northern Britain
was basically uniform on its upper levels. The countryside of both
eastern Scotland and Northumbria was divided into shires held by thanes
above the Tweed and by "lords of hho ..y i-ord the shire" south of this river. These
men rendered the great hosnit;,!-.-
^
g d spitalxty dues to the king and directly sup-
ported the local police just as the aen of th. u i ucn e Welsh commotes did these
things for their prince. Surh -fc i-u^ ^P mce c xs the picture yielded by Northumbrian
scholarship and its offshoot, the search for r«i^-cu rcti t Celtic universals. It is
all very symmetrical and rather majestic.
The question, of course, is whether one can accept it, and it is to
be feared that one cannot. There are two reasons for this. In the
first place, the comparisons of custom upon which this edifice is raised
are over-generalized and ignore certain major difficulties. T^. cain of
eastern Scotland, for instance, was a general food render, principally
of grain, not a cow render like comage.^^ This blocks its identifica-
tion with cornage, even if the latter was a commutation of old food
renders as Rees thought, because there was actually a well-developed
system of grain renders in Durham and Northumberland which ran parallel
with cornage. 3^ Should one conclude that there had been two systems of
food tribute in Northumbria or that Rees was wrong about cornage? The
latter alternative seems more likely since it is simpler to equate the
Northumbrian grain renders with cain, but this does not solve all the
problems. Cornage would need a new explanation. The question of why
there is no sign of royal cain, cornage, or even peasant grain renders
in Lothian and the Merse would stiU remain. Theoretically this area
should provide institutional links between Northumbria and Scotland, yet
it does not. Waiting is also a problem because it is not altogether
clear that it was really as common in Northumbria as these discussions
33imply. Finally, commorth was not a general obligation which ran
parallel with gw^stfa in Wales but was restr^r^.^ .^ ^^ icted to certain lordships
sarily
.ean
.Ha. .he a..e.p.s
.o compare Scc.ish. No..Hu*.ian. and
Welsh cus.o^ a.e ul.i^.el, „.o„g. hu.
.he. do weaken
.he co^ari=o„s
by des.roying
.he s3™e.^ upon which
.hey ^nly depend for
.heir
force.
The second reason why this picture cannot be accepted is that these
comparisons are either directly or indirectly based upon Jolliffe. His
reconstruction of Northu^rian society has gone unquestioned on account
of its convenience and co^lexity, but there is reason to believe that
it is defective because of his basic approach, that is, his endeavor to
reconstruct Northumbrian society fro. the bottom up. As a result of
this, he almost completely ignored the place in society of the men who
held the shires, his "lords of the shire," and consequently produced an
artifically primitive (pre-feudal) impression of Northumbrian society.
Furthermore, it is essentially a frozen system which he described.
There are no mechanisms for change in this society, and it survives
unaltered down to its truncation by the Normans. Both of these are ser-
ious flaws. On a theoretical level they limit the validity of his con-
clusions, and they may be responsible for the difficulties encountered
in the comparison of custom. In particular, a theory of institutional
divergence might clarify the situation, but this is just what Jolliffe's
denial of change precludes.
It is one thing, however, to say that Jolliffe is probably wrong;
it is quite another to show where. It seems unlikely that these diffi-
culties can be cleared up and a theory of institutional divergence
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supplied sl^ly by reworking the ^tertal „Mch he covered. Many of his
conclusion, see. indisputable, and the real problee is that his evidence
is, in effect, one-dimensions 1 tk-:„ i- •a al. This limtation is Inescapable unless
so»e earlier infonaation ean be brought to bear on these subjects, and
it is here that the Yorkshire
.oat beco.es a ^tter of the first impor-
tance. If the society which existed in Yorkshire in 1066 was not radi-
cally different fro. the one above the Tees, Domesday's description of
Yorkshire can be used to supplement and check Jolliffe's reconstruction
of Northumbrian society before the Conquest. If. on the other hand, the
Danes seriously altered society south of rh^ To^o •«-xec n ± t e Tees, this comparison would
be impossible in a laeaningful sense.
In other words, it must be determined if the Yorkshire moat will
hold water, and at the beginning it may be noted that the concept itself
is rather suspicious. This chasm is altogether too convenient for both
Northumbrian historians and students of the Danelaw. It allows the for-
mer to argue backwards from High Medieval evidence without any worry
that their constructs will be threatened by Yorkshire Domesday, and it
permits the latter to ascribe institutions to the Danes without bother-
ing to consider parallel institutions above the Tees. In the face of
such wondrous utility, one might well ask for evidence, and it is at
this point that the question becomes very curious. The disquieting
truth is that Domesday has been used as the principal "direct" proof
throughout the Danelaw that the Danes had altered the structure of soci-
ety. The reason for this is twofold. On the one hand, there is practi-
cally no evidence which discloses what effect the Danes had had on
native English society prior to 1066; but, on the other hand, eastern
Knsla„d appears
.o be
.a.her different fro. the western Midlands and
Wessex When these reslons are described In
.o.esda,. x„ perticuXar. the
East is Characterised by the so.e and by soUe.en. LogicaUy, of course
the restriction of this institution and social group to eastern England
proves absolutely nothing since this region „ight have been distinctive
prior to the arrival of the Danes, and since Northu*ria, which ^ght
have had a si^lar structure, is not described in Do„esday. This last
point is of particular importance because it is doubtful if the Tees had
ever formed a boundary between Durham and Yorkshire, but the distribu-
tion of the soke as it appears in Domesday has nonetheless created the
presumption that the Danes were in fact responsible for the differences
between the Danelaw and the rest of England. Furthermore, this presu^-
tion has been strengthened as the i^act of the Danes on the place-names,
personal nomenclature, and customary law of eastern England has been
worked out. Within these realms their influence, whether direct or
indirect, was certainly great, and this makes it easier to believe that
they influenced the basic framework of society as well.^'
In terms of the structure of society, the question of the Danish
impact on eastern England can be limited to the territorial soke. Was
It a Scandinavian creation or a native institution which had survived
the ninth century? Generally speaking, sokes were estates which con-
sisted of a main village with dependent pieces of property called bere-
wicks and sokelands. The larger territorial sokes covered wide stretches
of countryside, and the berewicks and sokelands might be either complete
villages or only parts of a village. The resemblance between this type
of estate and the Northumbrian shire is obvious, but the identification
its .odern f„™
.his hypothesis Is ^1„1, ,he „or. of SU Frank S.enton.
on the one hand, his definition of the soke as a„ Institution would pre-
clude such an Identification. He admitted that in so^ sokes the soke-
n^n o«ed their lord light agricultural services such as „„„l„g or help-
ins with the harvest which were survivals of pre-«norlal conditions and
were not "derogatory . "^^
^^t/::^l^i::^t^TJ::^ T--- ^^^^^^ ^
great'^bodv'nf °' eleventh 'c;ntury rest upon a
unfree to 33^^^:" ""f^^^-^g ^ ^-^'s dependents, free and
excision o^ ^n * "^^^^ his fold, his church, to thelusi f all competing institutions.
The emphasis here is on the idea that the sokes were held together by
suit, rents, and nonderogatory service; in 1927 he would call it "honor-
able" serv^ice.^S Sokes were basically jurisdictional units which could
not be confused with shireSo The main purpose of this definition, how-
ever, was not to differentiate sokes and shires, although it inciden-
tally did thiso Rather, the nature of the sokes after 1066 had to be in
accordance with their origins which Stenton saw as the direct result of
the Danish settlement. He envisaged the Danish invasions as having been
a folk migration of free and equal peasant warriors "at least comparable
ia scale to the later movement from which the duchy of Normandy arose. "^^
In fact, he thought that they had come in massive numbers and that the
territorial sokes had resulted "from the settlement of the rank and file
of the Danish armies around the men who had led them in the invasion.
The sokeiands were the estates which these free warriors had occupied;
and, for obvious reasons, it would not do to have their supposed
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descendants, the soke^n,
,„.de„ed „Uh semces inappropriate to their
rank. Ihus the Dane. ca.e to occupy the Yorkshire
.oat and the lands to
the south. There was. as Stenton admitted, no direct proof for this
hypothesls.^1 but his prestige was such that it has been accepted,
ertheless. It meant, of course, that Domesday could be taken at face
value as describing a society basically altered by a large Influx of
nev-
Danes
.
It would be unjust and inaccurate, however, to lay the burden for
the creation of this intellectual chasm across the face of England
solely on Stenton because initially Jolliffe concurred completely. In
his work on Northumbria, he investigated the question of whether shire
survivals existed in Yorkshire, and he found several examples of them in
the West Riding and the western part of the North Riding. These will be
discussed in detail later, but for the moment it is their distribution
which is important. The existence of shire survivals in western York-
shire and their absence from the Vale of York and the East Riding led
Jolliffe to conclude that:
The line at which
. . . [Northumbrian] custom stops is not an early
Anglo-Celtic frontier, but a Danish one, that of the kingdom ofAnlaf which destro-ed Deira, and the break is too abrupt to leaveits meaning doubtful. ^2
In other words, the Danes destroyed the shire system throughout most of
Yorkshire. Somewhat later, however, Jolliffe modified this position. In
an interpretive essay published in 1934 he argued that the territorial
sokes were not of Danish origin, that both sokes and Northumbrian shires
were analogous institutions arising from the pre-feudal stage of Anglo-
Saxon society, and that the bonds of suit, rent, and service which held
the sokes together were ancient royal dues." It .ust be noted that
this „as „ot exactly the same thing as saying that the soke and the
shire were the same Institution; rather, they were both relics of the
"era of the folk" and had originally served the sa.e end/* The impli-
cation was that Domesday still did not describe Northumbrian Instl-
tutions.
That this position came very close to enjoying the best of both
worlds did not become a serious problem for Jolliffe's explanation of
the soke has been largely ignored. This is unfortunate because he was
more right than wrong, but it is understandable. His arguments on York-
shire were either general or ill-conceived, and it took more than them
to drive the cohorts of Danish sokemen out of Yorkshire. Recently,
however, a good deal of work has been done which supports the general
idea that the territorial soke was an Anglo-Saxon (or Anglo-Celtic)
institution. P. H. Sawyer has shown that the Danish armies numbered
between two and three hundred men rather than in the thousands, and he
has suggested ways in which a dominant aristocracy of relatively small
size could affect place-names and law in the way that the Danes did.^^
This discovery is of fundamental importance because it destroys the idea
that the Danish invasions represented a folk migration and deprives the
sokemen of most of their hypothetical Danish forefathers. Even more to
the point, however, has been the work of R. H. C. Davis who has investi-
gated the socage customs of East Anglia which the Danes are usually
regarded as having introduced. He would translate "soke," not as "juris-
diction," but as "customs which the aforesaid land owes the king."^''
These customs consisted of hidage, wardpenny, and foddercorn in addition
to ^„i„g
.ervices. relief, and gers™/« and DavU was able eo show
that soueland, the land burdened with these services, was pre-Danlsh In
its origin.
t"icts'c:ve"li8 lllrirlltltT '""t'T' "^^ "^^"^^
—n cente? ^^l^^^^'^^l^^^^ -
He thought that this system had once been .uch like the Northumbrian
Shires, the lathes of Kent, or the Welsh co-otes but that its outlines
had been obscured by the commutation of the renders and by royal grants
to the nobles and the Church of the dues and services which the soke-
lands produced.
Davis did his work before Sawyer ,and it is therefore understandable
why he did not feel that his conclusion that the sokeland was Anglo-
Saxon could be extended to the northern Danelaw.^^ He still faced the -
concept of the Danish invasion as a folk migration and the very real
presence of the invasion's latter-day outriders, the philologists; while
they, in turn, were now burdened with the necessity of explaining why
sokeland was Danish in one area and Anglo-Saxon in another. This has
never been done, and the only important extension of the discussion
beyond certain attacks on Sawyer's theories on the formation of place-
names has been the work of G. R. J. Joneso His interest in the matter
has been unique in that he has been trying to establish the Celtic ori-
gins of the "discrete estate." The soke is a regional example of the
discrete estate, as is the shire, and Jones has argued that the sokes in
Yorkshire were formed when the Celts subjugated the pre-Celtic popula-
53tion of the area. If one could be sure that this idea is correct, it
woul. i»e«aeeX,
.educe theo., of a Oa„U, o.i,i„
,He so.es to
nonse^e and
.ake thei. identification as a„ Anglo-Saxon institution a
secondary ^tter, the result of Angl.Saxons replacing Celts as the
lords of these estates. Unfortunately, Jones has very little evidence
to «>rk With, and his arguments are of necessity extremely tenuous.^^
They cannot be taken as established, although they ^y be correct. One
l^^iate result, however, of his deter^natlon to prove the Celtic ori-
giri Of the discrete estate has been his discussion of the Danish place-
na-es of Yorkshire. He has argued persuasively that „ost of the„ were
the result of the renaming of Anglo-Saxon villages by the Danes rather
tha. new creations, and he has hypothesized that the important Danish
leaders took over the soke centers and granted out the dependent vil-
lages to their followers from whom most of the b^-names with a personal
name for a first element were derived." r,-,is last point is particu-
larly important because it provides a reasonable explanation for the
aristocratic implications of the numerous b^-names of eastern England
«hlch have never been adequately accounted for on the basis of a mass
migration of free and equal warriors.'^ Furthermore, it would account
for the fact that the r In villages of the Danelaw sokes have an embar-
rassing tendency to have English names.''
Taken together, the work of Sawj-er. Davis, and Jones strongly sug-
gests that the Danes did not significantly alter the institutional
structure of the Danelaw and that the soke was an Anglo-Saxon institu-
tion. This is in accord with the latest research on the Danes in Nor-
maady which has produced similar conclusions. and it provides new sup-
port for Jolliffe's idea that the soke and the shire were analogous
institutions. Unfortunately, this does not settle the issue. With it
established that the solce is probably a native institution, it beco.es
important to determine whether Jolliffe's concept of analogy is correct,
or whether this idea is only a s.oke screen, a new version of the York-^
shire aoat which will save the pri^nitive si:.plicity of Northu.bria while
dr^ging the Danelaw into the realm of the Anglo-Saxon "folk." Cer-
tainly the history of the Northmnbrian kingdom provides no basis for
assuming that Yorkshire was different in its institutional make-up from
the lands above the Tees once the influence of the Danes is discounted,
and two things are immediately apparent which indicate that the distinc-
tion might be groundless. First, there are examples of sokes in York-
shxre being called "shires." Both Howden and (North) Allerton were
called shires, and so were Hallam and Sowerby, a division of the Wake-
59field soke.
-
Second, this suspicious verbal identification of sokes
ami shires is matched by an even more curious phenomenon on the level of
peasant custom. While Yorkshire is not blessed with numerous documents
disclosing the nature of local peasant custom, occasional examples do
appear in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and these are quite
significant. The earlVst instances are in the Templars' Inquest of
1185, a document roughly contemporaneous with Boldon Book, and one set
of these customs, those of Temple Newsham in the West Riding, reveals a
very important point. Here the peasants, who held either one or two
bovates each, paid yearly 30d. per bovate rent (?), 2 hens and 20 eggs,
arod during the course of the year they ploughed and harrowed for four
days, mowed and made hay one day, and did four boon-days in autumn. In
addition to this, they were responsible for repairing the raillpond.
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bringing new Mllstones to the village, and washing and shearing the
sheep for two days.^« These custom are interesting in several respects,
and the first thing to be noted is that they were not unique. The
Tenrplars' Inquest reveals that sinalar customs were followed at Skelton
and Colton, both in the West Riding, and at Alwarthorpe in the East Rid-
ing. 1 Moreover, the thirteenth-century inquisitions post Mortem show
in more detail that services of the same type were rendered at Harewood
in the West Riding, at Klrkby Moorside in the North Riding, and at
Burton Agnes in the East Riding.^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^ customary
tradition could be cited, but the point of these examples is not to fill
thirteenth-century Yorkshire with villages where the peasants followed
these customs. Such a picture would be very inaccurate because the har-
rying of 1069 had destroyed many of the old villages. These lands were
re-developed during the twelfth century on easy terms. This process
and commutation produced a preponderance of rent tenures by the thir-
teenth century, but the wide dispersal and uniformity of the system of
services exemplified by those at Temple Newsham probably mean that these
had been the normal customary system before 1069. Jolliffe unaccount-
ably did not investigate this point although it is a matter of primary
importance. His picture of Northumbrian society was based on peasant
custom and the renders which it yielded, yet the peasants of Yorkshire
apparently had been under a very similar system. Except for the grain
renders and cornage of the Northumbrian bonder, his services are matched
point by point by those of the Yorkshire villein. Both were limited to
specific tasks at critical times during the year, and neither were sub-
ject to week-work.
These points are not conclusive, but the occasional verbal Identi-
fication of sokes and shires and the probabl. existence of a co^on sys-
tem of customary labor on either side of the Tees before 1069 certainly
make Jolllffe's Idea that sokes and shires were only analogous open to
doubt. In tenns of evidence, as opposed to utility, he held this posi-
tion as a result of his original work on Northu*rla which had led him
to negative conclusions:
rh.
^^^^^ ^y^^^'" ^^^"^ ^^^^ vanished altogether from
Inertonshlrp" "° ''^'^ ^"^^^^^^ ^^^^ Howdfnshire orAll tonshire were shires in more than name, and on the east themost southern drengage was at Marske, near Middlesbrough. In thewest however drengage tenures survive in the honour of Richmond,and a number of vxlls are burdened with forinsec works. The sameis true in a less [sic] degree of the soke of Knaresborough. themanor of Thorpe Arch, and the district of Leeds, while coLlge isstill paid in the fee of Bowes Castle. 6^
This distribution of shire survivals was the basis for Jolliffe's ini-
tial conclusion that the Danes had destroyed the shire system in York-
shire, and when he later perceived the similarity between the soke and
the shire, it stood in the way of the obvious solution of the problem:
The complete identification of the two institutions. His examples of
surviving shire customs, principally forinsec labor dues, were few and
restricted to western Yorkshire, and because of this—if for no other
reason—sokes and shires could not be the same. In actuality, however,
this distribution is false. For whatever reason, Jolliffe minimized the
examples of Northumbrian custom which he found and failed to discover a
considerable body of additional evidence.
In the first place, Northumbrian custom was more common in the west-
ern part of the shire than Jolliffe's brief discussion would indicate.
As late as the thirteenth century, a number of dependent estates were
linked to their ^no.tal cen.e.. by fortnsec agricultural wor.s which
were si^lar to those rendered by Northu^rian bondage vills to the
shire centers, and fre,ue„tly these works still rested on the vill as a
Whole, rather than on the individual tenants. The „en of Bumeston, for
exa^le, owed forinsec ploughing and reaping at Carthorpe, and the
inhabitants of Lofthouse rendered siMlar works at the .anor of Hare-
wood:
reapers in autumn for one day It L ^ord'^ food ty-three
Harewood also received these services from the dependent estates of New-
hall and Stubb House, but in these cases the old bondage dues had been
attached to the mense tenures by 1263. the date of the survey.^^
Jolliffe did not note either of these instances, nor did he find that
the men of Denton owed ploughing and reaping services at Otley as late
as 1315 or that five vills owed similar services at Ripon.^^ These were
important omissions, but the soke of Knaresborough is, perhaps, the best
example of his failure to follow his own leads. He knew of three vills
burdened with forinsec works in this estate. Actually, however, eigh-
teen vills seem to have owed boon-works at Knaresborough, and the old
obligation of feeding the lord's dogs, which was characteristic of many
Durham villages, was still in force. Finally, the sokemen of Shef-
field did hunting and forest services which may have been similar (it is
impossible to be certain) to those found in western Durham.
When combined with Jolliffe' s examples, these instances of forinsec
works establish that shire customs were far from uncommon in western
Yorkshire, but the really important point is that his distinction
ire are
—pies of surviving shire custo:ns i. the south and the east. It is
t.- that they see. to he less numerous than in the west, yet they have
a
-.ignificance heyond their numbers for there is reason to believe that
tl- harrying was .ore severe in the Vale of York, the eastern part of
tl^e North Riding, and the East Riding than on the flanks of the Pennines
wt^nce so .any of the western survivals co.e.^° The examples the..elves
ar. of several sorts. On the one hand, there were household rents and
f«rinsec agricultural services which znust have had their origin in a
vanished shire at Kirkby Moorside in the East Riding. On the other
h^nd, a number of Norman mense tenures bore incidents which had once
l^in on bondage vills or tenures in drengage. In the far south of the
^ire, the manor of Stainton was held of the castle of Tickhill by
kmight service, yet all the men of the manor, free and unfree, had to
"
plough for ten days on the demesne of the castle. ^.^
^^^^
c^se in Yorkshire of a type of tenure more common further north which
w^s the result of knight service being imposed on an old bondage vill,
hmt analogous tenures on a lower level existed in the eastern part of
t^e county. In 1255 Osbert de Bolbec held his manor at Levisham in the
V^le of Pickering by rent, suit to court, and by harrowing at Pickering
73c^tle. Jolliffe failed to notice either of these tenures, and this
was a serious omission because the twelfth-century charters show that
s«ich tenures as that at Levisham were more comnon than the later inqui-
sitions indicate. The earliest example comes from ca. 1120-1128 when
Aschetin de Hawsker received Normanby and Hawsker from the abbot of
WFaitby to hold by paying 24s. rent and by doing one boon-ploughing and
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one autu^
.„o„..., each ,ear. a„a si^u.
.e„„.es are recorded U.er In
the century at Gulsborough. at Welbur, m the Vale of Vor.. and at Six-
tendale in the East Rldlna .uK g. Finally, there is the question of drengs
Their tenure was an Integral part of shire organization, and dolUffe
argued that the survival of drengage m a„ area Indicated that a shire
had existed there." m this reasoning he „as correct, hut he also ^In-
tai.ed that the southern „ost drengage In Yorkshire was at Marske on the
northeast coast. This Is not true. Deep in the East Riding three
drengs survived into the thirteenth century at Burton Agnes, and several
others could be found during this period at Driffield and apparently in
Howdenshire.
In the face of these examples of forinsec services and drengs,
Jolliffe's distribution crund,les. Shire custon. were more numerous than
he thought and were not restricted just to the west of the shire. When"
coz^ined with the fact that the general system of customary labor prior
to 1069 closely resembled the one followed in Northumbria, this discovery
strongly indicates that such customs represented the predominant system
before the Norman Conquest, and this hypothesis greatly increases the
pr^ability that the obvious equation of sokes and shires is correct. In
actuality, one does not need to speak in terms of probability because a
nuii&er of the examples discussed above show that the dependent members
of the territorial sokes, the berewicks and sokelands, were linked to the
soke-center by the same type of seasonal agricultural services as those
which tied the bondage vills to the shire-center. Of course, by the time
of Domesday the tenurial arrangements in the county had been disrupted by
the harrying, the allocation of lands to the Normans, and by an arbitrary
reclassification of sokelands as berewiCs, and
.hese factors create a
degree of ambiguity.^^ But the relationships involved are still clear.
Denton had been a berewick of Otley in 1086; in 1315 the inhabitants of
the vill still performed one day's ploughing and one day's reaping at
Otley. ^« Ledeston had been a berewick of Kippax in 1086; in the early
thirteenth century it owed forinsec ploughing at Kippax. Levisham, on
the other hand, had been sokeland of Pickering in the eleventh century;
it did harrowing at Pickering in 1255.«0 Hawsker had also been sokeland
in 1086, and it rendered a day's ploughing and reaping at its old soke-
center of Whitby in the 1120's.«l Three of the five vills which owed
ploughing and reaping services to Ripon were classified as either bere-
wicks or sokelands in Domesday, and the same forinsec dependence exis-
ted in the manor of Knaresborough. The post-Conquest manor was a combi-
nation of the old sokes of Aldborough and Knaresborough. Seven of the
"
nineteen vills which did boon-works had been either berewicks or soke-
lands in 1086, and the remainder are either not in Domesday or are
deceptively listed with a miscellaneous group of king's thegns.^^
The soke and the Northumbrian shire were the same institution.
This idea may sound somewhat radical, but it is in complete accord with
Davis's work on East Anglia and provides a foundation for Jones's idea
that the Danes mainly took over existing villages. Furthermore, it is
not even really in basic conflict with the work of Stenton except on the
question of the origin of the sokes. The bulk of his work can endure the
idea of an English origin of this institution, and his assertion that the
greater sokes were held together by money rents in addition to the sev-
eral types of suit can be explained as the result of the commutation of
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Old dues. X.e .os. se.ious o.,ecUon . ...3 in.e^.e.tion wo.X. eo.e,
in fact, f.o. Northumbrian scholars who would probably raise at least
three basic questions, and these
.ust be discussed for the answers to
these questions will co^lete the destruction of the Yorkshire
.oat and
as a result seriously change Jolliffe's picture of Northumbrian society.
The questions revolve around the fact that, although the general
nature of peasant custom and the forinsec dependence of sokeland are
indeed ren^niscent of Northumbrian custom, certain other equally charac-
teristic ^rks of the shire system do not appear in Yorkshire. It might
be pointed out, for instance, that Domesday only records four drengs in
Yorkshire and that such individuals should be much more common if the
shire system existed south of the Tees,^^ but this objection would be
wroHg on two counts. In the first place, the Domesday commissioners
were only interested in putting on record who "owned" any particular
manor in 1066, not who may have been in possession, so that drengs, who
did not have a freehold according to Jolliffe, would not have been
recorded under 1066. Second, Domesday does record men in possession in
1086 and should note any drengs, but its description of southern Lanca-
shire uses the terms "J. ane" and "dreng" interchangeably which means
that it is entirely possible that the small thanes listed in Yorkshire
In 1086 were of the same ministerial class as those in Lancashire
.
This possibility is supported by three things. First, the four drengs
mentioned in Yorkshire are recorded in the very first folio before any
mention of thanes, and this suggests that the clerks decided to abandon
the uncouth title of "dreng" at this point in favor of the more familiar
"thane." Second, the small Yorkshire thanes paid the same relief, 40s.,
as the th»es and d.engs of LancasHUe
.
«^
^ese a.e i,o..a„t considera-
tions,
.ne ..e slsnlHcan. p.ece of evident U a Hs. of .o.
328 s.an .ano.. included under
.He land of ehe Un,. XHese
..nors for.
s co^act group at the end of the description of the king's larger
estates and „ere predo^nantly s.all. generally ranging In size fro.
one-half carucate to five carucates. They had ,«en held by na.ed Indl-
so„ why they were not listed with the king's thanes." Their absence
from this section might be exnl^ino/i ^-pnc p axned, of course, by the hypothesis that
these manors had not been oarf nf t-i,« i ^D p t of the king's demesne before the Conquest
and that they were confiscated estates, but this explanation cannot be
true. One of the most important characteristics of the ministerial
thanes and drengs on the royal demesne in Lancashire in 1066 was that
they paid rent-for their ••manors,"^^ and the sa^ was true of the small
thanes on the royal demesne in Yorkshire. This is clear from the values
ascribed to their manors for 1066. These do not represent a real
sequence of numbers such as would be produced by even a rough estimation
of the yearly value of 328 manors which varied in size and were scat-
tered over the face of ^he county. Rather, their values in all but an
insignificant minority of cases are directly proportional to the number
of ploughlands which they contained. Their values were based on the
ratios of 5s., 6s. 8d., and 8s. per ploughland or simple multiples and
fractions of each figure. This phenomenon is without parallel in
Yorkshire except for a group of royal and comital manors which were val-
90ued at the figure of .656, and these figures clearly represent a tradi-
tional feorm or rent. The men who held these nanors were then the
equivalent of ..e ^nisce.lal
.Hane. of
..e West. an. the Idea that
there were no drengs In Yorkshire Is specious.
A detemmed Northumbrian scholar, however, ^ght still not assent
despite the discovery of over 300 Mnisterial nobles south of the Tees
and demand to know if the peasants of Yorkshire eade the grain renders
and comage payments which were co^on in Northumbrian bondage vills.
These would be serious questions. If the institutional structure of
Northumbria was fairly uniform, there should be traces of grain renders
and cornage south of the Tees, and neither are found in any nun^er in
the custumals and inquisitions. Ihey contain only two examples of peas-
ants burdened with grain renders and but one instance of the payment of
cornage (cougeld).'^ But at least in the case of the first of these,
the grain renders, this is entirely a question of appearance, an inpres-
slon analogous to Jolliffe's ideas about the distribution of forinsec
labor dues and drengs. and just as devoid of substance. For once liter-
ary evidence can throw light on this discussion. The Chronica
. de
Melsa contains a curious story that when King Athelstan returned from
his Scottish expedition, he gave the church of Beverley the right to
collect four traves of grain, apparently oats, from each working plough
m the East Riding. This render was called hestercorn (hestornes). Its
collection was a royal right, and its original purpose had been to pro-
vide food for the king's horses. This last statement, of course, may
only reflect the chronicler's dislike of oats, but the main idea of the
account is very interesting. The grain renders above the Tees were of
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royal origin, and this story would prove that similar renders had
existed in Yorkshire and explain what had happened to them. Of course,
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the account itself might he doubted, but the O^o,,!,^^^
a serious, if late, source which embodies local material in addition to
the works of earlier historians.^^ Furthermore, the matter does not
rest solely on its authority. The Hospital of St. Peter of YorR had a
Similar tradition that Athelstan granted to the church of York the right
to collect one trave of corn from each plough in the province of Yorlc.^^
This right passed to the hospital after the Conquest, and both its exis-
tence and the existence of Beverley's grain renders are established by
later evidence. Beverley's right to its traves was confirmed by both
Henry I and Stephen, and St. Peter's traves were confirmed by William
P . 96 ^Rufus. These charters show that a comprehensive system of grain rend-
ers, which probably had consisted of one trave of corn and four traves
of oats from each plough, had existed in Yorkshire, and they strongly
suggest that the stories about Athelstan granting already existing rend-
ers to the Church should be taken seriously. Moreover, both the method
of assessment and the political situation in Yorkshire during the tenth
century point in the same direction. The levying of the dues on the
basis of the working plough looks very ancient, and certainly neither
Athelstan nor his immediate successors possessed enough power in York-
shire to impose a new general tribute for the support of the Church.
The most likely hypothesis is, then, that either Athelstan or one of the
other early kings of Wessex to hold power in the North granted out to
the Church the old royal grain renders which the kings of Northumbria
had once received and which the Danish kings of York had continued to
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collect. These renders in kind would not have seemed very useful to
the descendants of Alfred who never showed any great taste for staying
in Yorkshire, and the Church in Yorkshire clearly needed to he re-endowed
after its near destruction at the hands of the Danes.
This leaves the
.question of cornage, the most debated of all North-
un^rian survivals. Its absence fro. Yorkshire is absolute except at
Bowes castle, and no evidence of any sort hints that it has gone unno-
ticed like the grain renders. Yet this is not as serious a problem as
it might appear. The cumulative weight of the argu^nt has become
great; and, if there is no evidence of cornage in Yorkshire, there is
also no sign of it in southern Lancashire which was clearly a land of
shires in 1066. The nonexistence of cornage in the latter area lessens
the weight of this objection, and in an indirect way it suggests a solu-
tion to the problem. Most of the traditional discussions of cornage have
concentrated on the question of what the nature of the due was which
has inevitably involved a heavy reliance on late twelfth and thirteenth-
century evidence. By this time, however, cornage had assumed different
forms; and, not surprisingly, the fruits of this approach have been an
ever lengthening list of definitions whose current major representatives
are Jolliffe»s idea that it was a pasture due analogous to pannage and
Rees's theory that it was the equivalent of commorth
. a Welsh cow trib-
ute paid in lieu of old food renders. The difficulty with such defi-
nitions is that they ignore an important aspect of the early evidence in
their determination to elucidate the inner nature of the due. The only
recent scholar to escape this error is Barrow who accepted Rees's posi-
tion and further argued that cornage and the king of Scotland's cain were
99the same render. This equation represents a major advance, whether it
is true or not, because it emphasizes an important aspect of cornage
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Which usuaxi, o.sc„«d 1„ .he discusston of tKl„ee«h-centu.y details
a„<iCelUcpa.anels: I. ea.Uest appearances
.he coinage of „o..H-
ern England „as a royal due. I^e first pipe roll, Henry I-s for 1130
Shows that comage was paid to the king in Westmorland and C^berland
and Henry irs rolls disclose that cornage was a royal due in Northu^
berland. m Yorkshire and lancashire, on the other hand, neither
Henry I „or Henry II received cornage, and the su. which Henry I obtained
fro. Dnrha. In 1130 apparently ca.e to hi„ because he had custody of the
temporalities of the bishopric, not as a royal right.^" Furthermore,
the Situation was even
-ore conplex than this because there is contempo-
rary evidence that Durham had paid cornage to the king at an earlier date
in Henry I's reign, and later sources show that cornage payments were
made in northern Lancashire and at Bowes despite the fact that they did
102not reach the king. As it first appears, then, comage was predomi-
nantly but not exclusively a royal due. It went to the king in the four
northernmost counties. In Yorkshire and Lancashire it either did not
exist or was found only on the manorial level. This distribution of the
right to receive cornage is very curious for it corresponds with the
northern limit of the geld in 1066. Most of Cuinberland and Westmorland
were not under the English king at that date, and Northumbria paid no
geld. Yorkshire and Lancashire both did. This is surely significant and
suggests that comage was either an old Northumbrian tribute or perhaps
even an ancient royal tribute of the North. It is difficult to tell for
certain which it was because there is little evidence that it existed in
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Lothian. If it did not, as seems most likely, this would suggest that
cornage was imposed in the last half of the tenth century after Lothian
Ill
had been lost. In any case, this hypothesis explains its earliest names
Which were not "cornage" at all but rather the "geld of animals" or the
"geld of cows" in the West and the "comage of ani^ls" in the East.^^^
Cornage was the cow tax, not some primitive render attached to the bond-
age vills. Presumably it had been a general tribute above the Humber,
but when the geld was laid on Yorkshire and Lancashire, it was either
extinguished in these .reas or became a manorial render. Free from the
pressure of the geld, it survived in Northumbria and fell to the king
when Rufus took over the earldom. Subsequently Henry I granted the corn-
age between the Tyne and the Tees to the bishop and monks of Durham.
If this theory is correct, the absence of cornage in Yorkshire is
only an indication that the Anglo-Saxon kings had more power there than
in Northumbria, and the subject has no particular bearing on whether the
soke and the shire were the same institution. In fact, the conclusion
that they were the same seems inescapable. This means, in turn, that
there is no basis for the assumption that Yorkshire was radically dif-
ferent from Northumbria and that its description in Domesday can be used
to check Jolliffe's picture of society above the Tees. But with this
determined, it becomes immediately obvious why it was necessary for him
to create an institutional discontinuity between Northumbria and York-
shire. The Yorkshire section of Domesday may not be a mine of informa-
tion, but it is clear on a number of very basic things which reveal the
limitations of Jolliffe*s attempt to construct a picture of Northumbrian
society from a selective use of late peasant custom. Three things stand
out. First, the peasantry of Yorkshire was divided into the three usual
classes of eastern England, sokemen, villeins, and borders , """^^ and this
-Ues ve^
..u.eX. t.a.
.oXU^e's ass^.Xon that the No«hu*na„
peasantry co„.i.ted onl, of .^o„,.,3,.
^^^^
ao reason why
.he class divisions which existed 1„ Yorkshire should have
.topped at the Tees. Second, Yorkshire was also the ho.e of a numerous
Class Of landowners who ranged in importance fro. very great nobles to
<,uite h^hle With o.ly a few hovates each. And although these .en
cannot be counted or the extent of their holdings computed except in a
few cases due to the way in which their na.es were recorded in Domes-
day, it is still clear that Jolllffe's el,.ive "lord of the shire-
finds only a few peers among them. Third, despite the equation of soke
and shire, one cannot say that Yorkshire in 1066 lay under the shire sys-
tem as Jolliffe pictured it in Northumbria. Sokes there are. The inci-
dents of peasant custom clearly have their origin and rational in the
shire. But the great territorial sokes stand out like islands in a sea
of smaller holdings; they do not cover the shire from border to border
as Jolliffe would have the shires do above the Tees. Ihe intervening
spaces are filled with all sizes of smaller sokes, some of which contain
nothing more than a village with perhaps a single berewlck or an attached
piece of sokeland, and there are also many holdings which consist of only
a single village or of part of a village with no dependent berewicks or
sokelands. In terms of percentages, the sokes (the linked entries of the
geographers) account for 64 percent of the entries in Yorkshire; the sin-
gle holdings aoonnt to 36 percent.^"* In other words, although the soke
is characteristic of laindholding in Yorkshire, it varied in size and
shared the countryside with a large minority of unitary holdings. The
latter and the siaaller sokes are explicable in terms of a decayed and
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f.a^e„.e. sH...
.......
^^^^^^^^
Plici^y Of lana.oldi„g which
.olUHe cUi^. existed in
.o«H^..ia
before
.he .or_.
..,,^.,,,,„
^^^^^^ ^^^^
No«h>.bria„ lanaholdin, had heco.e complex lo„s .efore i066 and .hat
the lands beyond the Tee*; h^ri t,^*-es ad not remxned some sort of game preserve
for a timeless Anglo-Celtic society.
Jolliffe hi^elf seems to have gotten the concept of Northumbria as
a land of large shires from Domesday's description of Lancashire as con-
firmed by^the western portion of the early thirteenth-century Inquest of
Knights. These do indeed show that above the Ribble the vill was the
basis of society and that these vills were grouped together in large
shires which covered the countryside. Earl Tostig's pre-Conquest manor
of Preston in Ax^undemess had contained some sixty-two dependent vil-
lages, and his estate of Halton further north had included twenty-two
dependent villages. Other manors in the area in 1066 contained twenty-
seven, sixteen, and fourteen villages, and holdings made up of a single
village or part of a village seem to be entirely absent. These
shires of northern Lancashire were truly "princely" shires, and appar-
ently the five hundreds south of the Ribble, which belonged almost
entirely to the king, were similar tmits.^^^ The West was, then, full
of large constellations of villages which belonged mainly either to the
king or the earl and which provided Jolliffe's model. Yet it is doubt-
ful if they were anything more than a local phenomenon. It was shown
earlier that Lancashire with the adjoining parts of Westmorland and Cum-
berland was a late conquest from the kingdom of Strathclyde, and the
pattern of landholding which existed there in 1066 is just what one
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would expect to find in a recently conquered area. Arrangements were
si^le, and the clai^ o. the .ing were still strong. Furthermore, it
^ght be hazarded that if priMtive simplicity existed anywhere in Brit-
ain in 1066 south of the Highlands of Scotland, the lands of the old
kingdom of Strathclyde were the place to find it.
There exists no warrant whatsoever to carry groupings of this size
over the mountains as the normal form of tenurial pattern, but this is
exactly what Jolliffe did.^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^
^^^^^
appear in Northumbrian documents of the twelfth and thirteenth century
as "truncated" fragments of large shires which had existed in 1066 and
which had been universal at that date.^" Furthermore, he ignored any
evidence which indicated that Northumbrian society had become complex
before 1066 and was similar to Yorkshire. Ti.e process through which the
bishops of Durham acquired their estates, for instance, is known to a
certain extent and could only in the short run have brought diversity to
the shires between the Tees and the lyne. Aside from three royal grants
which apparently consisted of a full shire each or of several shires,
the bishops were granted villages and small groups of villages by the
local nobility, and they purchased groups of villages from the various
Scandinavian kings of York and Durham. Some of the estates which were
given to them by nobles had been originally purchased by the nobles, and
the bishops further complicated the system of landholding by "leasing"
assemblages of villages to members of the Northumbrian nobility . "^"^^ In
one notable case, a bishop even gave away a number of estates with his
daughter in marriage; and, although the marriage did not last, several
of the villages became hereditary possessions of the woman's descendants
by a later husband.^^^ Txansactlons of this sort are incompatible with
the social system which Jolliffe posited in Northumbria. There is no
mention of them in his discussion of Northumbrian society, nor did he
consider the peasant groups which existed in Durham in the twelfth cen-
tury. Boldon Book shows that they were divided into the three broad
classes of molmen (firmars), bonders (villeins), and cottars. The simi-
larities between the bonders, the most numerous class, and the villeins
of Yorkshire were pointed out earlier, and it see^ that a like identi-
fication can be made between the moLaen and the sokemen. Molmen were
perhaps former freemen; certainly they were distinct from the Anglo-
Norman firmars with whom they have usually been confused. They were
not essentially rent-payers like the latter. Several villages were popu-
lated exclusively by molmen, and in a number of others they constituted
a normal segment of the peasant population alongside the bonders and
cottars. These men held bovates and performed agricultural services
which were usually lighter than those of the villeins and were remark-
ably like those done by some of the sokemen in Yorkshire. Jolliffe
seems to have thought that the creation of these peasant groups above
the Tees had occurred after 1066,^^^ but given the parallels between the
molmen and bonders of Durham and the sokemen and villeins of Yorkshire,
this is quite doubtful.
In the face of these considerations, it must be concluded that his
picture of northern society was over simplified. His work on peasant
custom seems to be sound. But the shires had been "truncated," and
social diversity had developed long before 1066. Had Domesday reached
to the Tweed, it would probably have disclosed a society much like the
one wHicH exUte. Vo.Kah... «o»Hu...,a wouia .ave appea.e. poo.e.
no doub.. Pe.haps villages „ouX. Have
.een divided between diteereni
lords less frequently than those in Yorkshire/^" hut the sa.e social
groups and the sa.e basic patterns of landholding „ould have appeared,
were it not for the difficulties introduced into the study of English
institutions bv the n;in*>« t-u-tc. iy Da es, this conclusion would have been worked out
long ago on the basis of the general similarity between the soke and the
shire. That this was not done has been unfortunate. The institutional
structure of the North has been obscured by attempts to divine patterns
of ethnic institutions, and the actual indications concerning the evolu-
tion of northern society whirh H*^ t-u^ u-i^j-cL n cn lie in the shire fragments have been
ignored except by Jolliffe.
These fragments, in fact, provide important hints respective to the
evolution of the North's institutions. It is curious, for instance,
that Jolliffe's three clearest examples of shires, the Norhan^Islandshire
complex. Bedlingtonshire. and Heighingtonshire, all belonged to the
Church. This was evidently not the result of the fact that the Church
was the only known pre-Conquest landowner to survive the Conquest above
the Tees for the same pattern is observable in Yorkshire. In 1066 the
great territorial sokes belonged almost exclusively to the king, the
Church, and the men who had been earls, were earls, or could be expected
to become earls. This is suspicious, and it is matched by another sin-
gular phenomenon. By the time of Boldon Book, Heighingtonshire and Bed-
lingtonshire both consisted of six villages. Two examples, of course,
are not very significant, and Norharashire only comprised ten villages at
121this time. But a later survey which includes Islandshire with
six.
If the true number was the former, one »lght guess that a shire
cc^slsted of either six or twelve villages; and. somewhat surprisingly,
this figure can be confirmed. All that is necessary is enough encour-
agement to begin the tedious work of counting villages. »,en Cnut gave
St-inl-P cu. suis appendiciis to St. Cuthbert. it consisted of twelve
vills and was presu^bly a shire. The lands which Bishop Aldhun "leased"
to three earls contained twenty-four villages, and Athelstan's gift of
South Wearmouth was made up of twelve vills. Even earlier (900-915),
Bishop Cutheard "leased" Easington with either eleven or twelve vills to
123
a noble. These examples show that the Northumbrian shire was prob-
ably a unit of twelve vills or its multiple, but the truly amazing thing
is that this unit did not stop at the Tees. If one goes to the trouble
to count the berewicks and sokelands of the large territorial sokes in
Yorkshire, the same number appears with majestic regularity
.
TABLE 2
The Composition of Large Territorial Sokes in Yorkshire
Soke
Aldborough
Easingwold
Palsgrave
Grindleton
Howden
K±lnsea
Kirkby Moorside
Knaresborough
Lof tho use
Berewicks
3
1
1
12
4
11
Sokelands Total Holder TRE
8 12 King Edward
10 12 Earl Morcar
21 23 Tostig
13 Earl Tostig
24 25 King Edward
11 12 Morcar
8 13 Orm
12 King Edward
12 13 Earl Siward
TABLE 2--Continued
Soke
Mappleton
Northallerton
Pickering
Ripon
Sherburn
Tanshelf
Wakefield
Weaverthorpe
Whitby
Withernsea
BerpiiTi r"lf o bokelands Total
— 11 12
11 24 36
4 18 23
16 7 or 8 23 or 24
[23] [24]
5? 6? 12
9 or 9 14 or 38 24 or 48
3 8 12
1 11 13
11 12
Holder TRE
Morcar
Earl Edwin
Morcar
Abp. of York
Abp. of York
King Edward
King Edward
Abp. of York
Earl Siward
Morcar
This list is not all inclusive. There were several large sokes which do
not fit the pattern such as Coinisborough (28) and Gilling (31), and the
smaller sokes based on the unit of six have been left out.^^S ^^^^^
are enough examples here to show that the big sokes of Yorkshire were
based on the unit of twelve.
This is an interesting discovery. Numerologists can be expected to
have their own suggestions on its meaning, but its significance probably
reaches no further than the mundane fact that there are twelve months in
the year, and that this would seem a natural unit to an agricultural peo-
ple. Twelve villages made a shire above the Tees. A soke center with
eleven berewicks and so^elands made a soke in Yorkshire. The berewicks
and sokelands were not always complete vills in 1086. But they usually
were, and the exceptions probably had been in the past. The unit of
twelve villages was evidently very ancient. Both Ripon and the Norham-
Islandshire complex were pre-Danish possessions of the Church. Neither
the tax assessment for the Danegeld, the canicates, nor the specifics of
landlord right, the berewicks and sokelands, bear any clear relationship
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Lon
to It in
.„..3hire. The, pU, a„o.s the face of .he u„Us of e>,elve
an arbitrary fashion which bespeaks the needs and ^udg^ents of let.
ages. n>e unit Itself Is probably a relic of the days when taxatl.
went by the village. In Durha. this syste. survived in a number of vil-
lages into the late twelfth century, and lolliffe has argued convincingly
that a.sess.ent by the village had once been the rule. The principal
and oldest burden which lay upon the villages was. of course, the syste.
of renders in kind and the hospitality dues.^^* the English equivalent
of the Scottish cam and coneveth. and the grouping of villages in units
of twelve had in all likelihood been connected with this system. Such
groups may have been the basis for seasonal progresses through the king-
dom four times a year with a stop of. say. three days in each shire to
eat the food and dispense Justice. Alternately, they could have pro-
vided the court a regular supply of food in conjunction with the carting
dues which lay upon the villages. Other arrangements would also have
been possible, but it is the general Insight into the early function of
the shire which is important.
Originally the shires had been nothing more than arbitrary adminis-
trative districts of the royal support system of the Northumbrian king-
dom. They were the mechanism through which food and (later?) customary
labor were extracted from the peasantry for the support of the king and
his warriors, and they were not originally "Celtic principalities,"
although they might have been "Celtic" administrative units which the
Northuiafarians took over as the basis of their kingdom. Davis has argued
that the sokelands of East Anglia were a relic of a pre-hundredal royal
127support system, and the Northumbrian shires were probably analogous
enough to impose the hundred or the wapentake, and the old shires per-
sisted in altered for. down to the High Middle Ages, m Yorkshire, how-
ever, the new institutions were introduced presumably after the destruc-
tion of the Norwegian kingdom, and the shires of the area lost their
judicial functions. I^ey had also, it seems, been renamed "sokes" by
the Danes, but this was not a very serious change, although it has
clouded the issue. Later in Scandinavia, sokn meant "parish" which was,
of course, exactly what the shires had been in an ecclesiastical
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sense. Furthermore, the original nature of the Northumbrian shire
was curiously enough not forgotten in Yorkshire. There are occasional
exan^les from after 1066 of wapentakes being called "shires. "^^^
If this explanation of the shire is correct, it has important impli-
cations concerning the manorial structure of the North. Under the sys-
tem of landholding and rights which first appear in Yorkshire in 1066
and are later explained in more detail for the North generally, the king
received the old renders and works, which had characterized the shire
system, from the great sokes and smaller estates of the royal demesne.
Perhaps the sokes held by the earls should also be considered part of the
ancient demesne, but on the lands of the Church and the nobility these
same renders and works went to the landowner, not to the king. They had
been submerged to the manorial level: The right to exact them from the
peasants constituted the normal prerogative of the landowner in the
North. In a very real sense, these rights were the manor between the
Humfaer and the Tweed, and the work of Eric John on the land tenure of
early Anglo-Saxon England explains how this had come to be. He would
define
.He of an es.a.e as Boo.Una. no. a.
.He s.an. o. .He Un.
ieoTH wHicH
.He peasan.s o„e.
.He king, ^ese g.an.s were «.e In pe.-
peeui., and originally only „en. .o .He CHurcH. By Bede's
.1^, However
the nobilLy,
„H1CH had hl.Her.o only Had a life in.eres. in es.a.es
began
.o ob.ain Bookland. and
.His
.ype of
.enure la.er beca.e
.He co.-
way m WHICH land was Held."0
^^^^
lies in .He fac.
.ha.
.He Nor.hu*ria„ feo™
.us. have consisted of .He
dues and services produced hy .He sHires. If .his identification is cor-
rect, gran.s of Bookland provided the
.ecHanis. Hy which the old royal
rights of the shire devolved to the landlords of .He Nor.Hu*rian king-
dom and became
.He basic mnorial rights of the North.
This hypothesis does two inportant things. Firs., it provides a
theoretical background for the landHolding patterns of Yorkshire in
'
104.6. The original grants of Bookland were probably sHires or simple
parts of one. Over time, however, the normal mechanisms of Anglo-Saxon
laid transfer, buying and selling, division among Heirs, and gifts to
the Church in addition to seizure by the Vikings in Yorkshire and Durham
wcmld produce the compl-x and fragmen.ed es.a.es of all sizes which the
nobility Held in 1066. "1 ^e Church, on the other Hand, nei.Her divided
nor sold, although it was sometimes robbed, so .Hat its shires endured
XKal longer than those of the nobility, and .he great sokes of .he king
and the earls were unaliena.ed sections of the old shire system. The
smaller es.a.es held by the king and .He Church were obtained from .He
nobility by donation, purchase, and forfeiture for sin in .he case of the
latter, and presumably by confiscation in the case of the klng.'^'^
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Second, this hypothesis partially explains why the con^arisons of
Northu^rian, Welsh, and Scottish custom tend to be inexact, m the
early Middle Ages, functionally si^lar royal support system had
existed in all three areas, but their development over ti.e was very
different. The Welsh syste. lasted intact into the thirteenth century
still providing the Welsh princes with food, lodging, and local police,
la Northu.i,ria, the shire syste. was submerged to the manorial level by
Bookland except on the royal demesne and came to support the nobility
and the Church instead of the king. Subsequently, new burdens, the
kill's three works and the geld, were imposed upon Yorkshire, and there
are vague traces from after the Conquest that the Northumbrian earls had
created a similar system for Northumbria which consisted of army ser-
vice, fortress repair, and cornage.133 ^he Scottish system met a rather
different fate. Like the one in Wales, it lasted into the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries although its character had changed by this time.
The kings still received their cain and coneveth, but the Scots who did
not develop a tenure comparable to Bookland had achieved the same end by
other means. The thanes and earls, theoretically officials of the king,
had in fact become here "Itary, and they each took a "cut" ( cult ) of the
renders which in a diminished form eventually reached the king. Thus
the Scottish royal support system maintained both the king and the nobil-
1 3Aity by the twelfth century. Given these different histories, it is
quite understandable why the comparisons which were discussed earlier are
ofssen misleading. Such a method of institutional investigation is pos-
sible, but future attempts will have to be considerably more sophisti-
cafiied since, even if it is assumed that these three systems were once
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slenae. evidence
.Ha.
.He sy..e^
...u, ,
^^^^
ao. U,e .esul. of .He "pa.alleX s.ow.H" „HicH
.„lUKe
.HousH. so
unliUeX,. THe la..e. is „o. an
.^oss.HlU.,.
..naUy.
.He ,oes.lo„ of
*e A„8Xo-Saxon fee™ He .aken in.o consid.a.lo„. m pa..icula.
it Have .o be de.e^lned wHe.Her
.He sHl.e sys.e. of Ko..Hu.bria
was really unique In AngK^Saxon England or „hetner i.s ou.llnes are
only clearer because of the backwardness of .he Nor.h.
In conclusion, one very dark subjec. remain, i. see^ cer.aln
tha. northern socle.y was far
.ore complex In 1566 .Han Jolllffe
.Hough,
and that the existence of Bookland In the North was a ^jor cause of
this complexLy. THe latter was also responsible, in part, tor the
instltu.ional divergence of .He North from Scotland and Wales, but it
does not completely explain landholding as i. erLsted at the time of
'
Domesday Book. In his early work on landholding in the Danelaw, Stenton
found that es.a.es were divided between n,o .ypes of land, inland and
sokeland. The former comprised lands described in Domesday as being
manors or berewicks and mean. .ha. the soil belonged to the lord of the
estate. Sokeland, on f-e other Hand, was owned by the person who occu-
pied it, presumably a sokeman, and the lord only had jurisdiction over
135this land. One might, of course, take issue with this generalized
concept of jurisdiction and say instead that the sokemen paid the old
royal dues to the lord of the estate, but this does not abolish the dis-
tinction between inland, the origin of which is .jncertain, and sokeland,
which was Bookland. Nor was this distinction im its essence the result
of soiae formula imposed on the Danelaw by the Rormans. One may suspect
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that Donesday-s e»ploy.e„t of .he ter. "Inland" represented a southern
usage, but the sa„e categories were used m a pre-Con,uest survey of so.
estates of the archbishop of York. The survey was „ade ca. 1030 and
covers the sokes of Rlpon. Otley, and Sherburn. It see:.s to be based on
the assu^tion that the lands of these estates were either agenland or
socnland. Agenland, moreover, apparently consisted of Inlande (demesne
land in the strict sense?) and werocland, a term otherwise unknown."^
The distinction between agenland and socnland would seem to be the same
as Domesday's distinction between Inland and sokeland, or the distinc-
tion between inland and gesette land found in the Tidenham survey which
has recently been discussed by J. F. McGovern. He thought that the
£esette land was property held only by Bookright and that inland was
held by some inferior tenure as well."' This may be true, but one won-
ders if the emphasis is correct. From Bookland a lord received soke,
the royal dues. Stenton thought that a lord actually owned his inland,
the pre-Conquest agenland or the "land which belonged to the hall" In a
variant formula of Domesday /-^^ If this explanation is right, and it
certainly seems to be, then one would suppose that a lord would have a
great deal more control over and profit from this sort of land. Further-
more, there is a strong possibility that the differences between peas-
ants were somehow correlated with these tenures. In two instances Domes-
day gives the TRE population of sokes in Yorkshire. In Northallerton
and its berewicks there were 66 villeins in 1066, and its sokelands were
populated by 116 sokemen. At Falsgrave, Che other example, the popula-
tion of the inland is not given, but it is recorded that there were 108
139sokemen on the sokeland. If these two entries are representative,
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one cou.. concxud.
.Hat viXleins Uve. on .nlan. an. so.e^en on so.eXan.
Such a conclusion vould be a ^,„. ^tep
.o„aras
..i„gl„,
,,3,„,3,„„
Of Anglo-Saxon land law Into contact „ith the social structure of the
kingdom, but It can only he stated as a posslhillty. One and a half
exa^les are not enough to prove It; and. 1„ any case, there renins the
question of Inland Itself. Was it so„e old secondary tenure, as old or
older than BooUand, or was it a new development, an intensive £or„ of
noble o^ership which had emerged in the tenth century, perhaps connected
with sake and soke?
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since the reasons why these two sections differed are unknown. Conse-quently the figures are based on either the text or the summary, and thetwo are not combined except for Wakefield. In the case of villagesdivided between a berewick and sokeland, each property has been counted
separately.
The figures for three of the sokes require some comment. The text
gives 24 places for Wakefield in the main entry describing the estate
Domesday, fol. 299b; but if the 18 other pieces of sokeland which are'
recorded only in the summary are combined with 4 properties whose status
as sokeland or thaneland was uncertain and with 2 pieces of sokeland
which were added after the conclusion of the main entry, then the total
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23 places mentioned
.rL? / c rL^'lL" 'Tl.l"'^''!''' ^Tanshelf Is a problem Th^ ' -— • . P. 210, n. 4. Finally,
fol. 316b; and Che re;t 2 the " ^ ^I""' ' i""" •
mixed With the rest Ube«-s uL" ^^^"^^^^ J" -ol-^ed^rles
12 If two villages, Notone and Ce^^t" wh^A'sL"^ to h^
"
ent manors (each had a hal l ft,r^ , , ^"^"^ independ-
shlre) are excluded! i^.,'flT. TlT. °' "
Harold a^;;/Ed:in!°'' "^^^ respectively by Earl
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Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions," pp. lO-ll
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The Kalendar of Abbot S^lT^^nr^
,
ed. Davis dd vH.-.- t
xlvi-xlvii. See BarrowTlKTH^^^ f Scotr ^ 25 Tnr f . ^ 'explanation. ^ i_H^_5 ots, p. , for a similar
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Stenton, "The Danes in England," p. 216, n. 1.
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11^^ f^' ^^"^^ wapentake was called Burgshire. Bulmer
Tp?\ ' /"'"""'"^'""^ Cravenshire. Furthe^^o;e the honorof Richmond was made up of Gillingshire and Langershire!
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,John, Orbis Britanniae. pp. 69-70, 104, 108, 114, 117.
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Landholding had clearly become both fluid and complicated by1066. In particular, the claitis mention the case of Asa. She had beenmarried to Bernulf but had held the lands which she had brought with her
llll or r'f"'' r '^^"P^^^^l^ ^hat he could not give them Lay, sell
fllll ^ T 'u':^^''' ^^"hermore, when they separated, she ke;t herami y lands. This example shows the reality of female inheritence inthe North, and the prohibitions which limited Bernulf 's control overher land suggest that the possibility of alienation was not unlikely.Domesday
, fol. 373.
ux ttei
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T qoi
^''''^^^^'^°P Oswald's survey of some of the lands of York, EHDi, :)21. At the end of the sur-zey it is recorded that Archbishop Oscetil'
obtained Helperby and its soke "in compensation for illicit cohabitation."ibid
.
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Domesday, fol. 298. The question of the general burdens which
lay across Northumbrian society is very obscure. No pre-Conquest docu-
ments show whether the king's three burdens existed above the Tees, but
a charter from 1137 suggests that a similar system had been in force. In
that year Edgar, son of Cospatric, confirmed a piece of land to Ralph de
Merlay to be held in frank marriage freely exceptis tribus servlciis
,
videlicet cumunis excersitus in Comitatu, et cornagio. et comune opus_
castelli in Comitatu. Lapsley, "Cornage and Drengage," p. 679. Further-
more, sometime between 1139 and 1152, Earl Henry freed Tyneraouth Priory
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|." ^££^£iS£JsSi^':sa r sr::.<:;.r:;.
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1972). pp 88:96ru?-22T^^^^^^^^" " ^"^ (Cambridge,
Stenton, 'The Northern Danelaw," pp. n, 13, 14 50
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1956), Nort55^iV7^^^r^;Ff^3-^ Robertson (2nd ed.; Cambridge,
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Stenton, "The Northern Danelaw," p. 50.
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CHAPTER IV
THE RULE OF lOSTIG AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE NOBLES OF VORK
In the North there is a unity to the fifteen years which follow
1055. n.e cohesiveness is provided
,y the so*er theee of the hreaUdown
of royal government above the Hu*er and the attendant rush of the north-
ern thegns to destruction. The development and tragic dimensions of
these events could perhaps have been captured in heroic verse, but no
known saga-maker recorded the fate of the men of the North and the blind-
ness which brought them to it. Only disjointed or partially informed
Chronicle accounts of these events survive, and the monks who wrote them
were not able to explain in any detail what happened In the North.
Their attention was fixed on the career of William the Conqueror. The
way was thus opened to the conventional, William centered accounts of
northern resistance to the Norman Conquest. Such reconstructions have
their value, but with the life of William as their focus, they tend to
isolate events in the North from each other and to obscure their meaning.
This court-centered point of view creates its ow, system of causation
and emphasizes the connection between the coming of the Normans and the
outbreak of rebellion above the Humber.
The connection did, of course, exist, but the region-based narra-
tive of the preceding chapters has established that royal government In
the North was beset by serious problems long before 1066 and that Earl
Siward did nothing to improve the situation. This chapter will show
that an attempt was made to solve some of these problems on the govern-
mental level in the decade from 1055 to 1065 and that this attempt not
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only
.rough, abou. the collapse of
.o,al authority 1„ the Notth 10S5
but also „a. largely responsible for norther, resistance to the Nor»an
conquest. I^.e biographer of M„ard the Confessor
.ell have been
correct whan he linked the elision of Earl Tostlg fro. his earldo.
With the beginning of Edward's physical decllne.l The old
.ing knew his
real, well enough to see the significance of Tostig-s failure. It Is
this failure which links together the years Mediately before and after
1066 in the North. Tostig turned traditional resentments and passive
disloyalty Into actual rebelUon and thus created a very difficult polit-
ical Situation which in the end »ade a peaceful extension of Noroan
power over the North i^ossible. After 1065 the northern thegns revolted
as much because of what had happened to them before the arrival of the
Nonnans as because of what Williaa actually did to them. Their ultimate
fear was that their antique world was in jeopardy, and they resisted
WilUam with methods appropriate to that world. These came so near to
success that they provoked the harrying of the North in 1069.
The immediate origin of this sequence of events dates from the
deaths of Osbeorn In 1054 and Siward in 1055 because these deaths made
possible a most unfortunate decision respecting the succession of the
earldom. Hitherto, northern earls had possessed certain definite attri-
butes of family or ethnic origin, depending on whether they were earls
of Northumbrla or York. This is perhaps clearest in the case of the
former which had earls from the house of Bamburgh until Siward and where
even after this date the old ruling family maintained its local position.
In Yorkshire the situation was somewhat more complex, yet even here the
earls fell into clearly defined groups prior to 1055. With the exception
Scandinavians or. less f.e^uently.
.e^e.s of .he house of Ba*„,H ^
Keve. had a „es. Sa=con heM df.ec.
.„Xe fn eUhe. province. This changed
in 1055 „l.h the appointment of Tostlg. Barl Sodwln's third son. as earl
in preference to Waltheof. Slward's ,oung son. or Cospatrlc. the eldest
surviving representative of the Ba^nrgh fa^ly. ^e only thing Danish
about lostlg was his na^. and he had no .no™ connection with the old
ruling fa^iy of ^oxthu^rla. He was, consequently, a complete outsider
in the North, and his appointment was in that sense revolutionary.
Because of this aspect of the situation, the choice of Tostlg stands In
serious need of e::planatlon. but on this critical point, there Is no
direct evidence. It is often assumed that his appointment represented
an attempt to Integrate the North more closely into the Anglo-Saxon klng-
dom.3 There may well be some truth in this Idea, and It undoubtedly
appeared so to the northerners. lostlg could hardly have been expected
to share their point of view. But this may have been more a result than
a preconceived intention for It is quite possible that the choice of
lostlg represented merely a shortsighted attempt at family aggrandize-
ment by the house of Godwin. By the reign of Edward the Confessor, the
earldoms of the Eastern Midlands and East Anglla were commonly given to
younger members of the families of the earls of Wessex and Mercia." and
the appointment of lostlg may have been simply the application of this
policy to the North. Tostlg was the brother of Earl Harold of Wessex
and of the queen, and his acquisition of the North probably represented
a major victory over the family of Earl Leofrlc of Mercla whose eldest
sonSlfgar was exiled at this time, apparently because he too wished to
Of his ea.Xdo. passed to G,..H. „e«
,o.„ges. son of CoC„i„ = „
th.s e^xanauon of
..e eXevat.on of Xos.,
. .h. „„„He„ ean.o.
.s
correct, his appointment was p.o.a.i, devoia-at least i„itfaU.-of an.
Other significance.
Be this as It ^y, Tostlg „as an unfortunate choice and
.ust have
found hl^elf in an
.nenvlahle position. He could not have heen certain
how the northerners would react to their first southern earl, and he was
in a weaker position than his Inmediate predecessors It ,i^i.cuc(_t;j,i,ors, i IS true that
had Osbeorn lived and heco« earl, he would probahly have inherited his
father's unpopularity above the Tees, yet he would have had. at least,
the support of the Yorkshlremen. n,is had allowed Slward to rule and'
keep Northu:*ria ,uiet. lostig. on the other hand, fell heir to the
problem left by Slward hut lacked any i^ortant local support above the
Hu»ber. Indeed, his effectiveness as earl probably rested on the Inter-
nal divisions aM,ng the northerners and on his own warband which by 1065
nurtered over two hundred housecarls.^ This was a very Impressive force,
probably the
..instay of his government, of course, to maintain such an
army was an expensive proposition; and. like Slward before him. Tostlg
held southern counties as part of his earldom to help defray the cost.
From 1055 he was earl of Northampton and probably of Huntingdon as well,
and there is evidence that he also held Nottinghamshire.' As a result
of these possessions. Tostlg must have been formidable, even though he
was an outsider.
Furthermore, there was one immediate advantage which the new earl
enjoyed because he was not from the North. The converse of not having
local partisans was the absence of local eneMes. Tostlg bad a freedo.
Of maneuver greater than that of bis l..edlate predecessors, and be used
it to try to disar. potential sources of opposition. He entrusted tbe
actual government of the earldo. to a local Yorkshire tbegn, Copsig,^
Who does not appear to bave been linked either to Siward's fa^ly or to
the house of Bao^urgh. Copsig would have been fa^liar with local prob-
len^s and customs and may have acted as a buffer between the northern
nobility and Tostig. If such was the case, Copsig's appointment was a
prudent decision which minimized friction. Tostig may also have tried
to improve relations with the clerks of Durham. Certainly by the time
of Symeon of Durham, it was thought that Tostig had held St. Cuthbert's
church in great veneration and had given gifts to the church. It is
also known that Copsig gave several estates in Yorkshire to Durham dur-
ing this period.^ Since under normal conditions the giving of land and
ornaments was the surest way of winning the gratitude of clerks and
monks, these gifts probably represent an attempt to conciliate the
clerks of Durham. They were clearly not deathbed bequests.
It is doubtful, however, if this attempt was successful. The
Church normally held one thing dearer than property: its privileges.
These were what was at issue in the North, and on this point Tostig did
not abandon Siward's policy. In 1056 Bishop iEthelric resigned Durham
and returned to Peterborough, whence he had come some thirty-six years
before. Two explanations for this rather unusual act survive. One
source says that he gave up the bishopric because he was weak (i.e. he
had no local support) and could not properly defend the church's liberty
against unnamed evil men."*"^ The other account asserts that he robbed
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eath.
s power;
the Church Of a buried Measure and absconded to Pe.erborousb." what-
ever the truth of the ^tter was. both accounts show that ^thelric was
extremely unpopular in Durham. It is also „rok»M .i IS p bably significant that he
chose to relinquish the bishopric the year after Siward's d
^thelric had only Rept his position at Durha. by means of Siward-
end. With the death of the earl, he may have found his position unten-
able. It is even possible that Tostig refused to support him against
the clerks. This would be compatible with the first of the two versions
of his resignation and would be consistent with Tostig-s gifts to the
church. If this was the case, the earl clearly misjudged the situation,
however, for he did not allow the clerks to elect ^thelric's successor.
Rather, Tostig chose the new bishop, and he selected Sthelwine
,
iEthelric's brother," who was destined to be unpopular for the same rea-
sons that his brother had been. The new bishop was an outsider who had
not been chosen by the clerks; in time he too would be branded a thief.
Tostig did not win the goodwill of the clerks of Durham by this appoint-
ment.
Although this was to prove to be a dangerous mistake later, in the
years following 1055 the feelings of the Durham clerks probably seemed a
distinctly secondary problem to Tostig. He had much more immediate dif-
ficulties with the Scots. During the late 1050's, King Malcolm ceased
to be an English client king and became a threat to the North worthy of
his ancestors. The quickness of this reversal was partially the result
of his success in consolidating his position in Scotland. In 1054 Siward
had placed him in possession only of southern Scotland. Macbeth had
escaped the battle and retreated to Moray, his native province, where he
lield out for three more vears m=,i-, iy . Malcolm was able, however, to kill him
in 1057, and early in the following year he killed Lulach, Macbeth's
st^son. Who had been proclaimed king after Macbeth's death." Thus by
1058 Malcolm had eUminated all his i^ediate rivals and was free to
Begin raiding the North of England. Certain domestic factors, which
stewed from the nature of Scottish society, probably urged him to make
tMs decision. The Scots seem to have viewed an invasion of the North
principally as an occasion for the forcible transfer of property: They
ca^ over the Tweed and out of the hills to steal cattle, take slaves,
collect general booty. A king who could successfully lead such
bloodthirsty Shopping trips gained not only wealth and prestige at home
^ probably also found it easier to govern. Malcolm II had launched
to reign With an invasion of England, and his grandson Duncan had done
^ same within six years of becoming king. When Malcolm began to raid
the North, he was, in a sense, only responding to the necessities of a
iKxoT kingdom and of a political system based on a warrior king.
These general considerations are undoubtedly important in explain-
^ why Malcolm suddenly turned on his English supporters. He was not a
mere Ingrate whom Siward had completely misjudged. Still, there were
probably more concrete factors which urged him to come over the border.
In particular, the Scottish king had a "just" grievance and was faced
with a very promising chance to right it. The grievance was, of course,
English possession of the southern part of the Cumbrian kingdom. There
was no reason why Malcolm should accept this diminuation of his ancestral
lands once his need for English help had passed. This need ended with
the deaths of Macbeth and Lulach, and Malcolm could attempt its
reconcuest. This was the flaw in Earl Siward's Scottish policy. Per-
as his son, vould be able to thwart Scottish efforts to reclaim Cumber-
land. If such had been his hope, it was not unrealistic because the
only major victory which the Scots had won against the northern English
had been at Carham where they had faced only the men from above the Tees.
After 1055, however, the situation in the North was very different from
any that Siward is likely to have envisaged. The North had a West Saxon
earl, and it must have been problematical whether he would be able to
resist the Scots. In fact, the possibility that the divisions between
Tostig and the men of his earldom would weaken English resistance was
probably a strong inducement for Malcolm to come over the border.
The incursions began in 1058 or early in 1059 and were evidently
small raids, perhaps designed to test Tostig. If such was their inten-
tion, the earl's response must have been encouraging to Malcolm. Tostig
did not reply with raids on Scotland as might have been expected; rather,
he chose to negotiate. In 1059 iEthelwine, bishop of Durham, Kynsige,
the archbishop of York, and the earl journeyed to Scotland and induced
Malcolm to come south with them to parley with Edward. Although this
collection of dignitaries may have been designed to flatter the vanity
of the young king, it could equally well be viewed as an expression of
weakness. The English clearly hoped to pacify Malcolm by diplomacy
rather than by war. They brought him over the Tweed, and he met Edward
somewhere in the North, perhaps at York. The issues which were dis-
cussed at this meeting are not known, but it is likely that Malcolm
wanted the return of Cumberland. This demand, if in fact made, was
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tu. .Ke.e
.3 .o „o.. eKe so.ces MaXeoX.
.eceXvea a„..M„,
became sworn brothers anH Mai^^ia. d Malcolm even have given hostages for his
Sood .ehavio.. xhe
.eeUng of 105, „as aiplomaticall, a victor, for
the English. Xostig had won peace for the North, and Malcolm must have
gone hone with his aims unfulfilled.
At least, this Is the simplest explanation for what followed.
Tostig evidently thought that his sworn brotherhood with Malcolm could
be relied upon for in 1061 he traveled to Rome with Aldred. the new
archbishop of York. The North was thus deprived of its two principal
leaders, and Malcolm took the opportunity to show how happy he was with
the 1059 agreement. He launched a frontal attack over the Tweed, the
type of Invasion which had become increasingly common as the eleventh
century progressed. The Scots laid waste Northumberland and took slaves.
It la reported that they even ravaged Lindisfame. and there is circus
stantlal evidence that Malcolm crossed the Tyna and harried Durham
before withdrawing.^* This invasion is described in only the vaguest
tenK, but probably the violation of Undisfame shows that it was the
kind of double invasion from the north and west which Siward had feared.
This cannot be established conclusively, but it is very likely. During
later invasions, the Scots usually tried to respect the major holy
places of the North, but the Cumbrians honored no such restraint. If
this supposition Is correct, the invasion of 1061 shows the tactical
limitations of Siward's annexation of Cumberland. Possession of the
western end of the Tvne r^n as ary Gap dxd not protect the lands above the Tyne
against raids from the west.
What Malcolm hoped to gain by this incursion is not disclosed by
the chronicle account, but other evidence suggests that his aim was to
recover Cumberland and that he succeeded. This is, of course, a reason-
able hypothesis, and it is also the easiest way of explaining the few
things known about the West through the year 1070. As was discussed
earlier, Cospatric's charter established that Siward had held power over
Cumberland, but the document itself may date from after Siward's death
in 1055. Theoretically it could come from as late as 1064 when Cospatric,
the grantor, was killed,^^ and if this were the case, it would be impos-
sible to hold that Malcolm had recovered Cumberland in 1061. But such a
late date is, in fact, unlikely because there is evidence that the West
had been invaded and conquered prior to 1065. Parts of northern Lanca-
shire and the southern sections of Cumberland and Westmorland were sur-
veyed in Domesday, and by this time the villages in the area were in a
derelict condition. The ravaging of this region, however, cannot be
ascribed to any of the post-1066 disturbances; and, in any case, Domesday
suggests that these lands were already waste in 1066. Tostig had held
most of them before the revolt of 1065, yet they did not pass to his
successor Earl Morcar. Tostig was still recorded as their lord in 1066;
and since Tostig actually held nothing by that date,^^ this must mean
that the lands were already derelict when Morcar became earl. Given
this conclusion, it has been suggested that these estates were plundered
in the revolt against Tostig in 1065, but this explanation cannot be
sustained because the accounts of the revolt do not indicate that the
«l>.ls did anything ^.e than kill Xostlg-s housecarls and rob his trea-
before arching south. With the dls^asal of this suggestion. It
be«».s necessary to assu^ that northern Lancashire „as wasted prior to
l0«5-but after 1055 when lostlg beca^ earl. Given these tl.e Un^ts.
the «,st XlRely hypothesis Is that the area was devastated in the course
»f an l-rvaslon of Cumberland. The occurrence of such an Invasion cannot
be doubted. Hugh the Chantor records that Siward's western bishopric
was destroyed in war. and since the nu*er of Malcolm's invasions was
veil reme^ered in the North, this incursion Into Cu^erland oust be
identical with Malcolm's first major Invasion of the North in loei.^"
Bhen Malcolm launched his second invasion in 1070. he used Cumberland as
kU base and attacked Yorkshire over Stainmore. The chronicle which
describes this Incident says explicitly that Malcolm held Cumberland at
21this time
.
In 1061, then, Malcolm invaded to regain Cumberland, and he struck
while Tostig and the archbishop were on their trip to Rome. The North
was thus leaderless, and there is no word that Malcolm met any organized
opposition. He invaded Northumberland, ravaged as far south as Durham,
and then moved up the Tyne Gap to take over Cumberland. During this
last stage of the campaign, northern Lancashire was wasted to such an
extent that many of the estates there remained without a lord until after
the Norman Conquest.
Late that year or early in 1062, Tostig returned from Rome and
found Malcolm in possession of Cumberland. Tne situation clearly called
for military reprisals, but none was forthcomingo The earl's reaction
was astonishing: He accepted the loss of Cumberland, and at some date
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prior to the fail of 1055. p.oBahl. 1„ 10a2, «e« to Scotl™.
-de peace with Malcol.." The a,.ee..„e. ^foh „as a serious sethac.
for the security of the North, left the Scot^ -fn n, cn b s x possession of Cumber-
land and marked the abandonment of Siward'c, .ff .•-nc r b rd s efforts to give the North a
defensible border. Malcolm's frontier on Stainmore was now within two
days, ride of York, and the Tyne Gap stood open. With Cumberland the
Scottish king gained the tactical advantage along the border, and he was
destined to keep it for thirty years.
The poor defensive position which characterized the North during
the reign of William the Conqueror had its immediate origin in Tostig's
failure to defend the North. Since the importance of this failure was
probably obvious at the time, Tostig's inactivity requires explanation.
At no time did he invade Scotland. Every incident along the border
shows the earl temporizing and negotiating, and given the fact that his
later exploits reveal, if nothing else, that he was a vigerous and war-
like man, his refusal to oppose Malcolm is mysterious. It cannot be
explained by the idea that the northerners accepted the validity of the
Scottish claim to Cumberland or by the hypothesis that Tostig made expe-
ditions against the Sco^s which went unrecorded because of the failure
°^ Anglo-Saxon Chronirle for the years 1062 and 1064.^^ In lieu of
these two possibilities, the most likely explanation of his inactivity
must be that his hold on the North was too insecure to risk an invasion
of Scotland. If this hypothesis is correct, the earl's unpopularity
existed as early as 1058-59, at most four years after he became earl.
This in turn suggests that Tostig was unpopular in the North from
the time of his appointment. This idea, of course, is not basically
surprising given the fact that he was an outsider who lacked any clai.
to traditional loyalties, but it does provide guidance for the interpre-
tation of the events of 1063 and 1064. This is necessary because in the
Chronicles the revolt which unseated Tostig in 1065 stands out starkly
with little background. It appears unconnected with the historic prob-
len. of northern governxnent and is explained as the result of tyrannical
acts co^r^tted by Tostig.^^ A nu^er of such acts are specified, but
the real question is whether the chroniclers have gotten the sequence of
causation right. If Tostig's unpopularity really dates fro. the early
days of his rule, then his "tyranny" actually may have been the result
of his attempt to govern a restive nobility.
This hypothesis clarifies one of the most outstanding charges made
against the earl. Florence of Worcester says that the northerners rose
against Tostig to avenge his treacherous murder of three important North-
umbrian nobles. In 1063 he had Gamel, son of Orm, and Ulf , son of
Dolfin, assassinated in his own chamber at York while the two were visit-
ing him under a safe conduct, and these deeds were followed in 1064 by
the murder of Cospatric at the king's Christmas court. This murder was
supposedly planned by the queen, Tostig's sister, in the interest of her
, 25brother. As the account stands, the meaning of these events is not
clear, but when the identities of the dead thegns are considered in the
light of Tostig's unpopularity, a rather different picture emerges. The
Cospatric killed at court was Earl Uhtred's youngest son and Earl
Siward's collaborator in Cumberland. By the 1060 's he was the eldest
surviving member of the house of Bamburgh and, as such, had a good claim
to be earl of Northumbria. The other two thegns were apparently his
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a.soci«es. Orel's fathe. 0.. Had ^.ned a slste. „, Co^pa^ic's. a„a
a "Ga^l" is mentioned a„o„g Cospatrlc'. relatives and th.gns In his
Cu^rian charter." Ulf.
.on of Oolfm. is pro^ahl, to he Identified as
the son Of the Dolfln „ho died fighting Macbeth In 1054 and who was hl^
self the son of Thorflnn. the recipient of Cospatric's charter. These
ne„ were the natural leaders of Northumbrian opposition to Tostlg's
rule, and their murders were exact parallels to Thurbrand's murder of
Uhtred, Carl-s murder of Ealdred, and Slward's ^rder of Eadulf. Tostlg
clearly feared the rivalry of the house of Ba^urgh and chose the usual
method of stifling Northu^rlan separatism when he killed Cospatrlc, the
Ust of imtred's unfortunate sons. It was ultl^tely, of course, a
foolish thing to do. Murder may have been the only convenient way of
dealing with the Hamburgh family, but separatism above the Tees had had
its origin in Uhtred's murder and had been fed by the murder of Ealdred.
Cospatric's death at the king's court was sufficient reason for the
Northumbrians to revolt.
This is clear enough, but it leaves the question of why the men of
York supported the rebellion. The accounts of the event indicate that
the North generally rose against Tostig, even though the Northumbrians
may have led the way. This is a problem because the union of Northum-
brians and Yorkshiremen to achieve a common goal was without historical
parallel. It might be, of course, that Tos tig's general unpopularity
above the Humber was sufficient to induce the men of York to join the
revolt or that the charge made in the earliest biography of Edward the
Confessor applies to Yorkshire. The foreign cleric who wrote this work
asserts that the northerners revolted because of the severity of Tostig'
s
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secur-
la. enforcement. He provides a frigKtening picture of the lacU of
ity Which existed on the northern roads and i^Ues that the nobles who
led the revolt had then^elves lived by robbery and were aggrieved
because Tostig had li^.ed their opportunities to practice their occupa-
tion. This would be a convenient explanation for the revolt in York-
shire, but, unfortunately, its details cannot be accepted. First, it is
difficult to believe that the harsh treatment of highwaymen produced the
kind of popular revolt which drove oat Tostig, particularly since the
sa^^account says that Siward had also been a stem enforcer of the
law. 9 Second, if this explanation vere accepted, Tostig would appear
blameless of causing the revolt. Such a conclusion is suspicious
because the biographer tends to be generally partial to the earl.^^
Finally, it is doubtful if the writer actually understood the true ori-
gin of the brigandage which afflicted the North. It will be suggested
"
later that this was one of the results of the loss of Cumberland.
Despite these objections, there still may be some truth in this
explanation. At a later point in his narrative, Edward's biographer
says essentially that many men charged that Tostig had used the courts
to make money. When nut this way, the picture of Tostig as the severe
and unpopular defender of justice begins to make more sense, for similar
accusations are found in other accomits of the revolt. The Anglo-Saxon
Chronicle says that Tostig was expelled "... because first he robbed
God, and all those who were less powerful than himself he deprived of
32Ixfe and land." This may mean that he administered justice and levied
fines arbitrarily, but it probably refers to the charge found in Florence
of Worcester who says that the Northumbrians (in this case, everyone
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above
.He Hu^e.)
.evoUed Because Xostt.
..a coUec.ed eno^ous
.axes
contrary to custo. throushout
.he Ho«h.33 Here Is Che real cause for
the revolt. Taxation reached enough people to produce the t.pe of popu-
lar uprising which overturned the earl.
Direct evidence on northern taxation is slight, needless to say, hut
it is Clear enough to show how Tostig found it easy to overtax the north-
erners and that such an atte:npt was a serious transgression of their
privileges. The northern fiscal syste. survived unaltered into the Nor-
inan period as a result of the successful revolt of 1065, and an inspec-
tion of it shows that the northern tax assessment was much lower than
that of the rest of England. The earliest clue to this comes from the
Domesday description of southern Lancashire which contains the curious
statement that six carucates equaled one hide in this area.^^ This
equation has usually been treated as an anomaly. Hides and carucates
were artificial measures of fiscal assessment, and the two are usually
regarded as equivalent terms. Theoretically, one carucate paid as much
tax as one hide, hence the absurdity of six carucates paying the same
tax as one hide. Unless the carucates of southern Lancashire were
exceptionally small, this region had an extremely beneficial assessment.
It might be suggested that this light tax burden was due to the fact that
the area had been part of Edward's demesne in 1065, but this explanation
cannot be sustained. Actually, this same equation was more widespread
than Domesday admits. William Farrer has shown that in the twelfth cen-
tury it was in use not only in southern Lancashire but also in northern
Lancashire with the adjacent parts of Cumberland and Westmorland, in
Yorkshire, and in Durham. All these areas paid geld as part of Yorkshire
at tte rate of 4d. fo. each carucate;
.Ix carucates thus produced 2s.
In tte rest of England either one carucate or one hide yielded 2s
No«hu*erla„d not have paid taxes even at the low rate found In the
re3t Of the North; It had never been assessed m either carucates or
hides and thus stood co^letely outside the Anglo-Saxon fiscal syste..^^
in any case, the North carried a .uch lighter tax burden than the rest
of the kingdom.
This low assessment probably originated when the Norwegian kingdom
of York was annexed by Wessex;^^ along with legal autonoro^. it was the
price of the North's submission. At the time this would have seemed a
reasonable compromise, but northern tax privileges must soon have hard-
ened into custom. They were, perhaps, regularized by Cnut,^^ and they
survived until Tostig's day as one of the most important distinctions
between the North and the rest of the kingdom. In a sense they must
"
ha^e stood out as glaring inconsistencies in the Anglo-Saxon tax struc-
ture, but it is doubtful if any theoretical preference in favor of equal
fiscal burdens prompted the earl to attack these arrangements. His
motive was entirely practical. Because of his unpopularity, Tostig
needed larger sums of money than those which were available from tradi-
tional sources. Specifically, the money was necessary to support the
private army upon which his rule depended. As he was harassed by the
Scots and the house of Bamburgh, his expenditures could only have
increased so that they led him, on the one hand, to put pressure on the
judicial system to produce more fines and confiscations, and, on the
other, to levy higher taxes contrary to custom. It was this attack on
the fiscal privileges of the North which united the Yorkshireraen with
the North^rtans and produced the popular support for the revolt o£
1065.
The uprising itself was heralded by the clerks of Durha.. They
were no happier with Bishop ^thelwine than they had been with his
brother. In particular, they feared that he too would rob their church
for the benefit of Peterborough, and a localist party had developed to
forestall this. The leader of the group was Elfred, son of Westou, who,
addition to protecting the sacred ornaments of the church, had beco.e
the great scourge of the ancient churchyards of the North. Presumably
clerks had had to endure sopMsticated gibes fro. their southern
bishops concerning Durham's poverty in the natter of sacred relics. In
a^y case, Elfred had devoted great energy to digging up the bodies of
important northern ecclesiastics and transporting thebones to Durham for
proper display. Until the spring of 1065, his activities had been a
iiatural and harmless reaction to cultural chauvinism, but in March of
t2.at year, they assumed a political dimension. Some two and one half
««nths after the betrayal and murder of Cospatric, Elfred brought forth
t&e body of King Oswin, who had suffered a similar fate in the seventh
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century. The parallel between Cospatric and Oswin was obvious, and
the public display of the latter's body at Durham was clearly an attempt
by the clerks to incite their flock to revolt. Thus would Tostig pay
for his and Siward's infringement of the privileges of St. Cuthbert.
St. Oswin was unearthed in March of 1065; once the harvest was in,
tfee North rose in revolt utilizing the customary northern tactic for
riRsisting oppression: the sudden raid. Despite this traditional ele-
ment in their tactics, the precision of the revolt suggests that it was
the .esuU Of a ca.efull, f.a.ed conspiracy. On the third of October •
group Of insurgent thegns entered Yor. by surprise and took the city,
a. leaders of this force are otherwise unkno™, which probably indi-
se„ a good
.oeent to strike for Tostig „as absent fro. the North. The
men of York immediately Joined the Northu^rlans, and together they
killed the leaders of Tostig-s housecarls as the latter tried to escape
the city. This deed probably destroyed the conunand structure of Tostig-
men. and on the next day the rebels were able to kill some two hundred o
his retainers in Yorkshire and to take all of the earl's treasure, ^ney
J 40and weapons.
After destroying the hated tool^ of Tostig's rule, the rebels met
together and outlawed the earl. They then invited Morcar, the younger
brother of Earl Edwin of Mercia, to be their new earl; and, with hi. at
their head, they began to mrch south."^^ This decision to go south,
more than anything else, distinguishes the revolt of 1065 from the later
revolts in the North and shows that the rebels had competent, if unnamed,
leadership. In a sense, it was an attempt to force King Edward to
accept the revolution; the northerners were not so foolish as to stage
a local revolt and then wait for the king to ratify their deeds. This
aspect of the affair is clear, but their destination and their behavior
show that they also viewed the trip south as an integral part of the
original revolt. They had already destroyed Tos tig's power above the
Humber; it was necessary to do the same thing in the South. The rebels
apparently crossed the Humber and marched to Lincoln where they slaugh-
tered more of Tos tig's retainers. They were joined then by groups of
.en f.o. Lincolnshire, Nottinghamshire, and Derbyshire, and the whole
force n^ved on to Northampton. Here Morcar's brother Edwin met the.
with an army drawn fro. his earldom and some Welsh auxiliaries. The
rebels now constituted a formidable force and negotiations were opened
with the king through Earl Harold, Tostig's brother, m the meantime,
however, the northerners set about a systematic plundering of Northamp-
tonshire which had formed part of the earldom of both Siward and Tostig
and was now made to pay for the strength it had given to the northern
earls. The northern thegns were not oblivious to the relationship
between wealth and power. They enslaved hundreds of the men of the area
and stole thousands of head of cattle. Perhaps nK.re significant than
this, however, was the fact that they killed many of the natives, burned
their houses, and destroyed their winter supply of com."^"^ These deeds
could not have enriched anyone and were clearly designed to impoverish
the area. Finally towards the end of the month, the king agreed to
accept the results of the revolt. He could not fight the rebels for a
number of reasons, and he consented, therefore, to the appointment of
Morcar as earl. Earl Harold did not oppose the replacement of his
brother and swore to upv^old the settlement. In addition to this, he—
presumably in the name of the king—renewed the law of Cnut.^^ This
meant that Tostig's attempt to overthrow the fiscal privileges of the
North was abandoned.
Thus the experiment of the first southern earl of the North ended
in disaster. Tostig had failed in his two principal tasks. He had nei-
ther maintained the northern border nor succeeded in governing his earl-
dom. His murders and attack on the fiscal system of the North had
^.ed. The successful revolt which followed ended his rule and its
abuses,
.ut it left a legacy of ^strust which weakened the A.,lo-Saxon
M^do. in the last year of its existence and which lasted into the
-riy years of the Nor^n Conquest to stand in the path of a peaceful
.«^.n^on of William's rule over the North. For ten years prior to 1065
the northerners had had the experience of being under what was to the. a
foreign earl who had tried to alter their custom. They did not forget
this ^th the coming of the Normans and were on their guard.
Bitherto, the clarity of this connection has not been generally
i:^«>gnized for at least two reasons. First, no one has understood the
t^e of Tostig's misrule, and consequently the revolt of 1065 has
^>peared to be the result of straightforward greed and tyranny. The
Dreceding narrative has shown, however, that the real cause for the
'
revolt was Tostig's attempt to govern the North in the face of northern
resistance. Second, the northerners' choice of Morcar as their earl has
been misinterpreted. It has been maintained that their selection of a
ifercian indicated that they knew that the North cauld no longer stand
alone and that they "were apparently fully conscious of the strong polit-
ical bonds which bound them to the rest of England. "^^ This ingenious
theory saves the unity of Anglo-Saxon England froa the bodies and devas-
tation of 1065 by emphasizing the fact that the rebels sought the king's
approval of their new earl and by asserting that their very choice of
Morcar served to restore the unity of the kingdom. On a constitu-
tional level this theory may not be entirely specious, but it cannot be
based on the North's choice of Morcar which is adequately explained on
the basis Of „o„he™ poUUcs. The dXffUuU. *ieh the „o„heo,ers
and the No«hu^.ia„s. This ^de it impossible to choose one of the two
available notthe™ candidates and still ^i„tain the unity which was
necessary to inti^date Edwatd the Confessot. The Northu^tians would
not have wiUingly accepted Siward's son Waltheof, not would the York-
shire »en have been likely to accept Osulf. son of Earl Eadulf
, the cur-
rent representative of the house of Ba*urgh. Past antagonise stretch-
ing back at least to the days of Earl Uhtred and Thurbrand blocked
either »an. Given this i^ass, the northerners could only coepro^se
and choose an outsider. Morcar had no discernible connection with
either northern fandly.and his family had its o«, differences with the
house of Godwin. He was, therefore, a perfect compromise and his selec-
tion left room for an accommodation of the local „en which clearly indi-
cates what forces were at work. Osulf of Bamburgh was given the rule of
Northumbria under Morcar, and Waltheof was apparently given Northampton
and Huntingdon.'*^ Thus the choice of Morcar only indicates the para-
mount nature of local concerns.
The revolt of 1065 was then a conservative reaction to Innovation
and had brought back to power the traditional ruling family of North-
mAria and Siward's son. The events of the early months of 1066 show
that it had also created new difficulties for government in the North.
With the death of Edward the Confessor in January, Harold, Tostig's
elder brother, became king, but the northerners at first refused to
accept him. Their motivation was apparently fear. The source which
describes this incident, although somewhat general and rhetorical, says
exis-
explicitly
.hat they feared Being
tence ot this fear i. shown hy two Vor.shi.e coia hoards which were hur-
led at the accession of Harold.^ Evidently the northerners thought
that they could expect no hetter treatment fro. Harold than they had
received fro. Xostig. Given the succession crisis which the Ung faced
this fear was undoubtedly groundless, hut he had. nonetheless, to .ake a
special trip to York to reassure the northerners. Even though he
accomplished this bv Eaqr*>i- •r y b ster, the incident must still have been very
disquieting. The North had threatened, at the very least, to withhold
its support from the king, and the whole affair showed that Morcar. who
was loyal to Harold, had little control over the ^n of his new earl-
dom.
Still, no matter how fragile the situation above the Euniber may
have been, the first attack on it cama from a highly surprising source,
given the host of potential invaders who were lurking
.round the North
Sea and the English Channel in the spring of 1066. Upon his exile,
Tostig had gone to Flanders, where his father-in-law was count, and he
had spent the winter there gathering a fleet for an invasion of Eng-
1 , 52land. What he hoped to accomplish with this force is conjectural. It
is conceivable that he was working with either Duke William of Normandy,
his brother-in-law, or with King Harold Hardrada of Norway, both of whom
intended to conquer England. But there is no real evidence to support
either alternative, and it is hard to see how his recorded exploits
could have helped either of then>-e.xcept, perhaps, as a diversion. This
is, of course, possible, but it seems more likely that Tostig was work-
ing only for himself. He was a bold man; both his successful attempt to
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intimidate the Pope on his trip to Rome in lOfil , u-f u K 1061 and hxs unsuccessful
«ce^e to .oven,
.he «o„H sh«, this cleatl,. The coM„, ,eat offered
rewards for such .e„, and lostlg probably intended to try his luck.
Early in he descended on the Isle of Wight and extorted „oney
and provisions fro. the islanders. He then sailed east to Sandwich,
where he impressed some <?ailr>T-o.sa ors, and, upon the approach of King Harold,
he moved up the coast and entered the Hu^er, which was apparently the^
Object Of his expedition. Certainly it was not necessary to come this
far north simply for plunder. Tostig's force is said to have numbered
sixty ships; and, if this is true, it was clearly large enough to be
dangerous to local forces.^^ Such was undoubtedly its purpose. Tostig's
foray was not as ridiculous as it usually appears when historians employ
it as the curtain raiser for the great invasions of 1066. The real par-
allels of this expedition lay in the Anglo-Saxon past. Twice during the
reign of Edward the Confessor,^lfgar, the father of Edwin and Morcar,
had been exiled and had won reinstatement in his earldom by invading
England with forces gathered in Wales and Dublin.^"^ The principle
involved was that if an outcast could wreak enough havoc, the king would
be likely to buy him off by giving him back his lands and offices. This
must have been Tostig's intention in 1066: He would regain his lost
northern earldom by raiding it. Unfortunately for the success of this
plan, his arrival in the Humber was anticipated by Earls Edwin and Morcar
who were, after all, the sons of the last successful practitioner of
this Anglo-Saxon protection racket. Tostig landed his men in Lindsey
and burned several villages, but before he could become a real terror to
the countryside, Edwin and perhaps Morcar came up and drove him out of
the a.ea. Most of his n.^sh ships then deserte. hi., and he escaped
to Scotland with only twelve ships.
There Tostig became involved in a ^ch .ore proMsing invasion of
the North. Despite the fact that King Malcol. supported hi. and his
refining
.en over the s^r, the complete failure of his own expedi-
tion .ust have left hi. with few prospects for the future beyond s.all-
scale piracy. King Harold Hardrada of Norway was, however, planning to
invade England that autun., and, if subsequent events are a true indica-
tion of the king's original plans, he had use for an ex-earl of the
North. Harold Hardrada intended to invade Yorkshire and use it as a
base for the conquest of the rest of the kingdom. IT,e employment of
this essentially tenth-century scheme, which not even Swein and Cnut had
used until after they had spent years pulverizing English resistance,
may have been due to bold antiquarianism on the part of the Norwegian
king, but it was more probably the result of a very contemporary under-
standing that conditions in the North were far worse than they had been
in Ethelred's day. In any case, Tostig agreed to join this expedition,
perhaps through the intermediacy of Copsig, his old associate in govern-
ing the North, who had already raised a fleet in the Orkneys. This
proved to be Tostig* s final blunder.
The Norwegian fleet came west in late August or early September.
It stopped at the Orkneys where Harold was joined by a force led by the
earl of these islands and by a group of Irish Sea Vikings. Then it
moved down the east coast of Scotland where it was met by Tostig, who
became the vassal of the Norwegian king. The fleet now numbered perhaps
three hundred vessels, and its prospects for initial success were
good. King Harold of England was in the South waiting for Duke Wil-
liam's invasion, and the North was apparently unguarded. Harold
Hardrada and Tostig were able, therefore, to sail down the coast, enter
the number by surprise, and disembark their forces without meeting any
opposition.^^ Il^is suggests that Morcar was not in the North at the
time, but there may be another explanation. Specifically, there is
probably a minor lacuna in the chronicles at this point. None of them
say how long the Norwegians were in the vicinity of York before the bat-
tie of Fulford Bridge, nor do they explain in any detail what transpired
during that time. This is an important omission because it hides the
reaction of the northerners to the Norwegian invasion. The little evi-
dence which does bear on this point is discontinuous and perhaps contra-
dictory. Symeon of Durham says that Harold Hardrada took York by force
before he fought Edwin and Morcar, but the C version of the Anglo-
Saxon Chronicle seems to suggest that the Norwegians only entered York
after this battle. It implies that the earls were not in York when the
Norwegians landed and that they assembled their army in Mercia. If the
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle is correct on these points, the men of York made
no attempt to oppose the invasion, and this, in turn, could explain the
precipitate reactions of the earls and the king when they learned of the
arrival of Harold Hardrada. They faced not simply an invasion by the
greatest warrior in Christendom, but an invasion which had received
local support in the North.
This interpretation is not beyond question, but the invasion of the
Norwegians certainly did become this specter before much time had passed.
When King Harold learned of their landing, he immediately began to move
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North. In the meantime, however Edwin ^r>A m
,
, h and Morcar gathered an army and,
without waiting for the arrival of the king, engaged the Norwegians
battle at FuJford Bridge outside York on September 20, 1066. Thi
reckless decision for which the only justification could have been t
prevent Harold Hardrada from consolidating his position, but, in fact,
it produced the opposite result. After what is said to have been a long,
hard fight, the Norwegian king routed the earls, who, in their flight,
lost more men to the river Ouse than they had to Harold in the battle.
After this illustration of his power, Harold Hardrada entered York and
allied with the Yorkshire men. They agreed to help him conquer the
kingdom by going south with his army, l^ey also gave the Norwegians
provisions and exchanged hostages with them.^^ The full implementation
of this alliance was averted, however, by King Harold of England, who
was already nearing the North with an army. He reached Tadcaster by
Sunday, September 24, and advanced through York the next day. The Nor-
wegians had had no news of his coming and had gone east of the city to
Stamford Bridge to receive hostages from the outlying parts of the shire.
Harold was thus able to catch them by surprise away from their ships and
to bring their, to battle. In the fight which followed he won a complete
victory. Both Harold Hardrada and Tostig were killed, and twenty ships
were sufficient to carry away the surviving Norwegians .^^
With this victory Harold ended the immediate threat to hjs rule in
the North and proved his ability as a military commander, but from the
standpoint of the history of the North, these events have a different
significance. Harold Hardrada's plan, despite its anachronism, had been
basically correct. After at most one battle, and perhaps from his
arrival, the .en of Yor. had joined his atten^t to con.uer England.
Given an alternative, they no longer saw a need to he governed hy the
west Saxon monarchy. This was the legacy of Tostig's attack upon the
customs Of the North. By 1066 political northern separatism existed,
and Harold's victory at Stamford Bridge did nothing to end it.
Had Harold enjoyed a long reign, he might have improved the situa-
tion through moderate rule. In the days of Ethelred, ethnic factors may
have been partially responsible for the preference of the men of York
for the cause of Swein and Cnut, but since that time the problems of the
North had been basically political: the revolt of the Bamburgh earls,
the unpopular rule of Siward in Northumbria, and finally Tostig's attempt
to govern the North. The northerners had allied with Harold Hardrada
not because he was Scandinavian, but because they distrusted government
from the South. Since this was essentially a political problem, Harold
might have been able to quiet northern fears. But this is only specula-
tion. What Harold in fact did before he left York was more prosaic„
Morcar had failed either to control or defend Yorkshire, and Harold
apparently entrusted the shire to ^ferleswein, an important noble in the
northern Danelaw." The source which says this is not beyond question,
but it is probably correct. Despite the fact that Morcar is called an
earl in the chronicles after September of 1066, he never again is con-
nected with anything that happened in the North. This probably means
that he had no power above the Humber. Certainly all the northern
revolts were led by local nobles.
After making this change, Harold went south to face Duke William
of Normandy, who had landed while Harold was on his northern campaign.
an October 14, the duke con^pletely defeated Harold's ar^ at Hastings,
^^ Harold M^elf disappeared into the real, of legend. With hi.
cha.ce that the problems of the North would find a peaceful
solution. During the remaining months of 1066, William consolidated his
position in the South by receiving the submissions of the earls, of most
of the XBiportant churchmen, and of London; and on Christmas day. Arch-
bishop Aldred of York crowned him as the successor of the Anglo-Saxon
kings. This :neant disaster for the North. By becoming the "legitimate-
king, Willia^n inherited all the problems of northern government which
had been created before his arrival, but at the same time he lacked the
i»ecessary knowledge, if not the will, to deal with them.
This is clear from his initial northern appointment. Before return-
ir^ to Normandy in March of 1067, William made his first attempt to pro-
vide government for the North, and a worse choice is difficult to imag-
ine. He gave the earldom of Northumbria to Copsig, Tostig's old associ-
ate, who had submitted to William at Barking in early 1067.^^ This was
an incredible decision: Copsig had been an agent of Tostig's government
and had taken part in the earl's invasion of 1066. Furthermore, if the
stories of Tostig meeting Harold Hardrada at the mouth of the Tyne are
true, Copsig had probably supported himself by piracy at the expense of
the very men whom he was now called upon to govern. Any one of these
deeds was enough to make Copsig unpopular in the North, and it is exceed-
ingly difficult to imagine what William thought he was doing. To make any
sense out of the situation at all, it is necessary to posit that Osulf,
who had held Northumbria under Morcar, had refused to submit to William
and that Morcar was no longer the earl of the North. Otherwise, the
appointment a new ean wouU have
.een a
.i.ect p.o.oeaaon . ,o.h
the No„hu*.ians and to Mo.cat. Beyond this only con.ectute Is pos-
sible. Pethaps the „ost likely explanation is that „ilUa„ was trying
to be conciliatory
.y sending a near native to he eatl. hut that he had
inaccurate knowledge of the revolt of 1065 which ca^ ftoa lostig. The
latter had spent the winter of 1065-1066 in Flanders where he could have
been m co™.nication with Duke WilUa.. Tostig is said to have charged
in another context that the northern revolt had been the result of a
conspiracy headed by his brother Harold;" and. If „iiUa„ believed this,
the appointment of Copslg would not have seemed absurd. On the other
band. Copsig himself may have been partially responsible for the deci-
sion. He was clearly adept at survival having lived through the revolt
of 1065. Tostlg's invasion of 1066, and probably the Battle of Stamford
Bridge; there is no knowing what a man of his talents may have told the
new king.
Whatever role misinformation may have played in making Copsig earl,
it clearly did not affect his own behavior for he had no illusions about
the necessities of his government. In early February 1067, he came
north with a band of retainers and took the traditional first step
towards establishing one's rule above the Tees: He sought out Osulf,
the current representative of the house of Hamburgh. His intention was
probably to kill or capture Osulf, but this failed. Copsig only suc-
ceeded in driving him into the hills where he began to gather an army.^^
This was undoubtedly easy. The return of Copsig convinced the Northum-
brians, if they had any doubts in the first place, that they could
expect no better treatment from William than they had received from
Edward the Confessor. The new earl had crossed the Tees as an Invader
in the direct tradition of other Yorkshire ^n who would have ruled
Northu^bria-Thurbrand, Carl, and Siward-and
.ore recently, of course,
Tostig. Within five weeks, therefore, Osulf was able to raise an ar^
With Which to adMnister the equally traditional solution to the problem.
On March 12, he surprised Copsig at a banquet in Newburn. The earl
tried to save himself by fleeing to a church, but the Northumbrians set
the church on fire. When Copsig was at last forced out, Osulf cut off
his head.^^
Ihe sending of Copsig into Northumbria had been clearly a mistake
both for the earl, who had lost his life, and for William, whose author-
ity had been flouted. The earl's personal unpopularity and his attack
on Osulf were undoubtedly the major causes of the revolt, but certain
factors suggest that something else may have been involved. There is a"
distinct possibility that the Northumbrian revolt of 1067 was an echo of
the revolt of 1065 in a second way. William the Conqueror's most press-
ing need in early 1067 was booty. His mercenary army had not followed
him to England just because they believed in the validity of his claim
to the throne. He needed money to pay off his soldiers, and in 1067 he
levied a heavy geld to supply it.^^ The collection of this money from
Northumbria must have been Copsig 's first responsibility; indeed, the
promise that he could collect it may have been the chief factor which
prompted William to appoint him earl. Copsig had, after all, substantial
experience in extracting money from the North. No source says that the
Northumbrians rose against the earl because of the tax, but this may
well have been an important factor in their revolt. The two events were
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some-
^....^ by only a short period of „uUa. imposed
.he tax
^ bet^ea Christ^s of 1066 and hi. return to Nor^ndy around Fehru-
^ 2t. 1067. Copsig went north 1„ ^d-February and was killed about
*ive weeks later on March 12. The Northu^rians had revolted In 1065 In
l«^t over unjust taxes, and they threatened to do the sa.e in 1072-74
^ another attempt to collect taxes above the Tees.™ Furthermore,
«he ^eU of 1067 struck the North as being outrageous. The version of
^te Anfilc^Saxon r.hron.-cOe written at York, after noting that Willia. had
pro^^sed to rule in the manner of his best predecessors, says: "All the
«me be iaid taxes on the people very severely.-'^ The Peterborough
^sion, on the other hand, mentions this tax in a matter of fact way
and only m passing." Given these factors, it is quite possible that
William's first geld provided the Northumbrians with an example of Nor-
man tyranny which was quite as frightening as the return of Copsig and
just as reminiscent of the rule of Tostig.
Peon two points of view, then, William's dealings with the North
nwst have raised the specter of Tostlg's attack on the privileges of the
North, and it is no wonder that Osulf was able to move through the
Sorthunfcrian countrysi(>- at the head of a small army without anyone
warning Copsig of his approach. As at York in 1065, the sympathies of
the people were with the rebels. Ironically, however, William was
spared the full consequences of his mistakes by events in Northumbrla
itself. Ihe killing of Copsig marked the beginning of a revolt which
was directly analogous to the one which had occurred in 1016, but this
withdrawal from William's lordship soon ended in an ignominious fashion.
In the fall of 1067, Osulf, who was evidently trying to maintain the
nor^l functions of government, was killed while atten^ting to bring an
outlaw to justice/^ and this event gave Willia. the opportunity to
reestablish his authority above the Tees without ^litary intervention.
Upon his return fro. Nonnandy in Dece^er, the king sold the earldo. of
Northu^ria to Cospatric, son of Maldred, who was an adventurer appall-
ingly suited to the chaos which was nc^ developing above the Hu.ber.
His father Maldred had been the brother of King Duncan of Scotland, the
father of Malcolm III, and his mother had been a daughter of Earl Uhtred
and his third wife, a daughter of King Ethelred.^^ Cospatric himself
was, consequently, closely connected with both Scotland and Northumbria,
and it is impossible to say which connection he valued more. In any
case, he was able to go north and establish himself as earl, theoreti-
cally under the lordship of William.
The fact that the king had sold him the earldom probably indicates"
that William was uncertain whether he could extract a regular income
from Northumbria, and the events of 1068 show that this fear was not
without foundation for the same sequence of taxation and revolt occurred
as in 1067 except on a wider scale and unobs cured by other factors.
William levied his second geld at some date between early December 1067
and late March of 1068.^^ In the spring Edwin and Morcar revolted, and
the northerners joined with them. Indeed, the North is said to have
been the main center of trouble in 1068,'^^ and the current geld was
probably responsible for this. One of the basic laws of northern polit-
ical behavior was that it took a specific outrage to bring the northern
thegns into the field. This had been true of every revolt since the
first cause ceTebre, the murder of Uhtred in 1016, and it continued to
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be true
.h.ough *e las. „o„he„
.e,oU In 1080. o„l, i„ i058
.o
.He
chronicX.. ^.e the North rise sponu^eously. since this is at vari-
aace witJi their usual behavioi- =r.A -avior and s.nce it is clear that William's gov-
ernment and soldiers had ^<.f^ rh^ » -i.left the North untouched until this point the
Most pr*ahle explanation is that the
.ing's de^nds for
.one. provided
the nortterners ^th the necessary
.ncrete e^^pU of Nor^n tyranny.
The revolt Which actually materialised was entirely in accordance
With this explanation. It was essentially negative, a rejection of
Wima^.s power, and did not, at least in its initial stages, represent
an attempt to drive the Normans out of England. The Anglo-Saxon Chron-
icle:s laconic description of the beginning of the rebellion caught its
spirit accurately: "Then the king was infonoed that the people in the
North ware gathered together and meant to make a stand against hi. if he
1,7J
caine. William was faced in the spring of 1068 with a general revolt
of the Sorth which aimed at denying his authority. The situation was
particularly ominous because the rising was led by the existing govern-
mental authorities above the Humber., Cospatric, his new earl of North-
umbrla, and >ferleswein, both of who^ apparently preferred battle to try-
ing to tax the men of their earldoms. The only important man in the
North kiaown to have opposed the revolt was Archbishop Aldred who had had
first-hand experience with William's power, but he could do nothing.
The rebels knew, of course, that the king would indeed come North and
made preparations against the event. It was probably decided to hold
the Hunfcer-Aire line, a tactic which could deny William access to most
of the Korth and which certainly was followed in 1069,^^ but beyond this
their plans are a matter of conjecture. They may have thought that they
could Withstand the Conqueror with the help of Me.cia; this alliance had
worked against Edward the Confessor in 1065. Furthermore, Edgar the
Atheling had escaped fro. William's control by the spring of 1068, and
there may have heen those who wished to crown hi. king. Alternatively,
the northerners may have hoped for foreign aid. English malcontents had
been seeking the intervention of King Swein of Denmark, who had a claim
to the throne; and King Malcolm of Scotland seems to have been planning
an invasion of the North for the summer of 1068. m actuality none of
these possibilities materialized. While the northern thegns, posturing
in heroic fashion, lived in tents to avoid the enervating effects of
houses and fortified suitable places along the Humber and in the swamps
and woods of the West Riding, William acted quickly. Any military cal-
culations of the northerners which were based either on their revolt
against Edward or on a memory of the long campaigns of Ethelred's reign"
were soon proved false. The king first went to Warwick where he built a
castle, which induced Edwin and Morcar to abandon the revolt. He then
advanced to Nottingham and erected a second castle. These two successes
demoralized the northerners, who were now without domestic allies and
found the king bearing down upon them. Cospatric, Iferleswein, and Edgar
the Atheling fled to Scotland with a number of important thegns, and the
men of York submitted to the king, who entered the city and raised a cas-
81tie within its walls. Thus without a single battle, William had over-
come the revolt of 1068. It had been a fiasco, and the northerners'
brave talk of the springtime about standing against the king had only
resulted in the exile of their native leaders and the imposition of
direct Nonaan rule by Mdsu^r. They had been shown to be :nilitarily
ineffective, and William's triumph seemed complete.
These were the lessons which the revolt of 1068 seemed to teach,
but both were in reality deceptive. The only thing accomplished by
^
William in 1068 was to set the stage for the debacle of 1069. Such mil-
itary power as existed in the North had not been destroyed. The north-
erners had submitted because their allies had deserted them. In these
Circumstances, they judged it wise to recognize the king and thereby
avoid the reprisals which would follow a military defeat,^^ but they had
not been cowed. The fact that they had refused to meet William in the
field was as much the result of their conception of warfare as of the
size of his army or his military reputation. Although the northerners
would occasionally fight regular batUes as at Carham in 1018, their
taste usually ran to rural ambushes, raids, and surprise attacks on set-
tlements. The history of the North after 1000 establishes this beyond
dispute. While such tactics may have struck the Normans as treachery
incarnate, they were an effective adaptation to the small population and
broken terrain of the North. No invader with a large army was likely to
stay in the North for long, and upon his departure, the thegns who had
been skulking in the woods and hills could re-emerge and follow the tac-
tics used by Osulf in 1067 or by the northern rebels in 1065. The
employment of such means of resistance was in turn the reason why so
many members of the house of Bamburgh had been killed through treachery
by men wishing to govern the North; false promises were literally the
only means with which to catch them. In 1068 William himself may have
tried to employ this device. While in York, he sent the bishop of
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Durha. to Scotland to ^.e a peace treaty and probably to get Malcol. t
disgorge the leaders of the northern revolt who had taken refuge in
Lothian, or .ore probably in Cu^erland, but despite the assertion of
Ordericus Vitalis that Malcol. swore fealty to Willia. through ambassa-
dors, thelwine of Durham clearly failed to accomplish very much.
Malcolm did not expell the northerners, and Cospatric, >ferleswein, and
Edgar the Atheling remained at large to lead future revolts.
They were a threat because William's success in 1068 provided the
provocation for renewed insurrection. The revolt of 1068 had been the
result of William's failure to govern the North through its native lead-
ers. They had, in fact, led the resistance to the king, and this left
him with no realistic alternative but to replace them with Normans.
Consequently, he built a castle, garrisoned it with five hundred picked
men under William Malet, and entrusted the government of Yorkshire to
Robert fitz-Richard.^^ This decision was understandable given the situa
tion, but it led to disaster nonetheless. The imposition of direct Nor-
man rule coupled with the gelds of 1067 and 1068 must have struck the
men of York as a direct parallel to the government of Tostig. Further-
more, the Normans apparently acted rapaciously. Dark rumors come out of
this period about the imprisonment of Yorkshire thegns and the confisca-
tion of their estates, and these stories apparently have some basis in
fact for William Malet, the governor of York castle, definitely had
acquired estates in the shire before the fall of 1069. In addition to
this, the same general picture of Norman behavior is suggested by the
existence of an immense treasure inside York castle by autumn. This
money had clearly been extracted from the surrounding countryside, and
its collection coupled with thp t-;.t-i«„ ce aking of native lands by whatever means
was short-sighted and provocative.
The actual spark which set off the new revolt occurred in Northum-
brxa. By the winter of 1068, Norman control of Yorkshire must have
seeded secure enough for William to ^e an attempt to bring the lands
above the Tees under his control, and to accomplish this he appointed a
new earl, Robert de Comines, and sent him North with seven hundred men.
In January Robert and his men crossed the Tees and entered Durham where
they killed and plundered peasants who were unlucky enough to be in
their path. This must have confirmed the worst fears of the residents
of Durham concerning the real meaning of the Norman Conquest, and they
devised a stratagem to deal with the invaders. As Robert approached,
they left the city and hid in the surrounding countryside, and despite
the fact that Bishop ^thelwine warned him upon his arrival that the
Northumbrians were laying a trap, he took no notice, perhaps feeling
that William's easy triumph at York the previous summer had shown the
mettle of the northerners. In any case, Robert entered the city and
allowed his men to plunder the houses, which was probably what the
Northumbrians had hoped would happen. After night had fallen, the
natives assembled and broke through the town's gates without warning.
By this time the Frenchmen were scattered throughout the city, undoubt-
edly in a state of complete disarray. Exhausted by the day's plunder-
ing, confused and disorganized in a strange, dark town they could offer
no effective resistance, and the Northumbrians slaughtered them all
except for one or two survivors: Earl Robert himself was cut down in
traditional fashion as he tried to escaoe th. k •^""^P^ b"^^i"8 house in which he
had sought refuge.
The successfol ma<?<?3rTo r^f t-uoiassacre of the Norman force at n„^v,o,„ •x Durham signaled the
now to learn the „.«e„ing nature of northern tactics.
. .and of rebel,
caught Rohert flt.-a.chard. the governor of .or.. a„a, fro. the protec-
tion Of York castle and killed hi« and a group of his retainers. This
left the castle garrison as the last
.or.an force above the Hu^er. and
they were In the greatest Jeopardy. Cospatrlc, M rlesweln. and Edgar
the Athellng had returned fro. Scotland with the beginning of the Insur-
rection, and they »ved on York with an ar^. „hlch was soon strength-
ened by Archil, the greatest Yorkshire thegn, and the four sons of
Carl. ' The presence of Cospatrlc and the sons of Carl in the sa.e ar^
was of the gravest significance. Carl had killed Ealdred, Cospatrlc's
uncle; Carl's father Ihurbrand had killed imtred. Cospatric's grandfa-
ther. The union of ,„en who had every reason to hate one another was an
appalling indication of the degree of northern hostility to the Normans,
and William Malet quickly felt its force. The rebels entered York and.
in alliance with the men of the city, besieged the castle whose defenders
sent word to WilUam that unless they were relieved, they would suffer
the fate of Robert de Comlnes and Robert fitz-Richard. The king
responded to this threat as quickly as he had to the revolt of 1068. He
moved north and surprised the besiegers within the city walls before the
castle fell. There followed a shadowy encounter between the king and
the northerners in the streets which ended in the relief of the castle
and the flight of the rebels. Either as part of this battle or after
Its conclusloa. the Korean, ravaged the city and plundered the
Churches.
The chronicles describe this exoediM'^T, ocm p dition as a victory for the king
but actually his success was only partial. He had kept possession of
^
Yor. a.d inflicted a tactical defeat on the northerners. To strengthen
his hold on the City, Willia. stayed there for eight days and built a
second castle, which he entrusted to Willia. Fitz-Osbern. The choice
of this ^, perhaps William's
.ost trusted and capable subordinate,
probably indicates that the king realized the liMtations of his recent
Victory. It had produced no political agreen^nt with the northerners,
and they were still in revolt. All their i^ortant leaders had escaped
the battle in the city, and they had only retreated to the hills with
their xnen to await the departure of William. TUls came soon enough,
leaving William fitz-Osbem waiting for the counterattack of the rebels.
He, however, was a more formidable opponent than either Robert de Comines
or Robert fitz-Richard had been, and he probably had the further advan-
tage of knowing what to expect from the northerners who had already con-
ducted four surprise attacks on cities or towns since 1065. When they
did indeed try to repeat this tactic, William fitz-Osbern was not caught
unprepared. They assembled in the hills sometime after Easter, intend-
ing to renew the siege of the castles, but before they could reach the
city, he caught them in the open and defeated thein.^°
This victory relieved the immediate pressure on York, but it did
not end the revolt, whose leaders were still free and commanding the sur-
vivors of the two recent defeats. Indeed, the realization must have
been growing among the Norman leaders that they were facing a basically
-poss.Me Situation in the No.t.. T.ei. defeats of t.e
.e.els ha. nei-
ther destroyed the latter's ^litary strength nor proven their tactics
u^orlcahXe. After each defeat, the northerners had only retreated to
lurk in the hills awaiting a new Nonnan ^stalce, and the mechanics of
this Situation are probably illustrated by the behavior of the Nor^n
force w.ich Willia. sent to avenge the killing of Earl Robert de Conines
advanced as far as Northallerton in the North Riding of Yorkshire. Here
the Nor^ns were surrounded by a dense fog which prompted an immediate
retreat to York. Symeon of Durham says that St. Cuthbert had sent this
fog to protect the men of Durham and that the Normans realized its
supernatural origin.^^ m fact, they must have feared an attack by the
northerners in the fog; and whether such was likely is beside the point.
In an open field on a clear day the Normans did not fear the rebels;
when conditions were otherwise, they did.
The main hope of the northerners by this time was probably that
they would receive outside aid. It must have been known in the North by
the sunnner of 1069 that King Swein of Denmark was planning to send an
expedition to England tMt fall. His ambition to claim the English
throne had been encouraged by English money, and it is likely that much
of it had come from the North. All that the northerners had to do was
to hide in the hills until autumn when they could emerge with a good
chance of driving the Normans from the North. They presumably thought
that Swein would go on to defeat William later, perhaps after several
years of war on the model of the fighting of Ethelred's days.
ther Osbeo„ an. of
.He sons. X. consisted of f„o hundred
and forty ships and included „a„io.s fro. Poland. Saxony, and Prisia in
addition to Danes. Theoretically. tMs „as a force large enough to
Challenge Willia. the Conqueror hi^elf. particularly given the English
allies Which it would assuredly find, hut this possibility was cocked hy
subsequent events. The Banes had co.e to England to fight an antique
can^aign. They slowly plundered their way up the coast and entered the
Hu^er on Septe^er 8. By this ti.e their sluggishness had destroyed
any chance of surprise, one of the .ain advantages of a sea-borne attack,
and Wima. had been able to warn his .en in York of their approach. As
it turned out, the advance knowledge did not save York, but the Danes-
aversion to pressing an advantage was an ill omen for the North, none-
'
theless. The northern rebels also knew that the Danes were coming, and
Edgar the Atheling, hferleswein, and Waltheof, Siward's son, had gathered
a fleet of their own from unknown sources. They too evidently thought
that sea-borne raids offered the best hope of beating William, and the
initial encounter seemed to confirm this idea. Dpon the arrival of the
Danes in the Humber, the rebels Joined them. Archbishop Aldred died of
shock. He was the man who had crowned William and presumably foresaw
the destruction to come. The Danes waited several days in the Kumber to
give Cospatric with the Northumbrians and a group of rebels from York-
shire, led by Archil and the sons of Carl, time to Join the main force.
When this was accomplished, the composite host moned up the estuary
towards the city. As they approached, the Normans fired the houses near
the casues which they feared ^ght be used to fill up the ditches
arouBd the castles, but they did thei. „or. too well for the fla.es
and rebel, arched into the still burning city with the leaders o, the
North i„ the van. They caught the Nor^ns in the streets, and the out-
come was as decisive as in Durha. in January. The entire Kor^n force
was either killed or captured.
To understand the strange and awesome events which followed this
victory, it is necessary to put aside hindsight. Neither the northern-
ers nor the Danes knew that they, were soon to be the object of William
the Conqueror's most brutal campaign. Furthermore, there is no evidence
that the Danes had come to England to fight a major battle with William
in the fall of 1069. Had that been their intention, it would have been
far simpler to land in southern England and offer battle. The taking of
York had cost time and men, and it had brought them no immediate accre-
tion of strength. The destruction of William's power above the Humber
had satisfied the immediate aims of the rebels. The Northumbrians are
known to have gone home for the winter, and it is likely that the
Yorkshire men did the same. The Danes were thus left in possession of
York, and this had probably been their goal from the beginning. They
had come to England to destroy Norman power in the North and to estab-
lish a base there for the subsequent conquest of the rest of the kingdom.
This is the simplest and most reasonable explanation for their actions,
and it is supported by the fact that King Swein did arrive in the Humber
in the spring, intending to launch a campaign. He found then that he
was too Late and that his expeditionary force was in a pitiable
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-dl.io..
.ea^on fo. .HU was
.i^le and o„l, pa^.aU,
.He .esuU
»f .he act. Of WlUia. the Co„,uetor= The cost of taking Yo.U had been
.oo high. Because of the fl.e which the Nolans had set. the city had
t,eatly destroyed, and this had put the Danes in a bad position.
With York intact, they could have shut the^elves up behind its walls
««i snugly waited for spring, and WilUaa could have done little. To
besiege the city would have required that the Normans spend the winter
Iti the open, which would probably have broken their health and which
would have failed in any case, given Danish control of the Ouse and Hun-
ter. To take York by assault would have been extremely dangerous. The
Danes and the northerners were equal-if not superior-to the Normans in
hand-to-hand Hghting. But for the burning of York, William would have
faced these grim alternatives.
As It was, the plans of the Danes were seriously upset. October
"
and William the Conqueror were both advancing against them, and their
behavior, which seems so aimless in the pages of Ordericus Vi talis, was
largely the result of this quandary. They needed a place to spend the
winter, but William would not give them time to establish one. Ini-
tially they tried to salvage as much of their original plan as possible
by going down to the Isle of Axholme at the head of the Humber and for-
tifying it as a base for the winter. This attempt was frustrated by
William, however, who had launched a late fall campaign. The destruc-
tion of York had given him a chance to fight the Danes in the open, and
he had seized this opportunity with the fury and vindictiveness of a man
who has narrowly escaped a fight for his life. William reached Lindsey
with an army before the Danes' fortifications were complete, and he was
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«ms.e,ue.tly able to enter the svaaps and drive the. back across the
ft»b.r into Yorkshire. This defeat did not .ake the. desist £ro. their
P^a. however. Once the king had left the area to deal with a secondary
«volt in Staffordshire, the Danes recrossed the Hu^ber and
.oved Into
ii^dsey to establish a ca^. There a Norman force, which the king had
J«ft behind, fell upon them by surprise and dispersed them for a second
^. 96
:rhese two encounters were a serious setback for the Danes who still
lacked a winter base, and they must have made it obvious to William that
-ihey had no intention of fighting a major battle. The possibilities
^oed to him by this knowledge meant doom for the North. After being
Sxiv^n out of Lindsey, the Danes had returned to Yorkshire, and it was
^uiuared that they intended to reoccupy York. This was an admission that
their situation had become very serious, and William, who had returned
'
from the West, followed them into the North. The Yorkshire men were not
caught entirely unprepared by this development, however. They occupied
the northern bank of the river Aire and held it against the Normans for
three weeks. Perhaps they thought they could hold this position all
winter although it is more likely that the Aire represented an extempo-
rized line of defense. Neither the northerners nor the Danes seem to
have made atiy preparations in case the Normans crossed the river, and
when this occurred, all organized resistance disappeared. William
forded the Aire far upstream and moved directly on York through the
hills. By the time he arrived, the Danes had abandoned the indefensible
city and were apparently lying in the Humber aboard their ships they
were now in an untenable position. William's relentless pressure had
-de 1. ^„3si.le fo.
.He. eo es.a.U.h
. base eUHe. „o«, o. sou.,
the Hu^er. and „as „o„ winte.. ^ey could not go ho.e, nor „ouM
they fight. Given these circu^tances, Osbeorn. the Danish leader,
ad^tted his defeat and can.e to an agreement „lth Wlllla.. i,e king
gave hl„ Money and ptocaised that the Danes could forage along the coasts
of the North; Osbeorn promised to depart In the spring without fight-98ing.
This ignominious conclusion to the Danish invasion left the North
exposed to the full fury of Willia. the Conqueror's wrath. The rebels
had evidently retreated to the hills when the king crossed the Aire,
assun^ng. no doubt, that this invasion would lead to no .ore permanent
results than his earlier trips north had. William could be expected to
rebuild the castles, but with the comng of spring, they could issue
from their dens to attack them, probably in alliance with the Danes who'
might have forgotten by then their promise to go home. If the northern-
ers reasoned in this way, they were completely mistaken for William the
Conqueror was not to be tricked again. He had learned the nature of
northern tactics from the revolts of 1068 and 1069, and he now adopted a
plan which would make it impossible for the North to revolt after his
departure. Leaving detachments to watch the movements of the Danes and
to repair the castles, he entered the hills to hunt down and kill the
rebels. The success of this operation may have been strictly limited by
the latter's knowledge of the terrain of the North, but this made little
difference in the long run because the main Norman effort was reserved
for the peasants who were completely unprotected with their leaders hid-
ing and the Danes neutralized. William sent groups of soldiers
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throughout the Vale of Yor. and the ^,or .iver valleys with orders to
harry the peasants, and it was this ghastly tactic which finally brought
"peace" to the North. The Nor^ns ^ssacred ^ny peasants outright, but
the large number who .ust have escaped were ulti^nately doomed as co^
Pletely. The soldiers burned the villages and the grain from the last
harvest; they also made certain that no crop would be planted in the
spring by destroying the plows and other tools of the peasants and by
wantonly slaughtering the livestock.
The most intense destruction took place in Yorkshire, but the
Northuxnbrians did not escape completely. William held a macabre Christ-
n^s court in the burnt-out shell of York to which he had brought all the
visible paraphernalia of his kingship to symbolize the legitimacy of the
continuing slaughter. He then dislodged a group of rebels from Holder-
ness and moved to the Tees where he received the submissions of Cospatric
and Waltheof
.
The termination of their defiance did not save the North-
umbrians, however. William crossed the river with the intention of
wasting the countryside, but the situation in Durham was somewhat dif-
ferent than it had been in Yorkshire. The villages were empty. The
peasants, knowing what to expect from the Normans, had escaped to the
hills and forests with their herds and moveable property, and the bishop
and clerks had fled to Lindisfarne leaving Durham deserted. William was
consequently unable to destroy native society above the Tees as com-
pletely as in Yorkshire. The Normans did march in two major groups
through eastern and central Durham to the Tyne where they destroyed Jar-
row. Then they devastated the Tyne valley and perhaps southern North-
umberland as far west as Hexham, but their impact on this sparsely
populated U„d too s^all co warrant a long stay. So.eti.e in Janu-
ary. WllUa. led his ar.y back to the Tees by way o, the Ro.an road
through the Pennine foothills and continued on to York. There he garri-
soned the castles and made arrangements for ^Koid t the government of the North
before striking west over the Pennines to harry Cheshire.
Wl.en the spring of 1070 arrived, the northern rebels did not emerge
from tl.e hills to continue their revolt. They had resisted the Norman
Conquest because they had feared a basic redefinition of the relation-
ship between the North and the king. This fear had its origin in
Tostig*s murders and taxes, and it had been intensified by William's
appointment of Copsig, by his gelds, and by the imposition of direct
Norman rule in 1068. In 1070 this fear was no longer important. The
harrying of the North had been an attempt to produce an artificial fam-
ine, a^d it had succeeded. Few details survive, as might be expected,
"
but it is still clear in general what happened. The chronicles agree
that tJhere was no food in the North for those who lived through the
actual military operations of the winter of 1069-70.^°^ Some of the
greater nobles survived, of course, but the mass of the peasantry faced
a griM future in which mechanisms let loose by the harrying continued
the destruction long after William had left. After eating their domes-
tic artimals and horses, some peasants sold themselves into slavery to
avoid starvation. Others joined the bands of "outlaws" which formed in
the fnee-zone and plundered villages which had escaped the Normans.
Many starved to death; and, according to Symeon of Durham, the roads and
huts of the North were littered with decaying bodies which spread disease
among the living. There is even evidence that the harrying upset the
balance between hu^n society and nature so that the wolves ca.e down
fro. the hills to feast on the bounty of Willia. the Conqueror. Sub-
stantial nu^ers of northerners apparently tried to escape this night-
marish world by fleeing to the South and perhaps to Scotland. Their
presence is recorded as far away as Evesha., but this expedient did lit-
tle good for many died or became slaves nonetheless. These condi-
tions ensured that the North would never again threaten William's con-
trol of England. He had solved the political problem of the North by
destroying native society in Yorkshire and by severely damaging it in
Durham.
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CHAPTER7
GOVERNMENT BY PUNITIVE F.XPEDITION
under the very eyes of the Danes
.ho wintered in the Hu.5er, York-
shire had been turned into a waste land. Upon the arrival of spring,
this force, probably demoralized by its lack of-i-c;^ ck: success and certainly
half starved as a result o, the Ncr^n tactics, was no longer a danger-
ous fighting force. 1 Furthermore, no native ar.y reappeared to try to
capture the castles In York. To this extent the harrying of the North
was a complete success; it had ended the last significant threat to
WilliaM-s possession of the Anslo-Saxon crown. Yet one must be careful
not to exaggerate the effects of this event despite the ove«hel.ing
impression which it leaves. William had done his best to destroy native
society in Yorkshire. This had solved his i«ediate problem during the
winter of 1069, and it had certain •beneficial" implications from his
point of view for the future. Yorkshire could no longer be used as a
base for a Scandinavian attack on the rest of the kingdom. This unhappy
shire could not even support its own Inhabitants, Furthermore, York-
shire could now be integrated into the Anglo-Norman kingdom in a way in
which the old earldom had never been. The earldom itself was, of course,
suppressed, and the royal demesne was soon bloated with confiscated
estates to provide the sheriffs, who now administered the shire, with a
sound financial base.^ These were important considerations, but other
less hopeful aspects of the situation were just as pertinent, if not
more so, in the years following 1070. For one thing, despite the fact
that the men of York were now just as dead as the heroic age. It is
gained cu„e„c, across
.h. «o«h Sea. harrying of the North
.c-
vlthstandins. Scandinavian.
„ould s.ill drea„ fro. ti.e to tiee of reen-
acting antique feats of plunder and pillage in England, and so.e actu-
ally would co„e to try. Moreover, if it „as true that the „e„ of Yor.
could not support ^ny Invading Danes, it «as eaually true that they
could not support very ^ny Normans. In 1070 the redevelopment of York-
shire lay many years in the future.
Indeed, the situation in the North was .ore complex than it is usu-
ally made to appear. The harrying of the North established William as
the most powerful and feared dispenser of political authority in the
North, but it did not give him complete control or render his authority
unassailable. His power was limited and his authority open to attack
because the old political and military realities of the North reasserted
themselves in 1070 and the years which followed. Furthermore, William
seeiDs to have realized this to some extent. At least this is suggested
by the two appointments which he made in the North in 1070.
The archbishopric of York and the earldom of Northumbria were
vacant, and the king filled both positions during the course of the
year. To the first he appointed Thomas, a canon from Bayeux and a pro-
tege' of Bishop Odo, the king's half brother.^ Thomas did not, however,
succeed to all the old privileges and liberties of the position. Rather,
Lanfranc, the archbishop of Canterbury, made a successful attempt with
the king's support to limit Thomas's freedom by demanding a profession
of obedience from him. This demand and its repetition at the consecra-
tion of later archbishops of York led to a bitter controversy between
York and Canterbury which lasted into the twelfth century. The later
stages in this dispute, which were ^rUed hy pole^cs and forgeries
for. a rather unedifying episode in ecclesiastical politics, but in the
beginning serious issues were involved concerning the general nature of
the Church in England.* Furthermore, the Question h,Hic ^n q had important politi-
CI implications in 1070. Hugh the Chantor. the early twelfth-century
historian of YorU, asserted that Lanfranc defended his demand for a oro-
fession of obedience from Thomas before the Ung with the argument that:
llllrilTJitTJ/V''' of the kingdom that
.appen,rthrS^g?: ^-^r' ^ Z^T^^^^^^^
nen 'anS theT-°'H'°^'- "^"^ tr'eachL^s Yo 2h Lm , d kingdom disturbed and divided.^
Lanfranc's argument was not simply a device to further his own ecclesi-
astical aggrandizement. It was based on a real possibility. The Danes
actually took York in 1075, and in 1085 they prepared an expeditionary
force which caused William the Conqueror great anxiety.^ Moreover, in
1070, the very year of Thomas's appointment, there had occurred an event
which had serious implications in this connection. In the spring King
Swein entered the Humber to take command of his fleet. He apparently
disavowed the promise which Earl Osbeorn had made the previous winter to
depart England in peace; and, in the words of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
,
"the local people came to meet him and made a truce with him— they
expected that he was going to conquer the country Some four or five
months after the harrying of Yorkshire, the men of York were still pre-
pared to receive a Danish invader; and, although nothing serious
happened
.o.O.
...^^ ^^^^
^^^^ ^^^^
-s couX, no.
.eep
..e Banes ou. o,
,o.,.Hi.e
.a. so^e
.o.n.aUon.
Norman weakness in the North .i.IS shown even more clearly in William
other appointment i„ 1070. Sometime after Christmas of 1069, he had
-ceived the submissions of Cospatric and Waltheof on the hanks of the
Tees; and presumahly around this time, he reinstated the former as earl
Of Northumhria. This act of forgiveness was ,uite uncharacteristic of
the conqueror's dealings with landed Hnslish rebels, and it was a sign
that he had no realistic hope of depriving Cospatric of power or con-
trolling Northumhria. William cannot have had much faith in Cospatric
Who had been in rebellion since he purchased the earldom from the king
in 1068. in 1070, however, the castles at York were the de facto north-
ern limit Of William's realm, and fifty miles of empty countrys.de sepa-
rated them from Durham.' Even kings of the stature of Cnut had had
trouble governing Northumhria, and the harrying made this task doubly
difficult for William. He could not play the old game of using the ^n
of York to keep the Northumbrians in check, and in these circu^tances
he was forced to recognize Cospatric, the current representative of the
house of Bamburgh. as earl. This decision may have been distasteful to
the king, but the establishment of some agreement with Cospatric, no
matter how hollow it was, was far preferable to the alternative of
Cospatric submitting to his cousin Malcolm Canmore or ambushing some new
Norman earl.
The difficulty of exercising power beyond York led William to main-
tain the Northumbrian earldom; but there was a dark side to this situa-
tion for the Northumbrians. The ruin of Yorkshire may have insulated
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the. fro. Noo.n power, bu. also left the. to face the Scots alone.
This too became obvious in 1070 when Malcol. launched his second inva-
sion of the North. He was "still in possession of Cu^erland, which had
been lost by Tostig in 1061; and he now showed how this flanking posi-
tion could be used against the English. So.eti.e during the su^er, the
Scottish king led an anny, probably
.ainly composed of Galwegians, into
Cumberland. This force then .oved up the Vale of Eden, across Stain-
more, and down into Teesdale where it began to plunder the countryside.^'
Malcolm's intentions on this occasion, as on most others, are
rather obscure. It is possible that his invasions were only large raids
conducted to gain booty and slaves. Yet this idea, whose principal
recent exponent was R. L. G. Ritchie, has been rejected by J. Le
Patourel in general terms, and especially in the case of the invasion of
1070 it seems difficult to sustain.^^ Malcolm's armies did undoubtedly
come for plunder, but if this was the only consideration, the 1070 inva-
sion was quite ill-conceived. Yorkshire had already been wasted by the
Normans, and the Scots could have gotten more booty further north.
Indeed, the route which Malcolm's army took during the first stage of
the invasion and the fact that this was the only known Scottish invasion
between 1000 and 1200 which originated solely in the West were both
highly unusual. Most Scottish invasions included as their main element
a thrust over the Tweed. In 1070 Northumbria was left untouched at
first. Given the configuration of the border, this must have been
intentional, and it probably means that Malcolm hoped to isolate North-
umbria further by completing the destruction of the North Riding. Per-
haps he hoped to detach the earldom once he had shown the Northumbrians
that he could conduct a ca.pai,„ Xu lorRshlre. Cospatric was. after
all, his cousin.
Initially the invasion went fairly well tHp i .i-iy ej.j., i-he Scots plundered and
burned down the south side of Teesdale and .oved east into Cleveland
Which they also wasted. The Nor^ns apparently did nothing; but after
Malcol. was in Cleveland, something went wrong with his plans, although
exactly what is not
.nown. The Scots crossed the Tees into Hartness and
began to ravage up the coast towards
.ear^outh.^^ This was a violation
of Cospatric's earldo., and it destroyed any chance of Malcol. reaching
an understanding with the earl. It also put the expedition's booty in
jeopardy. Fro. either the standpoint of politics or plunder, the Scot-
tish attack on Durha. was illogical, and one can only suggest that per-
haps Malcolm's arn^y had gotten out of control. This was always a danger
with a Scottish army, particularly for one with Galwegians in it, and
the king's soldiers may have gone into Durham to find more abundant
booty or simply to obtain food. In any case, Cospatric immediarely
struck back. He did not, to be sure, elect to meet the Scots in the
field for he was in no position to repeat the deeds of Uhtred or even
Eadulf which had resulted in the decoration of Durham's walls with the
severed heads of defeated Scots. His reaction was more prosaic.
Cospatric led a counter raid up the Tyne gap into Cumberland where he
stole the booty which Malcolm had gathered in Teesdale and sent back
over Stainmore. This raid enraged Malcolm who, in retaliation, now
ordered his men to kill or enslave everyone who fell into their power.
It would seem that the Scottish king viewed Cospatric 's conduct as a
breach of faith in some sense, but alternatively he may only have
reacted in frustration because whatever political ai^ he .a. have had
»ere now impossible." The en^ty between Malcol. and Cospatric reduced
the 1070 invasion to the status of a raid. The Galwegians co^nitted
what were to become the usual atrocities and filled Scotland with
English slaves. Cospatric harassed the» with sallies fro. Ba^urgh and
remained William's earl."'"'^
This in itself is somewhat curious. It is doubtful if it can be
explained on the basis of some hypothetical loyalty which the earl felt
towards William. Perhaps Cospatric simply feared Malcolm more than he
did William even though he and the Scottish king were first cousins and
the earl had spent time in Malcolm's court. Alternatively, Cospatric's
behavior may reflect the strength of the political bond which united
Northumbria with the Anglo-Saxon crown, particularly when the Northum-
brians were faced with Galwegians. T^ere really is not sufficient evi-
dence to draw a conclusion. What is clear is that Cospatric was in a
difficult situation because the destruction of Yorkshire made a defense
of the North impossible. There was no longer any chance of obtaining
reinforcements from Yorkshire with which to beat back the Scots, and the
only other source of aid, a royal expedition, could not make good this
deficiency. Even if the king found it convenient to send an army north,
it would inevitably arrive too late.
Indeed, it is very hard to make sense out of Cospatric's political
position between 1070 and 1072. His recorded acts, although scanty,
seem to have been proper. In 1070 he defended his earldom whatever he
may have been plotting, and in 1071 he followed William's orders con-
cerning the bishopric of Durham. Bishop iEthelwine, who had become
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bishop under Tostig, had been outlawed late in 1069, and in 1071 Will
gave the bishopric to Walcher, a secular priest from Lotharingia. whom
the king had invited to England to fill the post.^^ This was another
sign that Northumbria was not really subdued. It was not secure enough
to be used as patronage for one of the king's faithful clerks. William
did what he could, of course, to get Walcher started. He sent the bis-
hop to York under the care of a housecarl named Eilaf with an imposing
group of magnates and ordered Cospatric to conduct him on to Durham; the
earl complied. There was also, however, another side to Cospatric's
behavior. In particular, it would seem that the king's enemies were not
necessarily his enemies. Several of the leaders of the revolts against
William were still at large, and they were using the Northumbrian ports.
In 1070 Edgar the Atheling, Siward Barn, and iferleswein were at Wear-
mouth with a considerable body of followers, and Bishop ^thelwine took
ship for Flanders from the same port several months after he was out-
lawed. "'"^ All these men eventually joined Malcolm in Scotland, and the
next year Siward Barn and Bishop iEthelwine with a large body of men came
18south again and joined Hereward on Ely. To do this, they almost cer-
tainly stopped along the Northumbria coast, and although the brief
descriptions of these movements do not connect them in any way with
Cospatric, it is very difficult to believe that these old allies of the
earl were sailing up and down the coast of his earldom without at least
his tacit consent.
In 1072 William the Conqueror tried to put an end to all this ambi-
guity and chaos in the North. He had been unable to respond to Malcolm's
Invasion for two years because of troubles in the fens with the remnants
Of King Swein's fleet and with the English rebels on Ely. m 1072, how-
ever, all these difficulties were past, and some sort of action above
the Tees was necessary as the last step in the consolidation of his
power over the Anglo-Saxon kingdom. This is obvious, but exactly what
he hoped to acconrplish is not so self-evident. Undoubtedly he wanted to
punish Malcol. for his invasion or invasions and to force him to abandon
his policy of harboring Anglo-Saxon rebels and allowing them to use his
kingdom as a base for operations in England. The latter aim would
involve the creation of some political understanding with Malcolm, but
beyond this point William's intentions are not known. Indeed, Ritchie
has asserted that the preceding objectives constituted his only aims and
that William had no intention of conquering Scotland in 1072. This may
be correct, but it must be noted that Ritchie's argument depends
entirely upon such inherent difficulties in conquering Scotland as the
lay of the land, the distances involved, and the absence of strong
20points which had to be defended. These considerations were probably
irrelevant to William's intentions in the summer of 1072. The king did
liOt know that Malcolm would refuse battle, nor can it be assumed that he
was well informed on the geography of Scotland. In fact, there is sim-
ply not enough evidence to say with any certainty how ambitious William's
plans were in 1072, and the idea that he wished to conquer Scotland is
just as likely as its opposite.
If, however, William did hope to accomplish great things in 107 2,
these plans did not last long. During the summer he collected an army
of cavalry and a fleet, and after mid August he began to move north
along the east coast. With him was Eadric the Wild, presumably to act
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as a technical adviser on how to deal with Celts. The fleet was perhaps
intended to bring supplies, but on this occasion it is also likely that
its purpose was to act against Anglo-Saxon
"pirates" in the Scottish
ports. At all events, the invasion went smoothly but not too success-
fully. William crossed into Lothian, but apparently MalcoLn refused
battle. Presumably with the Scots withdrawing before them, the Normans
marched through Lothian and crossed the Forth into Scotland proper where
they "found nothing that they were any better for," a commentary on the
poverty or at least pastoralism of the northern realm, and by this time
William was probably feeling somewhat frustrated and exposed. His
fleet may have had some success against the pirates, but otherwise he
had accomplished nothing. Even though he had penetrated into Fife,
there had been no battle. His army had collected little plunder, and he
was by now some 230 to 250 miles from York, his nearest base. Indeed,
his position was perilous for behind him all the way to the North Riding
the dales of northern Britain lay athwart his line of retreat, and it
was Malcolm who was king of the heads of these dales, a sobering lesson
in geography. Furthermore, autumn was advancing, and under these cir-
cumstances, William chose to negotiate. The two kings met at Abernethy
where they came to an understanding. Malcolm accepted William as his
overlord by doing homage, gave hostages, probably including Duncan his
eldest son, and apparently promised to expel Edgar the Atheling, his
brother-in-law, and other prominent English rebels. For his part,
William withdrew from Scotland after promising, no doubt, to respect
Malcolm's borders.
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This agreement may have fallen short of the Conqueror's expecta-
tions, but it had its value nevertheless. On his way south, the Ung
plucked its first fruits, that is to say. Cospatric. Once back in
NorthunJ^ria he deprived the earl of his office on the charges that the
latter had been involved in planning the death of Earl Robert in 1069
and that he had helped kill Normans at York later in the same year,
deeds which had presumably been forgiven on the banks of the Tees two
years earlier. Prior to William's agreement with Malcolm, the depri-
vation of Cospatric might have had serious repercussions, but in the
late fall of 1072 it provoked no native uprising or Scottish invasion in
support of the earl. Because of the Conqueror's agreement with Malcolm,
Cospatric could not even stay at the Scottish court, as was his custom,
and had to go into exile in Flanders William did not, however,
change his policy with respect to the earldom at this time. His expedi-
tion had been an impressive demonstration of his power which had won him
the submission of Malcolm and had allowed him to expel Cospatric. His
actual control of the North depended upon his presence there, and
William could not stay, even if he wanted to. because there was not
enough food in southern Northumberland to support his troops. In
these circumstances he could do nothing radical, so he appointed another
native earl. His choice fell on Waltheof, Siward's younger son, whose
27mother had been a daughter of Earl Uhtred. Waltheof was thus, like
Cospatric, related to the house of Hamburgh through the female line and
could be expected to possess personal authority in Northumbria because
of this fact. It is even possible that his appointment had been contem-
plated for some time. Alone among Edward's earls, he had enjoyed
2p his
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lasting favor from William. Waltheof had been allowed to kee .
father's old earldom of Huntingdon and Northampton, and he had b.
accorded the unparalleled privilege for an Anglo-Saxon of marrying
within the Conqueror's family. His wife was Judith, the daughter of
William's sister Adelaide.^^ Waltheof had not been permitted these hon-
ors for no reason; they were probably intended to insure that the new
earl of the Northumbrians would be a faithful adherent of the king.
William may have crossed the Tyne on his way south satisfied. It
can be argued either way. In a sense his achievement was superficial,
but the limits of the possible were rather narrow in the North in the
1070' s. With Yorkshire a waste land and in the absence of a numerous
group of Norman landholders above the Tees, his power was very limited.
As it was, he had obtained Malcolm's homage, gotten his enemies expelled
from Scotland, and installed a new earl who was bound to him by strong
ties. All these arrangements fell apart within three years, as it
turned out, but it is difficult to imagine what else William could have
done. It is even possible that he realized the fragile nature of the
situation for he did not pass into Yorkshire before he had left behind
something more substantial than the promises of Malcolm and the loyalty
of Waltheof. His army stopped in Durham and built Bishop Walcher a cas-
tle where he could find relief if the natives proved recalcitrant.^^
Even this turned out to be a failure in the end but through no fault of
William who crossed the Tees never to return.
One can hardly blame the Conqueror. It must not have been pleasant
for him to be faced with problems whose insolubility was primarily the
result of his own deeds. The church at Durham even had a tradition.
which had been turned into a miracle story by Sy.eon»s time, that
William had crossed the Tees at a dead run that fall through fear of St.
Cuthbert or, more specifically, through dread of damnation. It is
tempting to see in this story a reflection of the fact that in 1072
William came to understand the consequences of his acts.^^ Alterna-
tively, the story may only mean that St. Cuthberfs monks believed that
he should have understood and feared for his soul. They knew about the
harrying.
Indeed, they undoubtedly knew more than their historian, Symeon of
Durham, chose to explain in detail. His special concern was the history
of St. Cuthbert's church and, to a lesser extent, important events which
had occurred in the North. These were interests which could exclude
much, yet even in his works there are hints that conditions were far
worse than political and military events alone would indicate. Specifi-
cally, one might wonder what he meant when he said that William built
Durham castle so that Walcher and his men would have protection ab
31incursantibus. Obviously this phrase might refer to Scottish inva-
sions or even to the type of raid characteristic of northern rebellion,
and perhaps one of these was his meaning. It is also possible, however,
that by this vague phrase Symeon sought to indicate a more mundane real-
ity of the last decades of the eleventh century, a reality which has
escaped historians because it did not often fall within the categories
of events of interest to the chroniclers and which received, therefore,
only a scant description. Individually, the notices of this phenomenon
are not too informative, although some are highly suggestive. If they
are combined, they show that one of the most serious results of the
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conquest on the North was an intensification of the threat fro. the
free-zone to the agricultural cooMunlties of the east coast plain. That
Is to say. the nu*er of "outlaws" increased dramatically, and to under-
stand this development, it will be necessary to return to the years
before 1066.
As late as the reign of Edward the Confessor, one of the North's
outstanding problems was the large-scale brigandage made possible by the
wild conditions of the free-zone. Robbers were so numerous that travel-
ers went in groups of twenty to thirty men and still found no security
when Siward was earl, and Tostig is said to have made war on these brig-
ands with some success. ^2 The only specific example of the latter's law
and order campaign, however, shows that the problem had wider dimensions
than just the inherent lawlessness of the Northumbrians. On one occa-
sion Tostig captured a notorious "outlaw," nomine Aldan-hamel
. who had
been plundering, burning, and killing in Northumbria for a long time;
and after his capture, Aldan-hamel' s family and friends tried to ransom
33him, but to no avail. This is hardly an account of the bringing to
justice of a common highwayman. The uncouth name, which is presumably a
mangled version of a Norse or perhaps Anglo-Saxon original, his crimes,
which seem in fact to have been raids, and the attempted ransom indicate
that this outlaw was in reality a man of some standing from the hills or
from the West who had lived by raiding Northumbria.
If this interpretation is correct, it has extremely important
implications for northern history during the eleventh and early twelfth
centuries because it suggests that the famed lawlessness of the North
was produced in part by predatory incursions of the inhabitants of the
shores of the Irish Sea and of the hills of the northern free-zone.
Such raids would provide a reasonable explanation for the fonnidable
level of brigandage which had existed under Siward, and Tostig's war
against the "robbers" could be understood as an atte.pt to thwart raids
from the West.^^ In fact, this idea fits in very well with two pieces
of information which have survived from this period. First, in 1065
Tostig held nearly all of northern Lancashire with the adjoining parts
of southern Westmorland and Cumberland south of the mountains, and he
had probably held the great sokes centered on Gilling and Catterick
opposite Stainmore.^^ These two groups of estates commanded the most
important routes south and east from Cumberland and were probably
intended as a barrier against raids. Second, this explanation is sup-
ported by the only contemporary description of Tostig's campaigns
against the "Scots."
[They] harassed him often with raids rather than war. But thisirresolute and fickle race of men, better in woods than on theplain, and trusting more to flight than to manly boldness inbattle, Tostig, sparing his own men, wore down as much by cun-
ning schemes as by martial courage and military campaigns. 36
The Scots, by which this writer probably meant Galwegians, raided the
North, and Tostig replied with the ambushes and stratagems appropriate
to this kind of warfare.
Although the information on these raids is very general, it is
unlikely that they were restricted to Yorkshire's border with Cumbria.
Aldan-hamel had been active above the Tees, and this is not surprising
because Northumbrians western border was rather different from what it
is usually conceived as being. From the standpoint of Northumbria, a
good border was a frontier which lay far back in the hills on a line
similar to that which existed in the thirteenth century. With such a
line, the Northumbrians would have some protection against raids from
the west and certainly warning of their approach, but in this period
they did not enjoy these advantages. Twelfth-century evidence indicates
that the Cumbrians had expanded far to the east in the days of their
power and that the Northumbrians' border with their descendants, the
Galwegians, was a north-south line. During the reign of King David, all
the inhabitants of Scotland south and west of the Clyde were known as
Galwegians, and according to G. W. S. Barrow, Galloway "in its widest
sense" comprised all of Scotland south of the Clyde and west of Teviot-
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dale. Moreover, Barrow's definition is probably somewhat conservative.
Jocelyn of Furness says that Cumbria ran from sea to sea like Hadrian's
wall, and this outrageous statement contains some truth. Jocelyn was
presumably thinking of mid- twelfth-century conditions when he wrote, and
there is a way to confirm his statement in part for he also says that
St. Kentigern's bishopric, Glasgow, was coterminous with the kingdom. '^^
This is significant because David's Cumbrian inquisition makes the same
identification between Cumbria and Glasgow and adds that the former lay
41inter Angliam et Scotiam
. Moreover, this inter was not restricted to
the West. In the early twelfth century Teviotdale was apparently sub-
42ject to Glasgow. This does not, of course, bring Cumbria quite to the
North Sea, but it does in general confirm Jocelyn's conception of the
extent of Cumbria. Furthermore, three aspects of the feudal history of
the northern end of the free-zone amplify his conception. First,
despite Rufus's conquest of Cumberland in 1092, Gllsland, which was
centered on the western end of the Tyne gap, remained subject to the
Scottish king until the reign of Henry 11.^3
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^
dence whatsoever that North Tynedale was part of England until the
reign of Henry I at the earliest and more probably the reign of Henry
II; and third, the barony of Langley, which occupied the South Tyne west
of Corbridge, was a creation of Henry iVs,'' The North of England was.
then, much smaller and less defensible than is usually assumed. Until
1092 Northumbria's border with Cumbria probably ran north from the Rere
Cross on Stainmore to the Tweed and included on the Cumbrian side the
bulk of the northern free-zone, and even after this date the Scots held
a large salient which protruded down to the South Tyne/^ As late as
the reign of Henry II, Northumbria consisted of the eastern coastal
plain with the immediately adjoining hills. Corbridge and Hexham stood
on the border. Given this north-south frontier, Aldan-hamel's career of
plundering and burning would not have required exceptional energy on his
part. He need not have lived outside the modern boundaries of Northum-
berland.
There are signs that a border with this configuration must always
have been a source of danger for the Northumbrians during times of inter-
nal weakness or rebellion. Earl Eadulf had had to ravage the Cumbrians
during his rebellion against Cnut; and Tostig, whose rule was unpopular,
had struggled against raids from the Westo"^^ But after 1066 this prob-
lem became even more serious because the Norman Conquest distracted and
weakened the traditional governmental powers on the east coast plain to
a degree unparalleled since the ninth century. Unheard of events
occurred in the North. In 1068 "Earl" Osulf of Bamburgh, the killer of
Copsig, was actually killed by an outlaw; and when Bishop i?]the Iwine and
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his men tried to return to Durha. 1„ 1070 frc„ Undlsfarne where they
had fled to escape William, despite their nu^ers and the presence of
St. Cuthberfs body they were plundered and harassed by a certain
^"^^^ "l"a a..n Tina, oraeno^.n.
^ater in the sa,.
year, Malcolm raided the North Riding and Durham from Cmnberland, a tac-
tic which had no recorded parallel since the days of Norwegian power in
the North,
The harrying added a new dimension to this problem because with the
destruction of stable society in Yorkshire "robbers" appeared below the
Tees. Probably most of them were native Yorkshire men who had taken to
brigandage to avoid either starvation or William's "forgiveness," but
whatever their origin, they constituted a serious problem, Symeon of
Durham says that throughout the 1070's travel across the empty country-
side which separated Durham and York was extremely dangerous on account
of outlaws and wolves, which, incidentally, faced the same problem of
survival as the nobles once the peasants and their animals were
destroyed; and there are other accounts which confirm Symeon's informa-
tion. The founders of Selby, which was only ten miles from York, were
harassed by outlaws who lived in the woods during the 1070 's, and Hugh
fitz Baldric, the sheriff of Yorkshire, is said to have had to travel
around the shire with a small army because there were still hostile
49Anglo-Saxons at large. Finally, the monks at Whitby had trouble with
outlaws during the 1070 's and were so regularly robbed by outlaws from
the woods as late as the reign of William Rufus that they tried to set-
tle elsewhere.
These exaniples show that brigandage was a serious and enduring
problem in the aftern^th of the harrying. The surviving peasants must
have enjoyed little security. Furthermore, Domesday shows that the
notices of rapine which found their way into the chronicles do not give
the true dimensions of the problem. One of the most curious features of
this document's Yorkshire folios is its account of the Pennines and Lan-
cashire above the Ribble. These have been interpreted as showing that
Yorkshire west of roughly the 400 foot line and the adjacent parts of
northern Lancashire were almost entirely uninhabited in 1086, but such a
view is mistaken. The Normans did not actually survey many of the
Pennine villages and all of northern Lancashire, and the most likely
explanation for this is that they really did not control these areas.
Indeed, there is narrative evidence for this hypothesis. During the
early 1070's Archbishop Thomas of York had Bishop Wulfstan of Worcester
perform episcopal functions in parts of his diocese because these areas
were still unsubdued, and the areas in question can only have been the
West.^"^
This discovery completes the melancholy picture of the North in the
years immediately after 1069. The harrying had, apparently, activated
the southern free-zone by filling the hills with disinherited rebels
turned outlaws, and the isolated examples of brigandage in the literary
sources were only outliers, so to speak, of a much larger area which ran
south from the Cumbrian border through the Pennines into northern Derby-
shire and in which Norman power was not firmly established as late as
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the end of William's reign. William had, then, won his crown at a ter-
rible and lasting price for the North. Norman rule was restricted to
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the east coast plain and to the western plain as a result of the harry-
ing. Between there was brigandage. The harrying also made it extremely
difficult to control Northumbria on a regular basis, and it made it
impossible to keep the king of the Scots and the Cumbrians from raiding
the North, particularly given the fact that the Cumbrian border was so
far east. These were the basic problems which confronted Norman rule in
the North during the rest of the eleventh century. They could not be
solved until a numerous Norman aristocracy was established beyond the
Humber which could control Northumbria and fight the Scots. Such a
group could not be created until Yorkshire was redeveloped, and this
took time both because of the magnitude of the task and because the dan-
ger to peasants from outlaws based in the free-zone had to be contained
first. In the meantime, the events of northern history proceeded from
an outre mixture of traditional problems in an acute form and Norman
weakness. The North was violent and unstable, and it is no wonder that
William never crossed the Tees again and came only once more to York.
The Ab ernethy understanding could only fall apart.
Although this occurred by degrees between 1072 and 1080, the first
signs of what was to come appeared in 1074. With the Abernethy agree-
ment less than two years old, Edgar the Atheling sailed back to Scotland
from Flanders with his followers, and it is unlikely that he came unin-
vited.^^ Malcolm had either decided that he could safely harbor his
brother-in-law, or he was plotting to disrupt the North again. The lat-
ter would be the more likely of the alternatives if 1074 was also the
year when Malcolm invited Cospatric to come to Scotland from Flanders
and gave him the earldom of Dunbar in Lothian, an event which was
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clearly a prelude to trouble in Northumbria. But although the return of
Edgar and Cospatric would logically fit together, it is impossible to
date the latter event with any precision. It may have happened in
1074; but, in any case, the reception of Edgar by itself was a clear
violation of the understanding between Malcolm and William and showed
that the former had not been too impressed by the Conqueror in 1072.
This incident did not, however, lead to any serious problems in the
North because of two unforeseen events. While Edgar was in Scotland,
the French king offered him a castle on the Channel from which he could
harass William. Edgar accepted, but on his way south he lost all of his
ships in a storm somewhere along the English coast. This disaster ended
the Atheling's open opposition to the Conquest. He regained Scotland
but now sought and obtained a reconciliation with William, presumably
because he had lost too many followers to remain a plausible rebel.
The Atheling's defection from the forces of disorder was not, how-
ever, very important. He had never been dangerous except on the theo-
retical level. Yet the events of 1074 still raise two rather curious
questions o One might wonder, for instance, why Malcolm had risked
William's displeasure for no apparent reason and how Edgar, despite
shipwreck, his own incompetence, and the Normans, had managed to escape
back to S cotland, particularly since some of his followers went on
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foot. These questions, unfortunately, cannot be definitely answered,
but this in itself suggests that some important aspect of the northern
political situation in 1074 was not recorded in the chronicles. Even
more curiously, the same problem is encountered in the events of 1075.
In that year. Earl Waltheof of Northumbria, whom William had appointed
only three years previously, went into open revolt in company with the
Breton earl of East Anglia and the Norman earl of Hereford. Given such
a bizarre coalition, the motives of the rebels were bound to be rather
disparate, but despite the fact that historians have realized this, no
one has succeeded in producing a convincing explanation of why Waltheof
joined the revolt.^^ This is not the fault of the historians who have
studied the revolt, however. The difficulty steins directly from the
primary Anglo-Norman chronicles whose writers either did not know why
Waltheof had revolted or deliberately minimized his role in the affair
because his headless corpse had begun to perform miracles, a sure sign
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of innocence. The embellishment and outright fabrication which this
point of view necessitated would not have been possible if the real rea-
son for Waltheof 's revolt had been current in the South in the late
eleventh and early twelfth centuries.
Some important event or situation of 1073 or 1074 has been left out
of the major chronicles. Only its ramifications, which together amount
to the collapse of most of William's authority in the North, are visi-
ble. Fortunately this gap can be filled, although not with the exacti-
tude which one might wish. Symeon of Durham knew what had happened, but
he buried the event in one of St. Cuthbert's miracles in the defense of
Northumbrian property where it has successfully eluded historians. This
miracle shows that Waltheof had excellent reasons for joining the revolt
of Earls Ralph and Roger; indeed, he had no choice at all. The reason
for this was that William the Conqueror had blundered badly. Either in
1073 or more probably in 1074, he decided to levy a tribute or tax on
Northumbria and sent a certain Ralph above the Tees to collect it.^"*"
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The miracle describes the imposition of this tax as uncustomary, and
given the reaction of the Northumbrians to demands for money in the
past, the result might have been easily anticipated. But these Northum-
brians were on their best behavior in a miracle story; and. in any case,
credit, especially credit for defying the king, belonged to St. Cuth-
bert. Kept alive by this necessity, Ralph went about his business levy-
ing the tribute, but on the night before it was to be collected, he
foolishly dropped his guard and went to sleep. This, of course, gave
Cuthbert his opening. He duly appeared to Ralph in a dream, chided him
severely for taxing his flock, and intimated that he would not get away
with it unscathed. Ralph awoke the next day "sicko" He had lost all
interest in gathering the tribute and only wished to escape Northumbria
alive. After he had made appropriate signs of reverence to St. Cuth-
bert, this was granted to him. Upon his departure he regained his
health, but, needless to say, he carried with him no money.
Although Cuthbert was a powerful saint, this story must be a
twelfth-century monk's way of saying that William had tried to tax
Northumbria, probably believing that he had accomplished more in 1072
than he actually had, and that the Northumbrians had driven out the tax
collectors. Waltheof was inevitably involved in this because either he
had been a party to the expulsion of Ralph or he had failed to protect
him. Either way, he was effectively in revolt against William. Fur-
thermore, Waltheof made the now traditional Northumbrian gesture of
defiance of southern authority. He sent a raiding party of Northum-
brians over the Tees in search of the sons of Carl who were now to pay
for their father's killing of Waltheof's grandfather on his mother's
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side. Earl Ealdred. One might well wonder what Siward would have
thought about all this. His son had changed sides in the old battle
between Bamburgh and York, but this paradox did not save the sons and
grandsons of Carl. The Northumbrians caught them at a banquet and
killed most of them.^^
The innuendoes of this deed may have been lost on the Normans, but
its basic meaning was unmistakable. William's authority in the North
had collapsed in 1074, and it was entirely his own fault given the
Northumbrians' sensitivity on the question of tribute. Their behavior
was entirely consistent with what they had done in 1065 and during the
early revolts against William. The only question involved—and this is
perhaps the reason why William felt it safe to levy the tax—is under-
standing how they had the effrontery to do it again, especially with the
harrying only four years past. Furthermore, they were now faced with
the same old difficulty as in past revolts. It was one thing to drive
out the agents of an unpopular southern government; it was quite another
to avoid paying for it.
This problem presumably bothered Waltheof , and he may have been
more active in the events of 1074 and 1075 than one can gather from the
chronicles. In particular, Edgar's return to Scotland and Malcolm's
willingness to receive him with honor were probably connected with
Waltheof 's revolt and may represent the first steps in an unsuccessful
attempt by the earl to obtain aid from this quarter. Waltheof is also
likely to have been seriously involved in the planning of the revolt of
1075, if only because he stood in such great need of aid. His momentar-
ily successful defiance of William can only have encouraged Ralph and
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Roger, and he may even have convinced them to revolt rather that the
opposite as the chronicles assert." Finally, the rebel earls invited a
Danish fleet to co^ to their aid, and although Ralph and Roger are
expressly said to have been responsible for this, it is .ore likely that
it was the work of Waltheof or at least accomplished through his inter-
mediacy.
In any case, a respectable coalition, which offered Waltheof more
hope than he had had any right to anticipate in 1074, had been brought
together by the spring of 1075. Unfortunately for the earl, it vanished
as quickly as it had been formedo The rebels were undone by a failure
to coordinate their actions which stretched from the English borderlands
to Denmark. No one was on time in 1075 except William's representatives.
The arrival of the Danes was delayed by a conflict between the sons of
Swein Estrithson who had died in April of 1074.^^ Despite this rather
major flaw in their plans, Ralph and Roger took the field anyway, but
they were unable to unite their forces. Roger remained penned up in the
West, and Ralph's revolt quickly contracted to the inside of his castle
at Norwich which was besieged by William's forces for three months.
For his part, Waltheof, the victim, no doubt, of a growing sense of des-
peration, seems to have stayed in the North waiting for the Danes.
Rumors were current, to be sure, that the North was in revolt, and
Lanfranc ordered Walcher to be prepared for the arrival of the Danes.
Yet as the revolt in the South collapsed, Waltheof apparently remained
inactive because he realized that the Northumbrians could not act alone,
and when the failure of the Danes to arrive had clearly undone the
revolt, he capitulated. According to one version of the Anglo-Saxon
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Ch£2£lcle, the earl crossed to Normandy to seek William's pardon and
offered the king "treasure,- presumably the tribute which had been with-
held in 1074. Fro. Waltheof 's point of view this sign of submission
have seemed sufficient atonement; but, if so, he was forgetting the fat
of Earls Uhtred, Ealdred, and Eadulf. His was to be no different.
William dissembled until they had returned to England and Waltheof 's
safe-conduct had presumably expired. Then he had the earl cast into
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prison. About the same time the Danes finally arrived with a fleet of
200 ships. They could do nothing against the Normans by themselves;
and, after a perfunctory cruise up the Humber to York where they sacked
the cathedral, they left the kingdom.
Thus the great coalition of 1075 faded away. Military events had
made a mockery of the real danger which the alliance between the rebels
and the Danes had posed, and William's authority was again unchallenged
in the North. This was not the case, however, in Brittany whither Ralph
de Gael, the ex-earl of Norfolk, had removed his revolt. A threatening
situation was developing there, and it was perhaps this circumstance
which induced the king to treat the Northumbrians moderately. Waltheof,
who had risen far too high in the royal favor to be forgiven, was
beheaded; but the royal punitive expedition which might have been antic-
ipated was not sent into the North. By the next campaigning season
William had a more pressing use for his soldiers than burning out North-
umbrians, so they went unpunished for once. The king merely appointed a
new earl, and his choice was as conciliatory as it could have been short
of selecting another member of the house of Bamburgh, whose representa-
tives had not been notable for their loyalty. No new Norman earl was
placed ove. the Northu^rians; rather, the king built upon the one pil-
lar of public authority above the Tees which still stood. Bishop
Walcher wa3 allowed to buy the earldom. He had reroained both alive
and loyal since his appointment in 1071, an inrpressive accomplishment
for an outsider above the Tees; and his selection was the easiest solu-
tion to the problem of Northumbrian government in 1076 for anything else
would have risked an incident. Furthermore, William seems to have made
an attempt to bolster Walcher's prestige. He restored to Durham an old
estate which had been lost, granted some new property, and confirmed the
ancient l^s and customs of the bishopric. The latter presumably
included a promise that Walcher' s rule was not to be disturbed by any
threat of royal taxation.
This makeshift arrangement functioned with some success for five
years. It is, however, difficult to form a very clear impression of the
nature of ¥alcher»s government or its popularity with the Northumbrians.
He was fondly remembered by later monks at Durham, and Symeon portrays
him as an honest, upright man who diligently performed his episcopal
duties. Of course, the support which Walcher gave to the revival of
monasticism in the North would be enough to account for this, although
there is no compelling reason to believe that it does.^^ Rather, it
seems likely that certain aspects of Walcher 's character were edited
out, so to speak. The bishop was clearly an exceptionally ambitious
man. Why else would he have undertaken the care of St. Cuthbert's testy
flock, nofc to mention the government of Northumbria? Furthermore, if he
really did buy the earldom, one must suppose that he intended to get his
money back. Walcher had not come into Northumbria just to be a good
bishop, even though he n^y have been one; and he was sufficiently
political-minded to grasp the basic truth that to survive above the Tees
he had to come to terms with the house of Bamburgh. From an early date
he had adopted a certain Ligulf as his principal adviser. The latter
was an important landowner who had retired to his Northumbrian estates
in the face of the Conquest and who was married to a daughter of Earl
Ealdred. He was, thus, like Cospatric and Waltheof, connected with the
Bamburgh family, and his presence in the bishop's council must have pro-
vided a link with the native aristocracy. Indeed, Walcher is said to
have performed no important secular act without his consent, and this
policy of accommodation and respect for Northumbrian tradition was prob-
ably responsible for Walcher's survival. It is also obvious, however,
that there was another side to the bishop's government. Even Symeon of
Durham does not suppress the fact that Walcher's household knights often
plundered and occasionally killed the natives and that Walcher did noth-
78ing to stop them. This was, needless to say, a very dangerous policy
which could be expected to provoke the Northumbrians, and it is
extremely difficult to account for it. The usual explanation, which is
an extrapolation from Symeon, is that Walcher was simply incapable of
controlling his soldiers, and this may have been the case.''^ Alterna-
tively, Walcher's soldiers may have acted on the bishop's orders, con-
ceivably in response to native opposition or out of arrogance, situa-
tions which Symeon would not have felt free to mention since either
would have put the bishop in a bad light.
Whichever of these was actually the case, Walcher's government did
arouse the resentment of the Northumbrians; and, even without the
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misdeeds of his soldiers, this was probably only to be expected given
the circumstances which had surrounded his acquisition of the earldom
1075. WilliaTn's conciliatory settlement of the rebellion of 1074-75 i
unlikely to have impressed on them the inadvisability of defying Norman
power, but it is impossible to tell how serious this problem was between
1075 and 1079. In the latter year, however, an event occurred which may
have been prompted by the weakness of Walcher's government and which
increased his difficulties with the Northumbrians. In August of 1079
Malcolm Canmore finally decided that it was safe to ignore the Abernethy
agreement entirely and launched his third invasion of the North. Cer-
tain general considerations which had nothing to do with the North were
undoubtedly involved in this decision. In 1077 Malcolm had defeated the
ruler of Moray, his chief domestic rival, and this victory had freed him
80from internal dangers. Furthermore, William the Conqueror was fight-
ing his son Robert in northern France that summer and must have seemed
I . 81only a very distant threat. Malcolm probably also judged, however,
that Walcher would be able to put up no serious resistance. Certainly
this proved to be the case. In mid August the Scots came over the border
and freely plundered Northumberland for about three weeks. During this
time Walcher seems to have done nothing. He did not even launch counter
raids as Cospatric had done in 1072, and the Scots were able to return
82home with many slaves and much booty.
This invasion set the stage for the last outrage of the Northum-
brians. Walcher's failure to provide even a nominal defense for North-
umberland apparently ended his prestige; and by spring, Ligulf , Walcher's
native collaborator, became uncooperative in council. He was the
natural leader of any resistance to Walcher, and this was, therefore, a
serious development. Unfortunately, what occurred is obscure because
the only coherent account 6f the incident, that of Florence of Worcester,
explains it in terms of a personal conflict between Ligulf and two of
Walcher's subordinates, his chaplain Leobwin and Gilbert, the bishop's
kinsman who managed the secular government of the bishopric. According
to Florence, Leobwin had been jealous of Ligulf for some time and
decided to kill the latter after Ligulf had opposed him in the bishop's
council. Since Ligulf was the current link between the Hamburgh fam-
ily and Northumbrian government, however, one may legitimately doubt
whether the incident was this simple; but even if it was, the Northum-
brians had lost too many members of the house of Bamburgh ever to •
believe that the event which followed was not an official act of
Walcher's government.
A classic sequence ensued. Gilbert, who had agreed to do the deed,
attacked Ligulf 's hall by surprise in the night and killed him along
with most of his household. The use of this tactic should probably be
understood as a sign that Walcher and his men were already faced with a
serious situation, although it is theoretically possible that the arro-
gance of Gilbert and Leobwin was so great that they disregarded the
obvious danger of what they had done. In either case, the murder of
Ligulf had been a fatal mistake because whether or not the Northumbrians
had been contemplating a revolt, they had now been provoked by the tra-
ditional act of oppression, the murder of a member of the house of Bam-
burgh by an agent of the king. Their reprisal was equally traditional.
Walcher had shut himself up in Durham castle after the murder, but he
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^on consented to a meeting with Ligulf's relatives at Gateshead which
offered a convenient gathering place for Northmnbrians from either side
of the Tyne. Presumably he had been offered some hope that peace could
i>e restored, but the meeting was in actuality a trap. When Walcher
arrived at Gateshead with a hundred knights on May 14th, he found that
the llorthumbrians would come to no agreement. He then with some naivete
retired to the church, but it did no good. The Northumbrians first
killed all of his retainers who had remained outside, then cut down
Gilbert and the bishop when they tried to escape, and finally burned
down the church to get at Leobwin. The killer of the bishop was Eadulf
Rus, the son of Cospatric who had been killed by Tostig in 1064.^^
In a fundamental sense the massacre at Gateshead was the last inci-
dent in Northumbrian history because the Northumbrian nobility had
finally overreached itself. The rebels did go down to Durham where they
besieged the castle, but they were unable to take it by assault and
withdrew on the fourth day of the siege. Probably they reasoned that
the castle garrison was too small to be a serious threat; and, in any
case, their major objective, the destruction of Walcher and the instru-
ments of his government, was already accomplished. In 1080 as in past
revolts, the Northumbrians had acted in response to a specific outrage.
Once this was avenged, there was nothing else for them to do. They may
even have reasoned with the events of 1075 in mind that the worst which
they could expect would be the imposition of a new earl, and their fail-
ure to press the siege of the castle, which was within their means, nxay
have been an attempt to limit the provocation which they gave the king.
If this was the case, it was a futile gesture. The Northumbrians
were undone by their lack of imagination. After lifting the siege they
had gone home.^^ This time William did not simply appoint a new earl.
He had been doing that since 1067 when his first earl had been killed.
In 1080, he made a determined attempt to take Northumbria in hand; and,
even though the measures which followed are not known in detail, they
seem to have been part of a comprehensive plan. First, the Northum-
brians were punished for the killing of Walcher and his men. At some
date during the summer, William's half brother Odo led an expedition
into Northumbria to harry the countryside. No chronicler describes what
transpired in any detail, but Odo's purpose seems to have been to kill
Northumbrians. The Normans slaughtered and maimed both the guilty and
the innocent, and they were apparently able to weaken the native nobil-
ity seriously, killing or driving into exile many of its members.
This was an extremely important event. It was the final solution to the
old problem of governing the Northumbrians which stretched back to the
days of Cnut's conquest of England. There would be no more native
revolts above the Tees because in 1080 the Northumbrian nobility had
joined the nobles of York,
Odo's expedition solved one aspect of the general political and
military problem which the North posed, but it did little to insure that
the Normans could keep control of the area. The Northumbrian nobility
had at least demonstrated little inclination to go over to the Scots
except in extremis , and with them gone, some action against Malcolm was
clearly necessary. William met this need with a second expedition in
1080. In the fall, he sent his son Robert into Scotland with an army.
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It has been asserted that the purpose of this move was entirely diplo-
matic, that it was a "demonstration in force" designed to bring about a
reconciliation with Malcolm, but there is no proof that this was the
intention. William and Robert may have hoped for a decisive battle
which would simplify the situation in the North, and all that is known
for certain is that a battle did not take place. Robert led his army
through Lothian to Falkirk where he met Malcolm. The Scottish king
would not fight, and Robert was faced with the choice of chasing him
further or negotiating. Robert chose the latter. The two men renewed
the Abernethy agreement, and Malcolm gave more hostages for his good
behavior. Then Robert returned to Northumbria nullo confecto negotio .^^
This phrase of Symeon's certainly suggests that the outcome of Robert's
expedition was thought to be unsatisfactory.
Still, Robert had accomplished all that could be realistically
hoped; and, like his father in 1072, he did not leave the Northumbrian
landscape as he had found it. On his way south Robert stopped on the
north side of the Tyne opposite Gateshead and built a new castle, the
Newcastle as it would become in time. The erection of this castle had a
multiple significance. On the one hand, its location across from the
spot where Walcher and his men had been massacred stood as a warning to
the remaining Northumbrians. On the other hand, it was a tangible sign
that Norman England now extended to the Tyne. Some historians would
also add that the location of this castle was an admission that the
91
country north of the Tyne was debatable, or perhaps even Scottish, but
neither of these suppositions is true except perhaps in a military
sense. Newcastle could defend Durham but not Northumberland.
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Yet this observation, despite its descriptive truth in 1080 and for
many years to come, obscures the fact that Newcastle was probably
Intended as a base for the new regime which William created in Northum-
bria after the conclusion of the military operations of 1080. Robert
had secured freedom for the North from major Scottish invasions, and Odo
had crushed native opposition to Norman rule. These circumstances made
it possible for William to integrate Northumbria more closely into the
kingdom than it had been in the past by introducing Normans into the
ecclesiastical and secular government of the earldom. Before the year
was out, William de St. Calais, a trusted administrator of the king,
obtained the bishopric of Durham; and around the same time, a certain
92Aubrey became earl of Northumbria. For the latter to succeed, how-
ever, he needed a stronghold between Durham castle, which belonged to
the bishop, and Bamburgh, the ancient fastness of the earls, which was
nearly forty-five miles above Gateshead. Newcastle provided this. It
was a secure bridgehead into Northumberland, the necessary preliminary
to the exercise of political and military power above the Tyne.
Moreover, Newcastle did not stand alone. The expeditions and
appointments of 1080 which brought the formal conquest of Northumbria
were matched to the south by the beginnings of an assault on the free-
zone. This was a task of the utmost importance because the creation of
a strong North depended upon the extension of Norman control into the
hills. Until this was accomplished, the peasants would still be subject
to brigands, and it would not be too important who was earl or bishop
^
Indeed, this was strikingly illustrated in 1081(?) when William's new
1 of Northumbria actually resigned the honor and went home because heear
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either could not control the earldom or thought it was worthless,
curious incident forced Williaa to appoint another earl, Robert de
Mowbray, and confirmed the need for the policy, which had probably
already begun, of establishing a series of compact fees at the mouths of
the major breaks in the southern Pennines and in other places which were
subject to the incursions of outlaws and pirates. Some of these fees
were explicitly known as castleries, and all of them were exceptionally
compact units. Their purpose was defensive in the sense that they were
designed to control communications, and some of them, notably those
which adjoined the hills, were intended as bases for expansion. Fur-
thermore, their lords usually possessed formidable judicial powers which
included infangthief, the right to have a gallows, the right to the
goods of condemned fugitives, the assize of bread and ale, and the
return of writs except for pleas of the crown. Taken together, these
powers amounted to effective police power. They were all that a baron
needed to be a terror to outlaws and robbers, and herein probably lay
the principal day to day function of these fees. They were established
to provide law and order in vulnerable districts. A castlery was not
simply an area organized for the support of a castle; it was also the
area subject to the castle.
The oldest of these units around the Pennines was in the south and
probably dated back to the days when the marcher earldoms themselves had
been formed. Henry de Ferrers' castlery of Tutbury dominated the roads
which converged on Derby from the northwest and blocked the major river
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valleys of the southern end of the Pennines, and there was a similar,
although smaller, unit west of Nottingham where the holdings of William
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Peverel, which may also have been a castlery. covered the city against
the west.^^ These two fees had probably been formed in the early 1070's
to secure comnmnications around the southern end of the free-zone and to
contain raids from this area. Hereward the Wake, it will be remembered,
was killed by knights from Tutbury according to Gaimar.^^ They also
presumably served as the direct archetype for the fees which William
created in the North around 1080.
This late date for the establishment of the castleries and similar
districts in Yorkshire may seem rather surprising, but it is apparently
correct. W. E. Wightman has argued from the details of their descrip-
tion in Domesday that they were formed late in William's reign, probably
as an aid to Robert de Mowbray, and his reasoning is convincing.^^
Moreover, Symeon of Durham specifically states that the countryside of
Yorkshire remained uncultivated and empty for nine years after the har-
rying, and the most probable explanation for the passing of these condi-
tions is that William had begun to create defensive districts at criti-
cal spots in the North in 1079-1080. """^^
TWO castleries and three exceptionally large and compact fees were
established to protect ^he lowlands of the North from the various
threats which surrounded them. There was, on the one hand, the danger
of piracy along the coast; and Holderness, the area most exposed to this
danger, was given almost in its entirety to Drogo. On the other hand,
there was the more serious threat from the wild parts of Yorkshire, the
fens and the mountains; and three large lordships, Tickhill, Pontefract,
and Richmond, were established in settled regions which adjoined these
areas. In the far south of the West Riding and in the neighboring parts
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of Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire. Roger de BusU was given a compact
fee (Tlckhill) through which the roads from York passed south and which
abutted three dangerous areas, the Pennines on the west, the fens at the
head of the Humber on the east, and Sherwood forest on the southeast.
North of Roger's land stood Ilbert de Lacy's castlery of Pontefract. It
stretched continuously from the Pennine foothills to the fens on either
side of the Aire. Pontefract dominated not only all the roads running
north-south, but also the entrance of the Aire gap which was the easiest
passage through the Pennines from their southern end to the Tyne gap far
103to the north. The next important passage through the mountains above
the Aire gap was Stainmore in the North Riding, and it was blocked by
Count Alan's castlery of Richmond, a solid block of 199 manors on the
eastern slopes of the Pennines and the edge of the Vale of York."'"^^
RichmoEtd, Pontefract, and Tickhill closed the easiest exits from the
"
Pennines and together provided security for the Vale of York. In the
West the functions of these fees and of Holderness were combined in the
lordship of Roger of Poitou who held all of Lancashire between the Rib-
ble and the Mersey along with the western flanks of the Pennines around
the approaches to the Aire gap.''"^^ Roger's fee was in reality a mili-
tary salient intruded between the free-zone and the Irish Sea pirates.
Finally, by 1086 a new royal castle had been raised far up the Derwent
valley at the Peak in Derbyshire. '''^^
T3ae creation of these lordships around the Pennines was the most
imports.nt development which took place in the North in the 1080 's
because they offered the hope that the danger from the free-zone could
be contained and ultimately destroyed. Unfortunately, however, the
dally activities of men such as Ilbert de Lacy or William Peverel, not
to mention Earl Robert de Mowbray in the wilds of Northumberland, were
not gaudy enough to attract the attention of the chroniclers, and noth-
ing is known of them. Indeed, hardly anything at all happened in the
North outside the ecclesiastical sphere between 1080 and 1087 according
to the chronicles. There were no murders, revolts, or invasions, and
Norman power was uncontested, at least during the daylight hours and
away from the woods. The only exception to this was the threatened Dan-
ish invasion of 1085 which probably provoked the devastation of Holder-
ness by the Normans, but in the end the Danes did not come."'"^^
In fact, this rare period of peace even survived the Conqueror's
death in 1087. The military activities connected with the baronial
revolt of 1088 were limited to southern England, and even though Earl
Robert and Bishop William were among the rebels, there were only minor
repercussions in the North in a direct sense. Malcolm did not invade
either because he was getting old or because he was waiting to see how
Rufus would fare against the rebels, and Robert de Mowbray obtained a
complete reconciliation with the king. Indeed, the only ones to suffer
at all were William de St. Calais and the clerks of Durham. The former,
who may have done some local raiding, was exiled as a result of the
revolt, and the latter had to endure the fiscal tedium of one of Rufus 's
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agents until the bishop's restoration three years later. With this
exception, the tranquility of the North remained unbroken until 1091
whets open warfare with the Scots broke out.
This appearance of tranquility may be deceptive, however, because
there is a possibility that the settlement of the baronial revolt of
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1088 brought a basic change in royal policy in the North o Certainly
there was need for a change from the Norman point of view. William the
Conqueror had achieved the destruction of serious opposition to Norman
rule in the North but little else, and when Rufus became king the Nor-
mans above the Humber were still in a weak and unsatisfactory position.
With their settlement limited to below the Ribble in the West and prob-
ably to south of the Wansbeck in Northumberland, "'"^^ they were poten-
tially at the mercy of the Scots given the fact that the border was as
disadvantageous as ever and that the redevelopment of Yorkshire had only
begun despite the creation of castlexies around the southern free-zone.
This area itself was still for the most part unsubdued, and the peace of
the North depended on the homage of Malcolm Canmore, a volatile sub-
s tance
,
These circumstances cannot have been pleasing to the Normans in the
North. Ultimately they could only be solved by time, but in one respect,
the danger which stemmed from the border, the situation could be
improved quickly by a change of royal policy. Specifically, Rufus could
disregard his father's understanding with Malcolm. Malcolm's homage to
William has usually be°n considered from the standpoint of whether it
compromised the "independence" of the Scottish kingdom, and this is
unfortunate because the arrangement was as much in Malcolm's interest as
in William's. The Scottish king did homage and thereby accepted a posi-
tion of political subordination which meant little in practice; William,
however, must have guaranteed him ag3.inst general Norman aggression or
infringements on the border. In fact, the meeting of 1080 is said to
have included a definition of the border although its precise terms are
unknown. '^^ This understanding was to Malcolm's advantage for it, in
effect, froze the border and indirectly limited Norman settlement to
areas which were not too exposed to the sudden eruptions of Scots and
Galwegians. A breach with Malcolm was, therefore, in the interest of
the northern nobles if they could be assured of royal support in the
hostilities with the Scots which could follow, and it is likely that
Rufus gave this promise in 1088. As a result of the baronial revolt of
that year, the marcher lords seem to have obtained the abrogation of
similar guarantees which William had given to the Welsh princes, and it
is unlikely that the northern rebels, especially Robert de Mowbray and
Roger of Poitou, would have been satisfied with less
.
This can only be offered as an hypothesis, however, because there
is an important gap in the chronology of events in the North under
Rufus. At some point the king resumed his father's policy of establish-
ing well enfranchised lordships along the edges of the free-zone, but
exactly when these baronies were created can only be guessed. In one
112instance, that of Skipton in Craven, this is not a serious problem.
Skipton stood at the head of the Aire, and although it was of great
importance because it split the southern free-zone and insured direct
communications with the West, its establishment had only internal sig-
nificance. This was not the case with Rufus 's other new baronies which
were all on the Scottish border. In the West, he gave Ivo Taillebois a
new lordship composed of Ewecross Wapentake, southern Westmorland, and
southern Cumberland. These lands provided the basis for the later bar-
onies of Burton in Lonsdale, Kendal, and Copeland, and if Furness was
included, as is likely, they constituted a continuous strip of land
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running from the northwestern exit of the Aire gap to the Irish Sea.
Ivo's lands covered all the routes north into Cumbria and all the trails
from northern Lancashire over the Pennines from the Aire gap northwards.
If this land was given to Ivo prior to 1092, it originally formed a
1 -I o
frontier castlery analogous to Richmond. Rufus also created similar
lordships along the east side of the Pennines. Guy de Balliol obtained
upper Teesdale where he built Barnard Castle and the barony of Bywell
114in the Tyne valley. Furthermore, it is possible, although not likely,
that Rufus gave Redesdale to Robert de Umfraville who held this valley
by the tenure of guarding or keeping it from the outlaws. "''"'"^ This was,
of course, the purpose of Bywell and Barnard Castle also. These lord-
ships blocked either the two or the three most obvious passages above
Richmond from Cumbria into Northumbria and were of the utmost importance
for protecting the coastal plain. Rufus's fees were, moreover, squarely
on the Cumbrian border, or in the case of Ivo's lands, what was the bor-
der before 1092; and, if they were formed prior to 1092, they were a
direct provocation to Malcolm Canmore and a sign that the spirit of
Abernethy was dead.
This problem of t^'mng is important because of the chain of events
which began in 1091 and which led to great political changes in northern
Britain. In that year Malcolm Canmore shattered the peace of the North
by invading Northumbria, and the question is whether he did this for his
own reasons, such as to aid Edgar the Atheling who had been deprived of
his estates in Normandy, or whether he had been baited into it just as
Rhys ap Tewdwr, the king of South Wales, was being baited in these same
116
years by the marcher lords of Wales. Probably the latter was the
was
case, although it is impossible to be certain. The invasion of 1091
at least, extraordinary. Not only did Malcolm invade Northumberland in
May, a very bad time of year for an army to find provisions in the North
but he apparently hoped to take Durham, something not attempted by the
Scots since Duncan's expedition in the 1040's and which, if successful,
would have resulted in the collapse of Norman power above the Tees. The
invasion of 1091 was a serious attack, not a raid or only a diplomatic
gesture as has been suggested, and it indicates that Malcolm either
felt himself to be in an exceptionally strong position, which is
unlikely, or that he had become alanned at the growth of Norman power in
the North. In either case, his bold stroke did not work, though the
reasons for this are far from clear. The Scots entered Northumberland
in May. They then moved south, by-passed or took Newcastle, and pene-
trated as far as central Durham. At this critical point, however, the
oldest descriptions of these events become contradictory. The account
which is usually followed, a summary of Malcolm's raids in the Historia
Regim, says that Malcolm was confronted by a small group of knights at
Chester-le-Street just north of Durham and quickly withdrew. "'"'^
Other sources, in 'uding a different passage in the Historia Regum
itself, indicate that this is not what happened or, at least, not all
that happened. The main narrative in the Historia Regum directly asso-
ciates the failure of Malcolm's invasion with the arrival of William
Rufus's retaliatory expedition in the North in the fall, and one of St.
Cuthbert*s miracles indirectly explains what took place, '^''"^ It indi-
cates that Durham was, in fact, besieged for some time in 1091, that the
opposing knights did nothing to drive away the Scots, and that the
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latter finally fled for no apparent reason. ^^0 The befuddlement of
invading armies and of historians who would trace their movements was,
of coixrse, one of St. Cuthbert's most important abilities, but in this
particular instance the writer goes too far. To complete the miracle,
he adds that Bishop William was restored in the same hour as the one in
121which the Scots decamped. The bishop's appearance out of nowhere
would have been a miracle indeed; but, in fact, it is known from other
sources that William de St. Calais was reinstated in the fall of 1091 by
Rufus, his brothers, and a large Norman army which was on its way north
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to fight Malcolm. They were, the ones who saved Durham, and this in
turn means that the Scots had stayed in Northumbria throughout the sum-
mer of 1091.
This was an ominous development, and even if Rufus had not been
hitherto pursuing a policy hostile to the Scots, he now embarked on one.
The English king had come north that fall with an army and a fleet to
force a military decision, and when it became clear that the Scots had
already retreated out of Northumbria, he moved after them into Lothiano
Not unpredictably, this direct approach failed in 1091 just as it had in
1072 and in 1080. Ma"" olm would not give battle, and Rufus 's chances of
ever catching him were completely destroyed when he lost his supply
fleet. The Norman army was soon cold and starving, and the invasion
ended in the usual way. Malcolm and Rufus met in Lothian, perhaps with
a well fed and properly clothed Scottish army lurking in the nearby
hills., and negotiated a renewal of the Abernethy agreement through the
intermediacy of Edgar the Atheling and Duke Robert. Malcolm swore
fealty to Rufus, and the latter promised to return the twelve vills
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which Ralcolm had held under William the Conqueror. Then Rufus went
123
south o
Tkis settlement did not end the natter, however. Rufus was appar-
ently tmhappy with the results of his invasion of Scotland, ''"^^ and he
may even have felt that he had made a fool of himself. In any case, the
basic problem with the Scots still renained, and to solve this problem,
he trie-d in 1092 a new tack which con&ined force with deceit. His first
move was to conquer Cumberland o The expedition by which this was accom-
plished is described in little detail, but it seems to have been a well
conceived effort to take and hold the areao In 1092 Rufus led an army
north and drove out Dolfin, the lord who had ruled Cumberlando With
this accomplished, the king had Carlisle restored and a castle built
there » Furthermore, peasants with their families and livestock were
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brought in from the south to support the garrison.. Presumably this
was necessary because the local inhabitants had not been able to prac-
tice settled agriculture on any scale with the Galwegians to the north
and tine back side of the free-zone to the east and south. The castle,
town, and peasants were, then, a unit. Carlisle was a self-supporting
military colony which ^.Tould significantly improve the configuration of
the northern border. It could close the Vale of Eden thereby protecting
YorksSaire and Lancashire, and it could to some extent hinder movement
through the Tyne gap.
•niese were, however, potentialities in 1092. At the time, Carlisle
was only an isolated strong point whose lines of communication were
unprotected and which could not deferxi itself for long. Indeed, its
immediate use proved to be diplomatic rather than military. The
Mlitary colony at Carlisle functioned as either a bargaining point with
Malcol. or as bait to bring hi. out into the open. This is evident fro.
Malcol^^s strange behavior in 1093. Despite the fact that the conquest
of Carlisle is usually assumed to have been an act of naked aggression
directed against MalcoLn, he gave no sign for so.e time that he viewed
it as such. He did not try to stop Rufus in 1092, nor did he invade the
North during the normal campaigning season of 1093. Rather, in Septem-
ber of 1093 Malcolm came south peacefully, laid one of the foundation
stones for Bishop William's new cathedral at Durham, and then went on to
visit Rufus at Gloucester. His behavior is puzzling, and this unu-
sual restraint on his part must mean either that the situation was
ambiguous in some sense or that an iinportant factor has been misunder-
stood. Malcolm was not the man to come meekly to Rufus to ask for the
return of Cumberland. Indeed, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle says that he
came south to demand that Rufus fulfill the terms of some agreement, and
this agreement must have concerned Cumberland. ''"^^ This suggestion, how-
ever, is no help unless one assumes that Rufus had promised to give back
Cumberland, uncharacteristic behavior for the Red King but consistent
with a transitory vow reform himself which the king had made when he
thought he was dying during the summer of 109 3
o
This may account for Malcolm's forbearance. Yet it does not
explain why Malcolm did nothing in 1092, and another hypothesis is more
likely. Scholarship on these events has been marred by a basic error
concerning the status of Cumberland. In 1092 Rufus had driven a noble
named Dolfin out of Cumberland. The prevailing opinion is that this
Dolfin was the eldest son of Earl Cospatric who had once been earl of
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Korthumbrla and who was later earl .f Dunbar under Malcol.. but there Is
no direct evidence whatsoever which supports the Identification of the
Cu^rlan Dolfln with Cospatrlc's son."' it ^ght be suggested about as
plausibly that the Cumbrian Dolfln was a descendant of the Dclfln. son
of Thor. apparently a Cumbrian noble, who had died fighting against
130Macbeth in 1054. This point is important because the idea that
Dolfin was Cospatric's son is the only support for the belief that Cum-
berland was under the Scottish king in 1092. The last date when this is
known to have been true is 1070, and after that there is simply no
information on the question, although it may be relevant that Malcolm's
invasions of 1079 and 1091 do not seem to have included contingents from
131the West. Furthermore, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle says that Dolfin
ruled the area~not that he held some official position from Malcolm or
owed obedience to the Scottish king."*"^^
The idea that Cumberland was Scottish is an assumption with no sup-
port but silence. The contrary hypothesis that it had fallen away from
the Scottish kingdom at some date after 1070 and was ruled independently
by a local noble does less violence to the Chronicle' s description of the
conquest of the area, and makes sense of the events from the fall of 1091
to the early winter of 1093. When the Abernethy agreement was renewed
in Lothian in 1091, Rufus had undertaken to restore Cumberland, which
was ruled by a native noble, to Malcolm. The twelve vills (shires?)
which Florence says Rufus promised Malcolm probably represent Cumber-
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land. The next year Rufus did drive out Dolfin, and Malcolm had no
reason to suppose that the English king would not honor the rest of the
agreement. Of course, he did not. Consequently in the late summer
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of 1093, Malcolm came south to demand that Rufus keep his promise. The
chronicles, however, leave no doubt that Rufus behaved very badly on
this occasion. The Chronicle says that he would not fulfill the agree-
134
ment or even see Malcolm. Florence adds that he demanded Malcolm's
homage in court, presumably for Cumbria, and that Malcolm would not
135grant it except on the border,
Malcolm had been tricked. Rufus was in possession of Cumberland,
and if Malcolm could have it at all, it would be as a fief from William
Rufus, an unacceptable condition. It is even possible that the whole
incident had been contrived to humiliate the Scottish king or to drive
him into making a blunder, and there is some support for this idea.
Orderic Vitalis believed that the destruction of Malcolm Canmore was
brought about by treachery although he laid the blame on Earl Robert de
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Mowbray rather than on Rufus. In any event, Malcolm did make a seri-
ous mistake after his meeting with the English king. He returned to
Scotland in a rage and collected an army even though it was late fall.
Then sometime in early November, he invaded Northumberland probably with
the ultimate intention of taking Carlisle, but his reaction had been
anticipated. Earl Robert de Mowbray was waiting for him with an army in
Northumberland, and this is an indication that the purpose of Rufus 's
retention of Carlisle had been to lure Malcolm south of the Tweed for it
is very difficult to believe that Earl Robert normally kept—or could
even afford to keep by himself--a large enough army on hand in mid
November to fight the Scots in the field. Malcolm was entering a trap.
The earl awaited the Scots south of the Aln, and after they had crossed
the river, he fell on them by surprise. In the battle which followed,
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the buBc of the Scottish ar.y was either killed or drowned in the swol-
len river while trying to escape. Malcol. hi^elf and Edward, his
designated heir, were also killed.
Thus Willia. II's machinations reached a successful conclusion.
Malcol. Can^ore had finally given battle, and his death opened unusual
possibilities to the English king and ulti^tely led to the passing of
the old political structure of northern Britain. Judged fro. the stand-
point of the events which followed, Malcolm appears to have been a man
who had held back time by his own existence. Of course, this is both
the nature of politics and an exaggeration.
In its immediate form the possibility which confronted Rufus was
not unparalleled. Robert de Mowbray had killed the reigning king of
Scots, his heir, and most of their army. This led to internal political
conflicts in Scotland and gave the English king the opportunity to neu-
tralize Scotland by backing contenders for the throne. In this sense
the situation was similar to the one which had led to the establishment
of Malcoliu Canmore himself as king by Siward and Edward the Confessor,
but circumstances were particularly promising in 1093. Malcolm had been
prepared to ignore Scottish custom on the succession, which would have
made his younger brother Donald Bane king after his death, by having
himself immediately succeeded by Edward, his eldest son by Margaret. "'^^
The death of Edward and, more importantly given the number of sons of
Malcolm and Margaret available, the destruction of Malcolm's army, which
probably had included many of his closest supporters, made this impossi-
ble. Donald Bane, who had been alienated from his nephews by his broth-
er's attempt to disinherit him, was consequently able to become king
sons
late in 1093, and he insured that he would not be challenged by the
of Malcolm and Margaret by expelling the Anglo-Saxons whom Malcolm had
received during the Norman Conquest and who had presumably been an
Important source of his strength.^^^ These disasters ruined the hopes
of Malcolm's sons by Margaret and made Donald Bane a weaker king than
his brother,
"They also greatly improved the chances for success of Rufus's
attempt to solve the Scottish problem-in so far as politics could
solve it—by setting up his own king of Scots. Even before Donald
Bane's purge of the Anglo-Saxons had driven Malcolm's sons by Margaret
into William II' s hands, he had had a suitable candidate for the Scot-
-tish
-throne^ During the reign of William the Conqueror, Malcolm had
given up Duncan, his eldest son by his first marriage, as a hostage. In
1093 Duncan was serving in Rufus's army, and his chances of ever becom-
ing king were very small because he apparently had been declared a bas-
tard and thereby removed from the line of succession to the Scottish
throne as envisaged by "St." Margaret. """^^ Duncan was, therefore, a per-
fect tool for Rufus, a candidate who would ov/e the Normans everything if
he could be placed on the throne, and after his father's death Rufus
accepted Duncan's homage and gave him an army with which to claim his
141inheritance. The dispatch with which this was accomplished strongly
suggests that this operation had been considered in advance. Between
November 13th, the date of Malcolm's death, and Christmas, not in 1094
as is continually asserted, Duncan was able to raise his army, enter
142Scotland, and drive out his uncle Donald. Rufus and Duncan had evi-
dently been prepared for Malcolm's death, and the speed with which
zDuncan was able to act perhaps indicates that he used the same soldiers
.^:Robert de Mowbray had employed against MalcoLn. The latter, of
course, is only a suggestion; and, in any case, the attempt to set up a
-vassal king of Scots dependent on Norman arms was only momentarily suc-
cessful. Soon after becoming king, Duncan lost n»st of his army in an
^aiBbush and continued to rule only on the condition that he not bring
Anglo-Saxons or Frenchmen into Scotland to serve in his army. This
stipulation rendered him powerless, and in 1094 he was killed by Donald
-who again became king.^^^ This failure did not cause Rufus to abandon
4:he plan, but it was three years before a new pretender could be sent
,pver the border.
In the interval another event took place which revealed the ramifi-
cations in Northumbria of Malcolm's death and of the distracted condi-
tions of the kingdom of the Scots. In 1095 Earl Robert de Mowbray
revolted. This was an unparalleled event. No Norman had felt suffi-
ciently at home in the North to revolt before, and the very possibility
that the earl of Northumbria could consider breaking with the king
depended on the absence of danger from Scotland. Furthermore, the same
factor may have been ultimately responsible for his revolt in a direct
sense. The early chronicles do not ascribe very intelligible motives to
Robert, but there is one charter in existence which may contain the key
to his behavior. It is the record of a concord laade between the earl
and the bishop of Durham in 1094 which shows that Rufus had extinguished
the earl's judicial rights over St. Cuthbert's estates. If this charter
is genuine, which it seems to be, it provides a sufficient motive for
144Robert s revolt. Rufus had probably decided that he did not need
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such a powerful Northumbrian earl with Duncan on the Scottish throne,
and this hypothesis is supported by the fact that Robert did not hold
Newcastle in 1095. -"-^^ The earl refused to agree to this.
Specific Northumbrian factors, however, do not explain the downfall
of Robert. Had he been alone, he would probably have accepted the
reduction of his privileges, but he seems to have been a member of a
widespread conspiracy which involved many nobles, especially those of
the Welsh border. Their aim was to overthrow Rufus, and the plot must
have been formed early in 1094 before the great Welsh revolt of that
year and while Duncan was still alive. -"-^^ Once the Welsh revolted, how-
ever, most of the conspirators abandoned the plan—except for Robert de
Mowbray. He stood no chance alone, and the most likely explanation for
his defiance of the king is that he had been betrayed and that Rufus had
decided to make an example of him. Robert was, after all, a very con-
venient "example" in 1095 because he had recently inherited the
extremely wealthy estate of his uncle Geoffrey, bishop of Coutanceso ''"'^^
By Easter of 1095, when he would not come to court, the earl was a
marked man; and after he had failed to appear at Whitsuntide, Rufus led
an army into Northumbri ^ where he had little difficulty taking the
earl's castles and capturing the earl himself „ Only Bamburgh, which was
held by Robert's wife, held out for long, and she eventually yielded
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when the besiegers threatened to mutilate her husband.
Clearly times had changed, and perhaps the surviving Northumbrian
nobles were amused. Rufus had easily suppressed the revolt despite the
isolation of Northumbria. Robert's men had all been conveniently assem-
bled in castles, and the opportunities which the North offered for
irregular warfare had been ignored, although this may not have been the
earl's intention. Furthermore, Robert de Mowbray survived the revolt,
soinething which no Northumbrian earl, except for Cospatric, had managed
to do in the eleventh century. The earl went off to a dungeon for the
next thirty years. This commonplace baronial revolt had, however, a
significance beyond its comparison with past revolts. The earldom had
lost its regional political significance in 1080 when the Northumbrian
nobility had been destroyed in the aftermath of the revolt against
Walcher. Now it had lost its military utility. If the Scots had been
so little to be feared that Robert could revolt, then Rufus had no need
of a Northumbrian earl, and he did not appoint a new one. The earldom
of Northtimbria was abolished after this revolt, or taken into the king's
hands as some Northumbrian monks liked to think. ''"^^ The distinction
made little real difference. The king took over the demesne of the
earls, and henceforth, Northumberland would be ruled by sheriffs. This,
of course, represented a fundamental change in the position which North-
un&ria had occupied within the kingdom. The suppression of the earldom
ended, at least in theory, the administrative and judicial isolation of
Northumbria except on <"he estates of Sto Cuthbert, and it created the
novel possibility that royal power could be directly exercised above the
Tees by more prosaic means than the punitive expeditions and murders
wbich had characterized relations between the northern earls and both
the Anglo-Saxon and the Norman kings. In terms of the future, Rufus 's
failure to appoint a new earl destroyed the threat that a line of Norman
earls would become intrenched above the Tees and pursue the independent
policies of their predecessors.
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With this said, it must also be noted that the finality of the sit-
uation depended upon the continued weakness of the Scots. Should a new
leader of the stature of MalcoLn III arise among them, they could force
the revival of the earldom out of military necessity and perhaps even •
reverse Rufus's conquest of Cumberland. Indeed, these possibilities
were apparent in 1095 for Rufus did not leave the North, or was not long
gone, before he took steps to insure that the Scots would not become a
threat to the North in the foreseeable future. By late August of 1095,
if not earlier, he had begun his second attempt to establish a vassal
king of Scots, and this endeavor was probably directly connected with
his expedition against Earl Roberto This is established by a charter
made at Norham on the 29th of August which records a land grant to Dur-
ham by Edgar, Malcolm Ill's third son by Margaret. The charter dis-
closes that Rufus had already given Lothian and Scotland to Edgar, and
it is likely that this involved something more tangible than the Red
King's recognition of Edgar's right to be king and a symbolic investi-
ture because the charter records Edgar's gift to Durham of two large
estates in the Merse. Unless these gifts were anticipatory, which is
unlikely, they indicat'^ that Edgar already controlled the valley of the
Tweed, and the most probable explanation for this is that Rufus or his
agents had established Edgar above the Tweed after the fall of Ham-
burgh. In 1095, then, Rufus could safely suppress the earldom
because he had installed a new marcher lord beyond it. Furthermore,
this time the plan worked despite the precedents against it. In 1097
Rufus was able to send Edgar the Atheling into Scotland with an army to
put his nephew into possession of the rest of his kingdom, and for once
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the Atheling acted effectively. He defeated Donald Bane in battle,
drove him out of the kingdom, and then installed Edgar as king "in
152fealty to King William." All this, of course, had been done before,
but this time it led to important results. Contrary to any expectations
which might have been based upon the fate of Duncan II or the perfidy of
Malcolm III, King Edgar both survived and remained loyal to the Normans.
While he reigned, the North lived in peace with the Scots, and during
this period ties were established between the Scottish and Norman royal
families which insured the continuance of peace for thirty years after
Edgar's death. This abnormal period of peace, in turn, allowed the Nor-
mans to consolidate the hold on the North which they had already won
and, in a very important sense, to extend their rule^
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Teviotdale had probably been subject to the bishop of the Cum-brians throughout the eleventh century and presumably earlier despitethe fact that it is usually assumed that it had remained subject to Dur-ham until ca. 1101. Th- view that Durham had kept Teviotdale through
the period of Danish invasions and the subsequent expansion of the Cum-brians and the Scots rests on exceedingly bad evidence. There is, need-
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CHAPTER VI
THE IMPACT OF THE NORMANS ON THE NORTHERN VILLAGE
The preceding narrative shows that the North was conquered in three
stages and that the first two were completed by the death of Willia. the
Conqueror. At this date Norman nobles were established in southern Lan-
cashire and along the east coast plain from the south of Yorkshire north
through Durham into southern Northumberland, As yet they had not ven-
tured in any numbers into northern and central Northumberland and north-
ern Lancashire or into the Pennines, but on the plains their power was
supreme-if not unchallenged along its northern edges and in the moun-
tains. This chronology of their expansion is an important improvement
upon traditional accounts of the subjugation of the North which make the
establishment of Norman power automatically follow either the harrying
of 1069 or the punitive expedition of 1080 and which ignore the territo-
rial limits of this power even in the 1080's and 1090's. Furthermore,
an understanding of the local importance of the house of Bamburgh and of
the threats inherent in the North's western border make the extent of
this expansion more understandable. Still, the foregoing account is
traditional in a sense. It benefits from a regional point of view and
from the inclusion of the pre-Conquest history of the North, but the
process described is familiar in its general outlines. It is the narra-
tive of the replacement of native landowners by Frenchmen and the con-
solidation of the latter's power by means of the castle, the Church, and
the knight.
Aside from the slaughter, the es cablishment of this new aristocracy
was the most important in^mediate result of the Conquest, and before the
extension of Norman settlement into Cumberland and Northumberland can be
profitably traced, it is necessary to take a closer look at the settle-
ment of the Normans in Yorkshire and Durham from the standpoint of a
basic question which is usually shunned: Did the Norman Conquest repre-
sent a straightforward substitution of one upper class for another, or
did its effects reach deeper in the social hierarchy? Put in the par-
lance of Conquest studies, the basic problem is to determine whether
these new landlords simply stepped into the shoes, so to speak, of their
Anglo-Saxon predecessors and ran their new estates according to local
custom or whether they laade basic changes in the management and organi-
zation of their estates.
To those familiar with the general body of literature on the Norman
Conquest, this will, of course, appear an unfruitful line of inquiry
because it is generally assumed that the Normans were content to con-
tinue the level and type of agricultural exploitation which had existed
in King Edward's day. R.ecent research has shown, to be sure, that they
may perhaps have raised rents or demanded higher farms from their manors
and that, on occasion, they may have increased the amount of labor which
they received from peasants by insisting on strict definitions of ser-
vices;"^ but these qualifications have not shaken the great unvoiced
assumption that the greater Norman barons were basically gentlemen, i.e.
that their greed did not cross class lines. Perhaps Frank Barlow best
summed up this view on the subject in a recent appraisal of the effects
of the Conquest:
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^IdlZ acquired all the rents and services which theirpre ecessors had enjoyed, m an economic context the chlnee oflords n^de little difference to the agricultural producers' the
uX\"nrlh''^^'^^^- ""^^^ ^^^^ -^^^ action^and .is-
idf^r S ? ' T ^^'^^sionally have been new men with newI eas Sometimes there was a determined effort to re-stock under!
rSulrff if'"- .'"''^ ^^^^ ^ n^vement toequi e full economic rents. But the
. . . major barons weremostly absentees.
... They may have pressed heavily on their
stewards reeves, and other agents to increase revenue from theirestates; but they had no revolutionary means of exploitation. 2
This characterization of Norman economic behavior may be correct in
general, but at least one recent historian, R. Welldon Finn, has held
the opposite view that the Normans demanded increased labor dues from
the peasants where possible.^ And even if the prevailing view is an
accurate description of the way in which the Normans dealt with their
estates in southern and midland England, it is really only proof that
they were reasonably satisfied with their new manors rather than a sign
that they were either unwilling or unable to reorganize estates which
did not meet their expectations. It is becoming increasingly clear,
after all, that the greater Norman barons were mainly parvenus who were
still quite concerned with enlarging their landed wealth,^ and this
characteristic makes it doubtful that they could necessarily be expected
to respect peasant cur*-om when it was not in their interest to do so„
Specifically, one might wonder if the Normans behaved in the same way
above the Humber as they had in the South since in the former region
their new "nianors" were at best lightly exploited relics of the shire
system and more often were wholly or partially waste. Theoretically,
they might be expected to have taken a rather different line in such
circumstances, and there are, in fact, hints in the works of historians
of the North that this was the case. These are vague and imprecise, but
they are
.seful as a balance
.0 the prevailing opinion nonetheless.
Stenton-s early work on the estates of the northern Danelaw 1„ the elev-
enth century led hi. to the belief that so^ "process" was occurring
through which the greater sokes were breaking up and the smaller ones
amalgamating
:
to produce an intermediate type of estate an ^<.^.^o fintermediate agrarian unit, II which%\1^fea™ aS^e^LJicof tne later manorial economy mxght find roona for develop^^J's
What Sir Frank meant by
-process" and "development" is not obvious, but
they would, at least, seem to be open to the interpretation that the
Normans were restructuring the sokes. The same conclusion is suggested
by some of the work of T. A. M. Bishop. In 1934 he made a statistical
study of the vills in the Vale of York and found that those vills with
demesne land in 1301 had contained some population in 1086 while those
vills with no demesne land in 1301 had been waste in 1086.^ On the
basis of this pattern he thought that:
The social depression which had been suffered after the conquestby the population of Yorkshire will account for the prevalence of
a manorial institution in those vills where any population sur-
vived. '
This is a rather stronger statement than Stenton»s although it is not
clear whether Bishop thought that the Normans had introduced the manor
into Yorkshire or whether he believed that they had simply continued it.
The probability, however, is that he held the former view because he
suggested in passing in this article that there might have been a "sud-
den and limited expansion of the manorial system within a short period
after the conquest." Certainly by 1948 he was of this opinion. In
that year he stated this position clearly, albeit in a forbidding foot-
note on the next to the last page of his essay:
I assume that such burdens ™ j • -.
endured were fastened I
-edieval peasantry of Yorkshire
1100: the period of a ?eb»lH " ^'"^ ^"<' " 1=^-'
possession by alorfign "v'.» r"""" fP^^ltlon, entry Into
inhabitants L co^par^^ori^r h 'o^f Z'llsTlTZZrll
^SelrL't^r'^"''-^^"""''' cre:ti:rofcfndi? o" ^ «e-cedent to the manorxal system in a mild form.9
Finally, Jolliffe himself believed that the Normans introduced demesne
farming in Northumbria during the twelfth century.^^ of course, the
opinions of all three of these scholars are invalidated to some extent
by the fact that a "mild form" of manorialism had existed throughout
Northumbria in 1066, but it is not certain that this discovery com-
pletely explains the phenomenon which they notedo Consequently, their
views create a sufficiently strong £rima facie case to justify pursuing
this line of inquiry despite the general presumption that the Normans
simply installed themselves in the economic structure which they found,
caulked its seams, and preserved traditional forms of organization.
In the North this model has a certain unreality, in any case,
because in many villages there was little of the traditional rural
structure left for the Normans to respect. During the terrible winter
of 1069-70, much of northern society was destroyed in Yorkshire and Dur-
ham, and an understanding of this must stand at the base of any realis-
tic attempt to determine the nature of the Norman settlement of the
North. Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell how great this destruc-
tion was above the Tees, but as late as the time of Domesday, the marks
of harrying were still evident in Yorkshire where the countryside was
studded with empty villages. Darby and Maxwell found that "over one-
half of the vills of the North Riding and over one-third of those of the
East and West Ridings were wholly or partially waste."''"''" The remainder
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of the vills had some population in 1086 but not necessarily as much as
in 1066. Furthermore, these figures are too low because they include
only those vills explicitly described as waste or as containing waste,
but not those vills without recorded population yet not described as
waste. ^2 Other statistics in this vein could be easily supplied, but
perhaps a more meaningful impression of the extent of the destruction
can be gained from a comparison with Nottinghamshire. In 1086 there were
more people living in Nottinghamshire than in any two of the three rid-
ings of Yorkshire, and the population of that shire (5,573) was more
than double the recorded population of either the East Riding (2,362),
or the North Riding (2,014) o"^^ Plough teams show the same picture of
desolation. The figure for Nottinghamshire (1,969) was more than twice
as large as the figures for the East Riding (791) or the North Riding
(847) and substantially in excess of the number recorded for the West
Riding (1,292).-^^
These figures leave no doubt that the harrying of Yorkshire had
been very effective, and they automatically exclude much of the shire
from the bounds of any theory of Norman economic inertia. To be of
value, many estates above the Humber had to be revived. But beyond this
general point, the meaning of Domesday's figures is not so clear because
it is not certain that they can be taken entirely at their face value.
Some rebuilding had presumably taken place between 1070 and 1086, the
date of Domesday's description, but this document's Yorkshire folios
fail to give any intermediate value for manors between 1066 and 1086.
This omission hides the original extent of the waste in 1070, and this
in turn effectively screens the Normans' initial dealings with their new
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estates and creates uncertainty with respect to Yorkshire's population
m 1086. Theoretically, there are two zaajor alternatives which could
account for these figures:' development in place or forced innnigration.
The population of the shire in 1086 could have been composed of survi-
vors of the harrying and their children who had stayed in their ances-
tral villages and redeveloped them under their new Norman lords. If
this was the case, there would be a direct relationship between condi-
tions in 1070 and in 1086 except that the areas of waste would have
shrunk somewhat by the later date. Alternatively, the Normans may have
brought in immigrants from undevastated parts of the shire or from
beyond its borders to revive completely depopulated villages. If this
happened on any scale, there would be little connection between the sit-
uation in 1070 and that described in Domesdayo
Two important attempts have been made to deal with this complex
problem. "'^ The first was offered by Bishop, who in 1948 suggested an
ingenious theory based on the second of the two alternatives. '''^ His
ideas were buttressed by an . impressive statistical analysis of Yorkshire
Domesday, and they were revolutionary in the sense that, if accepted,
they would have forced a re-evaluation of the stereotype of Norman eco-
nomic behavioro Bishop began by pointing out that the distribution of
waste villages was not uniform in 1086. In the lowlands there were both
waste vills and inhabited vills, yet the higher parts of the shire, the
Pennines, the Moors in the North Riding, and the Wolds, were covered by
great, unbroken bands of uninhabited or waste villso^^ The obvious
inference from this uneven distribution of waste would be that the Nor-
mans had harried the highlands more effectively than the plains, but
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Bishop did not draw this conclusion. Rather, he asserted that the Nor-
mans had only harried the plains and river valleys in 1069 and had not
penetrated the Pennines, the Moors, or the Wolds. This assertion, for
which, incidentally, he provided no proof, was the foundation of his
theory. If it were accepted, then one was compelled to suppose that
there had been extensive population niovements of some sort within York-
shire between 1070 and 1086. In particular. Bishop argued that the Nor-
mans had made an attempt to revive agricultural production on the York-
shire plain by initiating population movements from the unwasted high-
lands down onto the lowlands. The sporadic distribution of waste in the
lower parts of the shire was a sign that certain vills had been redevel-
oped by their Norman lords—not that the Normans had spared an occa-
sional vill in 1069-70, and the bands of waste in the uplands were the
result of a forced exodus carried out by the Normans. Their motive for
doing this was to increase their agricultural profits."*"^ Bishop
believed that this theory was supported by three things. First, there
were a number of villages on the plain which contained a populated
estate belonging to one Norman lord and a waste estate belonging to
another lord. He rejected the possibility that the lord of the popu-
lated estate might have simply usurped all the peasants in a partially
waste village and argued that such populated estates had been redevel-
20
oped by their lords. Second, there were a number of other vills which
contained excess plough teams in 1086 as conqjared to 1066 but whose val-
ues had fallen from 1066. Bishop believed that these vills were
21
recently resettled and perhaps expanded. Finally, and this was his
major proof, he thought that as a general rule only those fiefs which
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contained both upland and lowland holdings had recovered to any signif-
icant extent by 1086.^^
This fascinating theory, which vould dispel some of the obscurity
which hangs over Yorkshire during the critical period from 1070 to 1086
and which hides the Norman settlement of the county, is unfortunately
false. Darby and Maxwell have raised four main objections to it in
their geographical analysis of Yorkshire Domesday. First, it was not
"intrinsically improbable," as Bishop thought, that the Normans had
wasted the uplands. These settlements were more in need of subduing
than the plain because of their remoteness. Second, they pointed out
that this theoretical consideration vas supported by the Domesday
returns from Cheshire. These give a value for each manor not only for
1066 and 1086, but also for the intermediate date when the Norman lord
took possession, and these show that the Normans had harried both the
uplands and the lowlands in this shire but that the uplands had not
25
recovered as quickly as the lowlands. Third, they were unable to sub-
stantiate Bishop's claim that only those individual fiefs had recovered
26
which contained both lowland and upland vills. And finally, they
pointed out that there were occasionally great differences in population
between two estates of a single lord which lay in the same village.
Such instances dull the significance of the cases of unequal development
of manors lying in the same vill but belonging to different lords which
27
Bishop interpreted as a sign of colonization.
These points are well taken and leave Bishop's theory quite doubt-
28
ful. Furthermore, the same conclusion is supported by the findings of
this inquiry. Northern resistance to the Norman Conquest was based upon
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hit-and-run tactics in which the woods and hills played a crucial role
as concealed places of assembly and refuge. Their reduction was neces-
sary for the Normans to control Yorkshire, and Orderic Vitalis specifi-
cally states that William pursued the rebels into the hills and woods
during the winter of 1069.^9
^^^^ 3,,,, ^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^
the Normans did as thorough a job wasting the difficult country of the
uplands as they did the plain, but the unbroken bands of seemingly unin-
habited vills which appear in Domesday are to some degree an illusion,
in any case, for they resulted from the failure of the Domesday clerks to
obtain information on the specifics of population and waste for many of
30the Pennine villages. They cannot, therefore, be taken at face value,
and the most likely hypothesis is that there was a sporadic distribution
of waste in the uplands just as there was on the plain. These consider-
ations strike at the heart of Bishop's theory by showing that his
assumption that the uplands had escaped the harrying is false and that
the impression that they were without population in 1086 is doubtful.
Despite their objections to Bishop's theory, Darby and Maxwell con-
cluded their discussion of this issue by suggesting that there might,
indeed, have been some population movement from unwasted to wasted vills
but that there was insufficient evidence to be certain. That the lat-
ter was a serious reservation is shown by their failure to enlarge upon
the question of what sort of redevelopment they themselves envisaged.
Actually, their suggestion, although it saved the theoretical possibil-
ity of redevelopment, was a tacit admission that there was little sign
of it. This may seem surprising but only from the standpoint of com-
partmentalized thinking. In terms of economics, there should have been
a ^vement underway by 1086 to revive the better land of Yorkshire; but
m terms of the military situation, or perhaps more accurately the police
situation, it is hard to see how such a movement could have made progress
in much of Yorkshire. Until the last years of William the Conqueror and
probably beyond, the Pennines and Moors were the seats of outlaw bands
which were reenforced along the coast by pirates and in the northwest
probably by raiders from over Stainmore. In these circumstances Isolated
colonists could have hoped for little security, and the most promising
sites for redevelopment would have been those near still populated vills
which could afford some protection. Not until the establishment of such
defensive bulwarks as Richmond and Pontefract, which occurred late in
William's reign, did these conditions begin to pass.^^ General efforts
at redevelopment may then have begun; but, if so, they are unlikely to
have made enough progress by 1086 to leave a clear mark in Domesday. The
question, then, has been misconstrued. The Normans may have made an
attempt to increase the amount of land under the plough, but only in
those areas where it was fairly safe to do so, that is, in areas where
there was a significant continuity of habitation.
Bishop himself uncovered the clue to what actually happened although
he failed to interpret it correctly. In terms of the general statistics
which were discussed earlier, Yorkshire was, indeed, in a destitute con-
dition in 1086. Most of its villages were either waste or underpopulated,
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and only a few had come through the Conquest unchanged. Bishop, how-
ever, pointed out that there were certain exceptions to this, the over-
stocked manors. These were villages in which the number of ploughs at
work in 1086 exceeded the number of ploughlands (the land which could be
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worked by one plough) traditionally ascribed to the vill. By inference,
such vills also had a larger population in 1086 than in 1066. Bishop
cited the example of Handsworth to illustrate this phenomenon. It had
land for 7 ploughs, yet there were 8h ploughs at Handsworth in 1086.
A substantial number of similar cases existed in Yorkshire at this date,
despite the general condition of the shire, and they were very signifi-
cant. Bishop, however, did not investigate them closely because his
attention was attracted by another characteristic of Handsworth. Its
value had fallen from £8 in 1066 to 40so in 1086, and Bishop thought
that this decline in value was important in terms of his theory of col-
onization and that it indicated that the 21 peasants at Handsworth were
recent colonists who "had not yet advanced far in clearing and cultiva-
tion." He further theorized that the excess teams here and in other
vills of this type were either engaged in clearing or were transient and
would in the future move to waste vills, but this interpretation can-
not be accepted. The values of manors in Yorkshire were subject to var-
iation as a result of too many possible causes to be used as an index of
37the date of colonization, and, in any case, the obvious inference from
the excess team and a half is that the arable of the village had been
expanded, not that there was a floating corps of ploughmen.
At one point in his article, Bishop raised the possibility of plot-
ting the overstocked manors on a map, but he dismissed it because he was
more concerned with the supposed relationship between upland waste and
38populated manors in the lowlands within individual fiefs. Had he pur-
sued the idea, however, he would have found the clearest signs which
Domesday can provide of Norman estate development in Yorkshire during
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Ilap 6. Distribution of Overstocked Manors in Yorkshire in 1086
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the years 1070 to 1086. A map of the overstocked B^nors shows that
these estates were distributed in a highly singular fashion across the
face of the shire. They were not spread evenly over the plain or even
limited to it as Bishop's theory would suggest that they should have
been. Rather, great stretches of prime land in Holderness and much of
the Vale of York were completely without them, and there were a number
of them on the unrewarding soils of the Howardian and Hambleton Hills
and in the Sandstone Hills. Moreover, the overstocked manors tended to
stand in groups, not in isolation. The majority of these manors were
located in four main areas: in the Aire valley and the land to the
south, in Richmond below the Swale, and around the edge of the Southern
Wolds plus a complex area which comprised the Howardian and Hambleton
Hills with the valley of the upper Derwent and the adjoining fringes of
the Vales of Pickering and York (hereafter called the "Howardian Hills
and vicinity"). Nor is this tendency of the overstocked manors to be
found in groups their only peculiarity. Domesday's description of the
fief of Ilbert de Lacy consistently names his Anglo-Saxon subtenants in
1086. His fief was situated on either side of the Aire in the largest
concentration of overstocked manors in the county, and the estates of
his Anglo-Saxon tenants show nearly as strong a tendency to have excess
teams as those of his Norman tenants. Finally, it should be noted that
of the eighty overstocked manors in this area, sixty-seven had fallen in
value.
The manors with excess ploughs were, then, concentrated in a few
areas. In the one area where Anglo-Saxon subtenants are named, their
estates also tended to be overstocked, and in the same area, which
contained the greatest nuinber of such manors in the shire, there had
been a general fall in value. Bishop's theory cannot explain these
things, but they are explicable in terms of the hypothesis that the Nor-
mans restricted their efforts at redevelopment to only a few relatively
secure areas. In a sense, "redevelopment" does not accurately describe
the process which occurred. The areas where there were concentrations
of manors with excess teams in 1086 were areas which" had either not been
harried in the winter of 1069 or which had not been ravaged so severely
that the continuity of life had been broken. In these areas the Normans
increased agricultural production in an attempt to augment their own
wealth by expanding the arable of existing villages and probably by
redeveloping nearby waste holdings. Ihis is the meaning of the extra
ploughs. Nor is there any need of an elaborate hypothesis to explain
where the Normans got the peasant labor for this expansion. All discus-
sions of this question have ignored the single most likely source of
"colonists": the refugees. The harrying of the North displaced thou-
sands of peasants by destroying their livestock, agricultural implements,
and winter food supply—not to mention their seed corn for 1070—and set
in motion a population movement which reached the Midlands and ulti-
mately even Scotland. The object of this migration was to find food and
probably the chance to sell themselves into slavery, a poor man's alter-
native to starvation, aside from brigandage, in a society which lacked
credit mechanisms. Initially these refugees would have made for the
undevastated parts of Yorkshire where the local Norman and Anglo-Saxon
lords had first choice, so to speak. Presumably they selected the most
desirable, young men and women in their teens and those with special
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skills, and sent the rest on their way because the stream of starving
peasants represented as
-oruch of a threat to the local economy, particu-
larly to livestock, as an opportunity to acquire cheap labor. Probably,
in fact, some small villages which had escaped the Normans were
destroyed by their passage.
As compelling as this line of reasoning is, some index of continu-
ity is, nevertheless, desirable as a support for the hypothesis that the
concentrations of overstocked manors were located in areas which had not
been too severely wasted in 1069 rather than in areas which had been
completely redeveloped after that date. Since Domesday does not give
any manorial values in Yorkshire for an intermediate date between 1066
and 1086, this problem cannot be approached directly, but rural churches
served by resident priests can be used as an indirect source of this
information because they are unlikely to have survived at a very much
greater rate than the peasantry itself. This should be true irrespec-
tive of whether the Nonaans burned down churches in 1069. Actually they
may have done so if the Yorkshire peasants followed the usual northern
expedient in times of danger—flight to the churchyard with all the mov-
able property which circumstances allowed. But even if the Normans
resisted the temptation provided by such convenient gatherings, the
relationship should still hold because it stems directly from the nature
of churches as parasitic service institutions. With the destruction of
the economy in cin area, the disruption of normal patterns of life, and
the death or dispersal of the inhabitants, the churches in the area
would cease to exist because both their reason to be and their income
would be gone. Furthermore, in a devastated area later colonized, a
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Map 7, Distribution of Functioning Churches in Yorkshire 1086
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sxnce
num-
functioning church would be one of the last things to be created
the population would have to reach a fairly high level m terms of
bers and prosperity before a church could be supported. These consider-
ations, of course, do not form a flr» basis for statements about Indi-
vidual churches, but they are vaUd for groups of churches. Regions in
which functioning churches were recorded in 1086 had either been spared
or not too seriously disturbed in the harrying of the North. Therefore,
the distribution of churches provides a general index of the continuity
of local habitation.
If overstocked Honors were in fact located in areas which had not
suffered overwhelmxag destruction, there should be a correlation between
the number of overstocked manors in an area and the number of function-
ing churches there. High numbers of the former should be found with
high numbers of the latter, and the opposite should also hold true.
This relationship does exist. If the shire is divided into suitable
areas suggested by the distribution of overstocked manors, topographical
factors, and feudal geography, and if these areas are ranked according
to the number of overstocked manors and functioning churches in each, a
marked correspondence emerges (see Table 3 and compare "A" with "B").'^°
The correspondence between files "A" and "B" is close enough to
establish that the relationship in question exists and to show that the
areas where there were numerous overstocked manors had not been harried
too severely. There is not, however, complete agreement between the two
rankings. With the second position slight discrepancies begin to appear,
although from the standpoint of the ranking of the overstocked manors,
there is an exact correspondence through position six. This is not,
281
TABLE 3
Overstocked Manors and Functioning Churches
! »
1
" C A B A' B'
I. Below the Aire 87 37 1 1 1 1
II. Above thp Air-a 23 14 3 3 3 3
III. Pennines 0 3 11 9 8 8
IV. Richmond 19 6 5 7 _
V. N. Vale of York 19 9 5 5 5 5
VI. S. Vale of York
with H. Levels
14 7 6 6 6 6
VII. Howardian Hills
and vicinity
J-/ 2 2 2
VIII. Clevp 1 anrl cJ 7 8 6
IX. Vale of Pickering 13 5 7 8 7 7
X. N. Wolds 2 2 10 10
XI. S. Wolds 22 13 4 4 4 4
XII. Holderness 4 16 9 2
Key:
M = The number of overstocked estates
C = The number of functioning churches
A = The ranking of the overstocked estates
B = The ranking of churches
A* and B' = The revised rankings of A and B, each corrected by the
deletion of those areas harried twice in 1069-70.
therefore, a serious matter since the proposition at issue is only that
there should be large numbers of functioning churches in areas which con-
tained numerous overstocked manors, not that there should always be
large numbers of overstocked manors in areas where churches were numer-
ous. Most of the discrepancies could be accounted for, in any case, as
the result of the inevitable inaccuracies introduced into the rankings
by the small numerical bases which appear towards the end of the ranks.
Still, this explanation can hardly apply to Holderness which was ninth
in overstocked manors but second in functioning churches. This differ-
ence is not due to some trick of the numbers, and it suggests an expla-
nation for the discrepancies between the two rankings. They are the
result of the simplicity of the model. Despite the prominence which the
harrying of the North claims in a discussion of Yorkshire, various parts
of the shire endured other episodes of destruction after 1069. Specifi-
cally, Holderness and the eastern part of the North Wolds had probably
been devastated as late as 1085 in order to deny supplies to a threat-
ened Danish invasion, and Richmond and Cleveland had been harried by the
Scots in 1070. Such incidents as these could be expected to introduce
confusion into the basic data; and, if these areas are excluded from the
rankings, a rather different result emerges: There is a perfect corre-
spondence between both ranks for the seven areas wasted only once in
1068-70 (compare "A*" with "B"').
This agreement and its absence when the four fringe areas are
included in the calculations can best be explained by the following
hypothesis. In the winter of 1069 William only began to harry Yorkshire
after he had crossed the Aire, and the land to the south of this river
only suffered from the enforced stay of his army as it waited to force
the line of the river. This undoubtedly produced a good deal of local
destruction but far less than the harrying proper which only commenced
once the Nonnans were beyond the Aire and the Danes had retreated to
their Ships. The Nonnans then thoroughly wasted two great swathes of
land Judging fro. the survival of functioning churches. One included
the Vale of York. Richmond, and much of the region above the Aire; and
it ran an indetenuinate distance into the Pennines. The other area com-
prised the Vale of Pickering, the Northern Wolds, and Cleveland. Aside
from the south, the Howardian Hills, the Southern Wolds, and apparently
Holderness escaped the full fury of the destruction.
This hypothesis has much to recommend it. First, it is entirely in
accord with what little is known from chronicles about the harrying.
The first great band of destruction in central Yorkshire would have been
produced by the systematic harrying which was conducted in December of
1069, and the second would have been the result of William's later move-
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ments. Specifically, after Christmas the Conqueror moved east from
York to dislodge a group of rebels from Holderness and then went north
to the Tees, presumably along the coast. During the course of this
campaign, the Northern Wolds, the Vale of Pickering, and Cleveland would
have been harried. Second, this reconstruction of the harrying is sup-
ported by a significant feature of Darby and Maxwell's maps of the waste
in Yorkshire in 1086. These show that the waste in central Yorkshire
above the Aire included a high degree of totally waste villages such as
would have been produced by the methodical operations in December and
that the waste in the east was more often only partial, a reflection
apparently of William's haste to cross into Durham as winter deepened.
Finally, this theory accounts for the existence of a less heavily wasted
strip of land running from the western end of the Moors down through the
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Holder-
Howardlaa Hills and the Mddle Derwent to the Southern Wolds and
ness. This area was on the edge o( both phases of the harrying but the
direct object of neither.
Once the Norxnan armies had departed, peasants fled the blasted
stretches of countryside, and many of them went initially to the less
devastated regions. South of the Aire and in the other inland areas
which had not suffered too greatly, some of their number were used by
the Normans to expand agricultural production and to redevelop waste
vills during the 1070's. Most were probably forced to move on. Tl^ose
peasants, however, who had fled to the northern part of the shire and to
Durham met a rather different fate. In the spring of 1070, Malcolm
Canmore suddenly erupted into Yorkshire. He came over Stainmore and
ravaged Teesdale and Cleveland before crossing into Durham."^^ Of course,
by this time there was not too much left to plunder, and the Scots con-
soled themselves by turning the raid into a slaving expedition. This
may even have been their intention from the beginning since the taking
of slaves was a common feature of later Scottish raids. In any case,
they were able to take advantage of the conditions created by the harry-
ing to enslave large numbers of refugees who had assembled in some of
the areas through which they passed, and Symeon of Durham believed that
they were so successful that every Scottish household had the conve-
nience of an English slave as a result of this expedition. Perhaps
many of the refugees were not unwilling to go. This last episode was,
in turn, responsible for the failure of the relationship between over-
stocked manors and functioning churches to hold true on the northern
edge of Yorkshire.
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The Normans increased agricultural production by expanding the
arable in localities where large segments of the native population had
survived and which had been the object of population movements set off
by the harrying. They may also have redeveloped waste villages near
these secure areas, but they probably did not risk their oxen and seed
in isolated attempts at reclamation until the 1080's at the earliest.
Generally speaking, there is a fairly direct relationship between what
happened in Yorkshire in 1069-1070 and the situation described in 1086.
A complex form of development in place had occurred, and Domesday can be
more or less taken at its word without the help of convoluted hypotheses.
This much is sufficiently clear, but it is imprecise in that it
ignores the fundamental question of how the Normans organized their
"increased agricultural production." This is a matter of overriding
importance for understanding the significance of the Norman Conquest of
the North. Whether this settlement represented merely the substitution
of one landholding group for another, or whether its effects went deeper,
ultimately depends on how the Normans obtained wealth from their new
manors. In theory they had a clear choice. Either they could organize
their expanded (and repopulated?) manors on the basis of shire custom
and realize an increased revenue indirectly because the manorial popula-
tion was now larger, or they could adopt a more direct system. In many
cases the Normans apparently adopted the latter alternative. In the
1070*s there was no compelling reason why they should stay within the
limits of Northumbrian custom, and the evidence which has already been
discussed shows clearly that they abandoned it in at least one basic
respect. What occurred in the overstocked vills during the 1070's was
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not predcinanay an expansion of the area under the plough to .eet the
needs of a .ore nun^rous village co^unity, although there „ere instan-
ces of this; it was in most cases a direct expansion or creation of
demesne land for the benefit of the lord of the village. In 1086 there
were some 220 overstocked manors in Yorkshire. Of these, 179 contained
demesne land, and in one- third (f^n^ -u(60) of these, the ploughs belonging to
the lord of the manor exactly accounted for the excess ploughs of the
estate and were clearly recent intrusions. Moreover, if those over-
stocked manors in which the ploughs of the peasants were only one-half
plough greater or smaller than the number of ploughlands attributed to
the manor are added to this group, then the clear examples of manorial-
ization increase from 33 1/3% to 44% of the overstocked manors contain-
ing demesne land. This group consisted of old bondage vills which had
been manorialized by the Normans. The other overstocked manors with
demesne are more complex than this group, but they had probably been
subject to the same development. One of two conditions was found in
them. Either the number of demesne ploughs exceeded the increase in the
total number of ploughs (24 cases), or it was less than the total
increase (72 cases). The former condition probably represents the
expansion of a pre-existing demesne, and the latter is perhaps the
result of a general enlargement of the arable with or without the crea-
tion of a new demesne. Alternatively, individual manors in either group
could have been formed by the revival of waste villages. Finally, only
12 of the 41 manors which still lacked demesne in 1086 and were less
valuable than the rest had been granted to undertenants by this date.
In Yorkshire, the Nonnan Conquest did not represent the simple sub-
stitution of one group of landholders for another. The Normans broke
with northern tradition by increasing the amount of land which was
tilled directly for their benefit. Probably this meant that they would
be wealthier in time than their predecessors, but it also had immediate
social ramifications because it was combined with a preference for one
specific manorial form. At least this is suggested by what little can
be learned from Domesday about a second aspect of the way in which they
organized their estates. Of course, Domesday was not a custumal, nor
did it define the terms which it used to describe the peasants. But it
seems to record a great social depression in Yorkshire which was princi-
pally marked by the almost complete disappearance of sokemen. There
were, for instance, over three times as many sokemen in Nottinghamshire
in 1086 as in all of Yorkshire, and the meaning of this comparison can-
not be explained away by the suggestion that sokemen had not been numer-
ous in Yorkshire in 1066.'*^ The populations of two sokes, Northallerton
and Falsgrave, are given for 1066, and these two estates contained more
sokemen (22A) at that date than the North and East Ridings combined in
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1086. The Yorkshire sokemen had almost vanished as a significant
class. This was an important social change, but what is usually not
pointed out is that the fall of those sokemen and even villeins, for
that matter, who had lived through the harrying, was not as great as
economic considerations alone might have dictated. In the years immedi-
ately after 1069 the problem which faced the burned out peasants was
survival. There were too many people for the weakened agrarian economy
to feed; and because of the slaughter of oxen and the destruction of
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agricultural implements, cecovery is not likely to have been
.apid.
Indeed, the situation may have worsened during the early 1070's until
enough people starved to death or left for the economy to stabilize. In
these Circumstances the Mormaos could have set what term, they wished
for the refugees, but they seem to have acted with some restraint. When
the population of Yorkshire was finally recorded in 1086, there were no
serfs at all in the shire and only a small number of bordars.^^ This is
significant because it means that the Normans had not chosen to culti-
vate their new demesnes ^th either serfs or a naked use of hired labor.
The only possible exception to this is the West Riding where bordars
accounted for 33% of the population. This may mean that some of the
survivors had been reduced to the status of bordars there, but this is
uncertain. The percentage of bordars in the population is impressive
in comparison with the percentages of bordars in the North and East
Ridings, 16% and 19% respectively, but it is not much larger than the
percentage in neighboring Derbyshire where bordars were 27% of the popu-
lation,^"''
Throughout the North and East Ridings the bulk of the population
consisted of villeins in £086. This class made up 79% of the recorded
population in the former and 73% in the latter. Even in the West Riding
they were 54% of the population; and, if grouped with the sokemen, who
were more common here thajn in the other two ridings, they and the soke-
52men were nearly twice as numerous as the bordars. Given the forces
let loose by the harrying, this preponderance of villeins was clearly
artificial. If Domesday's employment of the term "villein" (villanus )
was at all consistent witJt later northern usage, their existence had
been fostered by the Nor^ns, and this phenon^non requires explanation.
At the ^ni.u., of course, it means that the Normans preferred to have
their demesnes cultivated by the customary labor of villeins, the hold-
ers of one or two bovates presumably, rather than by either serfs or
bordars. But beyond this obvious point, one is nearly in the dark on
the basis of the Yorkshire evidence. Theoretically, the large nun^ers
of villeins could be explained within the terms of Northumbrian society.
The Normans had a greater need for peasant labor than their predecessors.
Villeins yielded more free labor than either sokemen or bordars, so the
Norman lords maintained surviving villeins and established indigent
sokemen and villeins (and bordars?) as villeins, l^is line of reasoning
could provide a rationale for groups of overstocked manors such as those
of Hugh fitz Baldric which contained almost exclusively villeins, (1
sokeman, 385 villeins, and 7 bordars to be exact)^^ and could explain
those numerous (72 out of 179) overstocked manors with demense which
show an increase in the number of peasant ploughs. Both could be under-
stood as attempts to increase the amount of customary labor available
by the multiplication of the villein population.
This line of explanation may contain some truth, but a limited body
of evidence indicates that the social depression of the Yorkshire peas-
antry may also have been the result of an arbitrary act of power and
greed. A survey of Ripon, Otley, and Sherburn, estates of the archbis-
hop of York, has survived from around the year 1030, and when its
description of these estates is compared with their description in
Domesday, radical changes are obvious. These are least pronounced at
Ripon, where the two accounts substantially agree except for five pieces
of land which appear as sokeland in 1030 but as berevlcks in 1086.^^
Given the size of the Ripon estate and the a^unt of time between the
two surveys, this change
.ight not be judged significant were it not for
the fact that the same type of transforation reappears at Otley and
Sherburn on a much greater scale, m 1030 the estate of Otley consisted
of the head village and sixteen dependent villages. Otley and six of
the villages were divided between agenland and sokeland, and the remain-
ing ten villages were entirely sokeland.^^ By 1086, however, there was
no sokeland dependent upon Otley. It and fourteen of the sixteen vil-
lages mentioned in 1030 are listed, but they are all described as bere-
wicks. The accounts of Sherburn reveal the same phenomenon. In the
early survey it had twenty-two dependent villages and parts of twelve
more villages. Six of these properties were divided between agenland
and sokeland; the rest were entirely sokeland. Domesday, however,
describes Sherburn as only having berewicks." In both of these estates
the rights of sokemen had been annulled. By 1086 their land belonged to
the archbishop, and the Normans probably were responsible for this
transformation of sokelands into berewicks. Furthermore, this act of
tyranny seems to have affected the status of the peasants. Sherburn's
population in 1086 consisted of 8 sokemen, 101 villeins, and 122 bor-
58dars. The Normans did not simply preserve villeins and set up refu-
gees as villeins; they created them by fiat.
There is a little evidence, moreover, that the Normans changed the
nature of villeinage itself. The obligation to perform week-work was
not one of the ancient burdens which lay upon the northern peasantry,
but two examples of it are known in Yorkshire. At Carlton and East
Hardwlck. dependent »e»bers of the of Tanshelf. the peasants who
held bovates had to work two days a .eeU during 47 weeks of the year and
Sl^ days a week "during the five weeks of autu^" on the old central
de^sne at Tanshelf. and at Buttercr^e on the Derwent the bonders
worked four days a week from Whitsunday to Martinmas. These examples
are unique, but they are disquieting, nonetheless, because they come
froffl the two areas with the highest concentration of overstocked manors
in 1086 and. In fact, from vllls which themselves seem to have been
overstocked/" This might be only coincidence, but It probably means
that at least in these two Instances the Normans had Imposed heavier
labor obUgatlons on the villeins to make possible the cultivation of
enlarged demesnes.
It was Bishop who first pointed out these examples of week-work in
Yorkshire. He believed that the Noraans had, indeed, imposed this obli-
gation around Tanshelf (he did not discuss Buttercrambe)
, but he
rejected an economic interpretation. Rather, he thought that it:
must be considered to have been imposed by an exceptional effort of
socxal and economic oppression, from a motive other than that of
mere economic exploitation: a sotive presented by the strategic
isaportance of the Aire crossing in the vicinity of Pontefract.^l
Given only two examples of week-work in Yorkshire, this might seem a
reasonable idea, particularly since Sishop had misinterpreted the evi-
dence of an expansion of demesne faming, but even without this informa-
tion Bishop's interpretation ignores the basic problem that week-work
may have been more common at an earlier date than the thirteenth-century
inquisitions indicate. By this period labor services had been commuted
into doney payments to a great extent in Yorkshire, and it may be that
c«mutation hides old obligations to perform week-work. This is not
ju3t a theoretical possibility. Within a restricted area comparable
obligations should have been commuted for roughly similar payments,
altthough complete agreement could not be expected on account of the bar
g^lLning process and variation in the value of bovates, money, and labor
Furthermore, the payments made as commutation should stand in a close
relationship to the money value of uncommuted villein services in cases
where the services themselves were originally similar, provided, of
corurse, that commutation had not been carried out too long ago. These
co^nsiderations are important because of the dim light which they throw
OH commuted peasant custom in the vicinity of Buttercrambe. If these
payments are compared with the combined value of the rent, renders in
fcLnd, and customary works of the villeins of Buttercrambe, a suspicious
pattern emerges. In those manors which had contained demesne land in
1086, the payments ranged from 9s. 2d. per bovate to 13s. 4d. with the
value of the rent, renders, and works at Buttercrambe (9s .lid.) falling
well within these limits. The rate at the manor of Helms ley, however,
wfeere there had been no demesne in 1086, was only 5s., half the common
raJte of 10s c found in -^e vills which had been manorialized in 1086.
Tlals pattern shows that the obligations of the villeins of Buttercrambe
were not unique in their scale, and it probably means that the Normans
head imposed heavy labor duties on the peasants in the surrounding vil-
Lages,
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TABLE 4
Rates in the Vicinity of Buttercrambe^
Date Manor Bovate Rate i.ia.ii.'_<i. icixx/sea m J.UO0
1271-72 Burton-le-Willows 10s. X
1282 Buttercrambe (9s. lid.) X
1258-59 Catton 9s. 2d. X
1285 Helmsley
West Newton 5s.
(a member)
Pockeley 5s.
(a member)
1285 Howsham iOs. X
1245-46 Skerpenbeck 10s. X
1267-68 It 13s. 4d. X
I, Nos. VIII, XLVI, LX, LXXI; II, No. XXIX.
Unfortunately, this line of inquiry cannot be extended to the shire
at large because of the uncertainties inherent in the method. Yet its
results seem solid in the neighborhood of Buttercrambe, and this means
that the general absence of week-work in the inquisitions is not neces-
sarily significant. Indeed, this example and the mentality reflected in
the social depression of the sokemen, the preference for villeins, and
the expansion of demesnes make it likely that the two known examples of
week-work were not "exceptional" acts of oppression. Rather, it looks
more as if the first generation of Norman lords used their power to
establish a seignorial regime which approximated the textbook manor and
Which m ^ny cases included the imposition of week-work on the villeins.
That the Nonnans took this last step, of course, can only be stated as a
probability on the basis of the Yorkshire evidence, but this is only to
be expected given the agricultural history of the shire during the
twelfth century. The creation of ^nors was a .ovement which was inevi-
tably limited in its scope and duration. Only during the 1070's and
early 1080's did conditions exist which .ade it possible to i^ose new
burdens on the peasants of Yorkshire. Once these years of starvation
and exodus had passed, the Norman lords no longer held the upper hand.
If they were to redevelop their remaining waste estates, they had to
attract peasants by offering them easy terms, and Bishop has shown that
revival along these lines did take place in the long run.^^
secondary effects was the encouragement of the widespread commutation
which hides the older burdens of the Yorkshire peasantry.
What is needed to settle this question is some way of getting
around the effects of thirteenth-century commutation; and although this
is apparently impossible in Yorkshire, such is not the case in Durham.
The agrarian history of the lands between Tyne and Tees is not so sub-
ject to this complication both because much of the land belonged to the
church and because this area was not harried to the same extent as York-
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shire. Only limited rebuilding was necessary above the Tees after the
harrying; and, if a brief expansion of manorialism accompanied the Nor-
man Conquest here, its chances of leaving traces in the records were
much better than those of the parallel movement in Yorkshire. In par-
ticular, it should be visible in Boldon Book, Durham's twelfth-century
custonal, which provides an Incomparable chance for the study of north-
em peasant custom.
To be sure, the various scholars who have worked with this document
have not discovered any development of this nature, but this is not
decisive. The exclusion of Durham from Domesday precludes a straight-
forward collation of the manorial forms of 1086 and later peasant cus-
tom. There are no overstocked manors here to serve as the obvious
starting point for an investigation. Furthermore, the scholars who have
used this document have had their own concerns, and these have overpow-
ered Boldon Book. G. T. Lapsley, for instance, was interested in the
survivals, and he based his division of St. Cuthbert's villages into
classes of forest, pastoral, and agricultural villages principally on
the presence or absence of cornage.^^ Jolliffe followed a similar line.
He was almost entirely preoccupied with the insight which the survivals
in Boldon Book could throw on conditions in the North before 1066.
Beyond this date his only interest lay in establishing a connection
between the integral shires and the complex manorial forms found in
later records. This led him to his theory of truncation and an unsup-
ported assertion that demesne farming had increased in the twelfth cen-
tury, accompanied around Durham by the imposition of week-work on the
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peasants. Regrettably, he did not pursue this idea since it was only
a logical necessity of his theory of truncation, not a question which
basically concerned him. Finally, M. Postan, who ignored Jolliffe,
based his analysis of Boldon Book on the false assumption that Durham
had been manorialized on a Midland pattern since time immemorial, and
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this curious mistake led him to interpret Boldon Book backwards.
Actually, the information on demesne farming in Boldon Book is one
of its clearest aspects. The document is not, after all, a description
of peasant farming or a self-conscious repository of ancient Northum-
brian custom, even though information on both subjects can be derived
from it. Boldon Book is an account of the manorial rights of the bis-
hop, a list of the renders in kind, payments, and customary labor which
he could claim each year from the manors he held directly and a record
of the farms of manors held by tenants. Although at first sight this
information represents a confusing maze with its welter of detail, if it
is studied closely, certain general patterns become evident in the vills
which were not at farm, and the most important of these was the distinc-
tion which existed between villages with a demesne and those without
one. This was the critical factor which differentiated villages in
twelfth-century Durham. General internal organization and peasant cus-
tom were correlated with the presence or absence of demesne land in a
village except in late functioning shires such as Heighingtonshire.
There were, in fact, two systems for harnessing peasant labor for
the support of the landlord in operation in Durham at the time of Boldon
Book, The one which has traditionally attracted the most attention was
a survival from the old shires, and it was usually found in villages
which lacked demesne land. These villages were not completely uniform,
of course, but Butterwick can stand as a fair example of the type.
Buterwyk [Butterwick] renders 32 shillings and 9 pence cornage
and 1 milch cow and 8 scot-chalders of malt and the same of meal
and the same of oats. And every plough [team] of the villeins
ploughs and harrows 2 acres at Sedgefieldo And the villeins do 4
boon-days for every house with 1 man. And they cart a tun of wine
and the millstone of Sedgefield„ The dreng keeps a dog and a horse
and goes on the great hunt with 2 hunting-dogs and 5 ropes, and
does suit of court and goes on errands.^'
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This was the classic bondage vill. Butterwick lacked a demesne, and its
inhabitants, who were all apparently bonders aside from the dreng, per-
formed light agricultural duties in another village. At the time of
Boldon Book, seven other villages had the same characteristics, and six
villages without drengs belonged to this type.^^ Moreover, the five
villages which contained molmen (firmars) should be added to this group
because their only distinction was the payment of a farm assessed on the
bovate in lieu of the grain renders, cow render, and cornage payments
which were made by the bonders in the other villages. The only excep-
tion to this general rule that the custom of the shire was found in
vills without demesnes was a small number of villages which had presum-
ably been the centers of groups of bondage vills in days gone by. Aside
from Heighington, they had been shorn of their dependent villages by
1183, but their internal arrangements still bore the mark of the shire.
Demesnes were either small or defunct except in Heighingtonshire, and
the peasants either paid compositions for part of the old dues or were
subject to the usual heavy renders in kind and formalized but limited
obligations to perform customary labor.
This was hardly the case in the manors where the second customary
tradition was followed. Despite the prominence which shire custom has
claimed in most discussions of Boldon Book, by this date there were a
number of villages in Durham with big demesnes, and in these villages a
customary tradition, which was an integral part of extensive demesne
cultivation and which had no discernible roots in Northumbrian custom,
was in force. Villeins subject to this system of obligations performed
week-work, and the custoros of the o, BoKion, where there was a
demesne of four ploughs, typify the system:
Who. h^:rfh":vi?:s":?\:^r:f"o ~° ir-^^ °^the whole year three days in tL L l • • ; ^nd works through
and thirteen days a^ Ch^isJLs
. t'^r^^^'
'^''^^ Whitsunweek
There were also twelve cottars at Boldon who held twelve acres each and
had to work two days a week throughout the year except on the three fes-
tivals mentioned above. ^^.^^^^^^^^ ^.^
ninety days of unpaid work each week throughout most of the year for the
upkeep of the demesne at Boldon and for other manorial tasks. Nor was
the situation at Boldon unique. The peasants in nineteen other villages
were subject to the same customs as their fellows at Boldon/^ and there
were several other manors with large demesnes where the peasants did
week-work also, although the obligations themselves were somewhat dif-
.
ferent from the three days a week required in the Boldon villages. In
most of the other villages the villeins seem to have held only one bovate,
and they worked two or three days a week from Lammas to Martinmas and
one or two days a week during the remainder of the year.^^ Finally,
there were three villages inhabited exclusively by cottars burdened with
week-work. Jolliffe dismissed all these villages in one brief and
ambiguous sentence which hid both their number and their importance, and
Lapsley classified most of them as pasture vills because their inhabi-
tants paid cornage.^^ Only Postan accorded them their true importance,
but he failed to understand their meaning.''^ In fact, the manors in
which the villeins did week-work were the most heavily exploited manors
in Durham. They accounted for most of the demesne land which was not at
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far. and were subject to a reglne which was diametrically opposed to the
shire system customs followed in the villages without demesnes. The
latter was predominantly a system which gathered in the products of
peasant labor and only a limited amount of direct labor. The former
yielded hugh amounts of free labor. This fundamental distinction
divided the Durham peasantry.
Moreover, the liae of cleavage ran even deeper than this discussion
would suggest. There was no simple opposition of shire custom and week-
work in St. Cuthbert's villages which might be explicable in terms of
alternative systems for exploiting the peasants. Although the differ-
ence between the two customary traditions was real, the situation
described in Boldon Book had another dimension, a dimension with impli-
cations of the gravest social importance. It is easy enough to read
Boldon Book and find clear examples of bondage viUs where the peasants
were burdened with shire customs, but it is quite another thing to turn
up equally clear examples of villages with demesnes and peasants bur-
dened with week-work because the accounts of such manors are long and
confusing and bear an obvious resemblance to the bondage vills. Again
the situation in Boldon was typical:
[The villein]
. . .
does in autumn four boon-days at reaping with
his entire household except the housewife
. . . and they [the vil-
leins] reap moreover 3 roods of oat-stubble
. . . and harrow it.
Every plough [team] of the villeins, also, ploughs 2 acres and har-
rows them, and then they have once ... a dole
. . . from the bis-
hop, and for that week they are quit of work, but when they make
the great boon-days they have a dole. And in their works they har-
row when it is necessary, and they carry loads
. . . and when they
have carried them every man has a loaf of bread, and they mow one
day at Hoctona [Houghton]
. . . and then they have a dole. And
every two villeins build one booth for the fair of St. Cuthbert.
And when they are building lodges and carrying loads of wood they
are quit of all other works.
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In addition to their week-work, all of these obUgations rested upon the
Villeins of Boldon, and this is significant because these services were
nearly a parallel of those of the villeins of Heighingtonshire,
Jolliffe's standard exann^le of shire custom, and of those found in less
detail in the bondage vills. Furthermore, the villeins of Boldon made
the same renders as the peasants in bondage vills. Ti.ey gave hens and
eggs, wagon loads of wood, and cornage; even the old grain renders were
present being represented by certain rents and an oat render. This
situation was typical of all the manors in which the peasants did week-
work except for the three manors inhabited solely by cottars. In all
instances the peasants were not subject just to week-work; they were
burdened with all the renders and works of shire custom as well.
This underlayer of shire custom shows that the Boldon villages and
the other villages with big demesnes had once been typical Northumbrian
villages. Furthermore, it means that there were not only two customary
traditions in Durham in the twelfth century but rather two distinct lev-
els of peasant exploitation, and the heavier of the two, the manor with
week-work, had been superimposed on the lighter, the Northumbrian bond-
age vill. In light of the expansion of demesne farming which the Nor-
mans initiated in Yorkshire, the explanation of this situation is all
too obvious: Walcher and his men had manorialized the Boldon villages
and imposed week-work on the peasants. Boldon Book records the Impact
of manorialization on the level of peasant custom in Durham, just as
Domesday Book disclose-i its general outline in terms of manorial
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structure In Yorkshire. Furthermore, the two exa^les of „eek-„ork from
Yorkshire Unk these two descriptions for they come fro. overstocked
vlll. and exhibit the same combination of week-work and shire custom as
the Durham examples.
Probably most of the Boldon villages and the other villages in this
category had been devastated by the Normans in the course of William's
march to the Tyne after Christmas of 1069. The uniformity of custom
exhibited by the twenty Boldon villages is itself indicative of this
because it is a sign of a recent, common origin. If they had been mano-
rialized piecemeal, in separate, acts of power, diversity would probably
have been created, and the most likely occasion when they all could
have been restructured was immediately after the harrying of the North.
Of course, very little is known about where the Normans went above the
Tees, but the
-rather peculiar distribution of villages with week-work
does generally fit in with the few things which are known of William's
movements. Orderic Vitalis says that William traveled to the Tees after
driving some rebels out of Holderness , and this probably means that he
marched north through the eastern end of the Vale of Pickering, skirted
the Moots along the co--t, and crossed into Durham from Cleveland. With
the Normans across the Tees, Symeon of Durham picks up the narrative.
He says that William divided his force, that Durham was abandoned out of
fear of the Norman advance, and that the church at Jarrow was burned.
Finally, Orderic concludes the episode with the information that the
Normals returned to the Tees from Hexham through some very rugged coun-
83
try. These details are meager but sufficient. It so happens that the
villages with big demesnes and peasants who did week-work were not
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scattered at random over the face> of ru^ ^r ce the county; they were predominantly
arranged in north-south lines except in the area just south of the Tyne.
In fact, they all lay on or near a hypothetical line of march running
north from Preston on the Tees, dividing to pass on either side of the
raised ground in eastern Durham before reuniting in the vicinity of Jar-
row, and then running west towards Hexham. From Hexham the line runs
south to the Tees either by the old Roman road through Ebchester and
Langchester, or perhaps through the hills to the upper Wear valley and
down this valley to the Roman road. The correspondence between the dis-
tribution of the manor in Durham and what is known of William's move-
ments during the harrying is too exact to be coincidence. The villages
with demesnes were the ones which the Normans destroyed in January of
1070.
What happened seems clear. The Durham peasants are known to have
fled when the Normans crossed into the bishopric They consequently
saved their lives and perhaps their oxen, but many faced a grim future
nevertheless
o
The inhabitants of the devastated villages returned to
find their food taken, their homes burned, and their tools destroyed.
Somehow they had to re^ - ild and bring their fields back into production
while avoiding starvation, and it is doubtful if they made much progress
before Walcher and his knights appeared in 1071. He took advantage of
their plight by setting up demesnes in the wasted villages and by impos-
ing week-work on the peasants. In return, they received food, tools, and
seed; and presumably the particular social mix in a given village—mol-
men, villeins, and cottars; villeins and cottars; or just cottars
—
reflects how desperate conditions were in that village in 1071. For
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»any-all the villeins and most of the cottars-week-work was the price
of credit. This was the meaning of Symeon of Durham's statement that
during this period many men "truly sold themselves into perpetual servi-
tude, provided that they could maintain a certain miserable life."^^
Week-work not unreasonably appeared to be slavery to men accustomed to
the light or indirect customs of the shire, especially since the two
were combined.
This hypothesis lays a heavy burden on the shoulders of Bishop
Walcher, but there really can be no doubt about his responsibility in
the matter. Evidence from Northumberland is conclusive on this point.
One can scan Jolliffe and other modern discussions of Northumbrian cus-
tom and find no examples of week-work above the Tyne. The peasants of
Northumberland appear under the undisputed, although sometimes decrepit,
sway of shire custom, and this seems quite reasonable since the Normans
had little impact on this area before the reign of Henry I, and the
creation of manors was a phenomenon associated with the years shortly
after the Conquest. This picture is generally correct, but it is not
entirely accurate. Despite the preponderance of shire custom, there
were a few instances of peasants burdened with week-work above the Tyne.
The bonders in at least four of Tynemouth's villages did two days of
week-work except at Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide. The villeins of
Grindon in Norhamshire performed two days of work with a second man each
86
week throughout the year, and the bonders at Acklington, a member of
87the barony of Warkworth, were liable to three days of week-work.
These examples are not numerous enough to challenge Jolliffe's general
picture of peasant custom in Northumberland, but they do have a direct
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bearing on the introduction of the ^or into Durham. They all exhibit
the sa.e underlayer of shire custo. as the Boldon vills and the villages
with week-work in Yorkshire, and this in itself suggests a Nonnan origin
for the week-work. Moreover, they have one notable thing in connnon:
They all were probably in Walcher's possession at some time between 1071
and 1080. Norhamshire, of course, was one of the most ancient endow-
ments of St. Cuthbert, and it would have fallen to Walcher as bishop in
1071. Warkworth and Tynemouth, on the other hand, were part of the
demesne of the earl in this period.^® but Walcher held this position
also from 1075 to 1080 and was presumably in possession of these estates.
He is, then, the single thread which unites the three anomalous examples
of week-work from above the Tyne, and it must have been under his rule
that these villages were manorialized.
Taken together, the evidence from Yorkshire, Durham, and Northum-
berland provides an insight into the sombre nature of the Norman Con-
quest of the North. The Normans did not simply dispossess a large nunh-
ber of Anglo-Saxon thanes and continue to collect the old revenues.
Rather, they altered the manorial structure in many northern villages.
Until the Conquest, the northern manor had consisted of the right to
receive the old renders and customary works of the Northumbrian shire
from a particular group of peasants. These were important rights and
had served to support a numerous class of landowners in 1066, but they
were predominantly an indirect systen for drawing off wealth from the
peasantry. They produced substantial renders in kind, a certain amount
of general purpose work (errands, carting, the maintenance of the mill,
etc.), and only a limited quantity of customary labor for the cultivation
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of the lord's demesne. The Nor^ns did not accept this syste. where
they could avoid doing so. In the 1070's they had all the advantages
over the peasants-superior force, Judicial power, and supplies of grain
and oxen-and they used this power to introduce a different manorial
regime. Capitalizing on the desperate conditions which they themselves
had created, they increased demesne cultivation and imposed week-work on
the peasants where circumstances were favorable, n,ese innovations were
a radical departure from northern custom, particularly since week-work
was simply added to the existing obligations. They meant that the hold-
ers of these manorialized villages would be wealthier than their prede-
cessors and that the peasants would be poorer. The Norman settlement of
the North was founded upon an exceptional act of economic brigandage, an
act whose effects passed from generation to generation except in York-
shire where widespread commutation intervened to ease the burden.
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CHAPTER VII
HENRY I'S NEW MEN IN THE NORTH
It has been said that while Rufus won the North, Henry I consoli-
dated Rufus's gains, and this is true in a descriptive sense.^ Yet this
distinction between the achievements of Rufus and Henry gives the estab-
lishment of Norman power in the Far North (Northumberland, Cumberland,
and Westmorland) an air of continuity and inevitability which the proc-
ess did not in reality possess. It would be more accurate to say that
Rufus won certain short-term advantages which might easily have passed
away and had, indeed, done so once and that due to several factors which
had little to do with the North, Henry realized the potential in the
situation which Rufus had left him. Even this statement, however, falls
short of the truth in two important respects. Henry was, in fact, a
"conqueror" in the North although he did it by proxy, and his consolida-
tion resulted in a fundamental shift in northern power relationships in
favor of Northumbria and the recreation of conditions not seen in the
North since before the Viking invasions.
This appraisal of what happened in the North between 1100 and 1135
should not be understood as an attempt to minimize William Rufus's con-
tribution to the creation of stability in the region. His accomplish-
ments are clear enough, but they were limited to a specific area. The
Red King's domain was diplomacy and war, and he had achieved nearly
everything which could be hoped for, short of the conquest of Scotland,
from these means. The building of the castle at Carlisle offered some
protection to the lands to the south if only because any future Scottish
invasion would have as its first object the recapture of Cuznberland.
The ending of the Northuxnbrian earldom removed the threat that a line of
Norman earls would pursue the semi-autonomous a^d sometimes rebellious
policies which the isolation of Northumbria made possible, and the kill-
ing of Malcolm Canmore allowed Rufus to establish a friendly king of
Scots. These were important improvements in the northern political sit-
uation, but it must be emphasized that this state of affairs was fragile
and easily reversible. Siward, the last great warrior to rule the North
before the coming of the Normans, had followed a policy remarkably simi-
lar to that of Rufus. He too had taken over Cumberland and installed
his own king of Scots, Malcolm Canmore. This first attempt to pacify
the Scots through good relations with their king had fallen apart as
soon as Malcolm was secure in Scotland, and Edgar presented the same
danger. It may be true, of course, that such a reversal was not a real-
istic possibility for the Scottish king prior to 1099. The accounts of
Edgar the Atheling's expedition of 1097 which put Edgar on the Scottish
throne say only that the Atheling drove out Donald Bane, not that the
latter was captured or completely neutralized; and it is likely that
King Edgar faced some opposition or at least potential danger from
Donald between 1097 and 1099 when the latter was finally captured and
2blinded. This circumstance insured Edgar's loyalty to Rufus until
1099, and it is not surprising that in that year the Scottish king con-
sented to come south and carry the sword at Rufus 's crown-wearing in
3London. But no one could have known with any certainty that Edgar
would remain faithful to the Normans. Due to Donald's xenophobic expul-
sion of the Anglo-Saxons, Edgar was perhaps less powerful than his
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father. Yet he apparently brought some Anglo-Saxons back into Scotland
with him, and there is no evidence that his rule was particularly weak
because his subjects viewed him as a "usurper."^ Had Edgar lived long
enough to consolidate his position, he might well have come over the
Tweed to waste Northu^erland and demand the restoration of Carlisle.
Rufus was, after all, no more of a convincing benefactor to Edgar than
Siward and King Edward had been for his father.
Rufus's real failure in the North, however, did not spring from the
paradox that he had sought peace with the Scots by supporting Duncan and
then Edgar while he retained Cumberland. Rather, the flaw in his
achievement lay in the fact that he apparently did very little to insure
that Cumberland could be retained. It had been won by an army from the
South, and Malcolm Camaore had been defeated and killed by another army
specially brought norto. Both of these incidents were part of a delib-
erate plan to lure Malcolm Canmore into the open and defeat him. They
were hardly typical. The Normans' real strength in the North had been
demonstrated more accurately in 1091 when Malcolm had been able to plun-
der Northumbria as far as the city of Durham and escape scot-free.
Until a Norman aristocracy was established in the Far North, such raids
could not be contained, and there is no evidence that Rufus took this
step despite the fact that he had control of Cumberland for nine years
and of Northumberland for five years. He did, to be sure, install sher-
iffs or analogous officers in the region. From 1095 Robert Picot was
sheriff of Northumberland, and W. son of Theoderic and a mysterious "Go"
are addressed successively in writs referring to Carlisle.^ Yet the
identities of these three men are unknown, and although the writs in
question
.entioa their barons and lieges, it is doubtful if these shad-
owy figures can be taken as evidence for the existence of a Nor^n land-
holding class in either area. If their inclusion in the addresses of
these writs was not conventional, they were probably the ar.ed retainers
of the sheriffs. Even in the early thirteenth century when the Norman
equivalent of the Mayflower syndrome was well established, none of the
tenants-in-chief in Cumberland claimed that their families had gotten
their lands before 1100, and despite the fact that some of their peers
in Northumberland did assert that their ancestors had held post con-
questum Anglie
,
it is utterly doubtful that their claims had any founda-
tion. The claim itself is anachronistic. No Norman could have gotten
or kept land above the Tyne before the campaigns of 1080. Earl Robert
de Mowbray might conceivably have created some baronies between ca. 1080
and 1095; but with the possible exception of Herbert de la Val, the
first lord of Callerton, a small barony on the south coast, there is no
evidence that any of Mowbray's men were reconciled with Rufus.^ More-
over, none of the supposed early holders of the baronies in question is
mentioned in or xd.tnessed either King Edgar's grant to Durham or the
several charters made by Rufus while he was in Northumberland in 1095.^
The only exception to this is William de Morley, the first lord of Mit-
ford, whom Gaimar mentions in his account of Mowbray's revolt. But
Gaimar's description of this revolt is confused and at variance with the
older accounts, and his story about Rufus besieging William de Morley is
unsubstantiated by the other sources. Furthermore, there is no mention
of William de Morley or any other of the founding barons between 1095
and 1100, and this even includes Guy de Balliol, lord of Bywell, whose
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descendants claimed that Rufus had given him the family lands.^^ Most
of these men do appear in documents made after 1100, however; and this
along with no mention of them before 1100 suggests that the thirteenth-
century claims were inflated. With the probable exceptions of Bywell
and Callerton and the possible exception of Mitford, none of the baron-
ies in Northumberland originated before 1100. Combined with the evi-
dence of the more modest Cumbrian barons, this means that the barons of
Robert Picot, W. son of Theoderic, and "G." were the household knights
of these officials. Circumstances in the North had not changed signifi-
cantly from the 1080 's when Bishop Walcher maintained a private army of
over one hundred men and Bishop William de St. Calais is said to have
kept a force of comparable size.^^ The Normans were still castlemen who
lived in large groups behind their walls and ditches and subsisted on
the tribute of sullen villagers. This is not a romantic image. When
Bishop William de St. Calais died in 1096, a number of Durham peasants
took the opportunity to decamp into Northumberland with their cattle.
Others went into Yorkshire either to find refuge in the southern free-
zone or, as seems more likely, to advance themselves by taking part in
the redevelopment of the wasted countryside.
When Henry became king, Norman settlement had scarcely advanced
beyond its limits at the death of William the Conqueror. Above Durham
which was probably fairly well in hand despite peasant dissatisfaction,
Robert Picot controlled Newcastle, Tynemouth, and Bamburgh. In the
West, someone held Carlisle for the king, but on either side of the
mountains, the countryside—or whatever was left of it after the revolts
and Scottish raids of the eleventh century—was unoccupied by Normans
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except in Durham,
.here ^erius de Cornford appears by 1095, and perhaps
in the very southernnost part of Northumberland. ^.^^^^ ^^^^^^
of Norman settlement in the North at this date is, in fact, surprising;
and, although there was xnore involved than this, it was the result of
the fact that the border counties were unattractive to the Normans given
the brigandage which the free-zone and the configuration of the Cumbrian
border made possible and the threat of Scottish invasions. These dan-
gers had not passed away as if by magic. Even later in his reign when
he had done much to pacify the North, King Henry enlarged his bodyguard
when he crossed the Humber, and at least in 1100 there was no certainty
that King Edgar would not resume the raids which had characterized
Northumbrian-Scottish relations since the early years of the eleventh
century. The Scottish monarchy was not yet dependent upon the Normans
in any fundamental sense, and there is no evidence of any Norman pene-
tration into Scotland either as members of the court or as landholders
before 1100. "'•^ Indeed, this is not surprising given the extent of Nor-
man settlement in the border counties.
The accomplishments of Henry I in the North were to alter basically
this set of circumstances. Due to the fortuitous conjunction of a num-
ber of factors of which the most obvious were Henry's own experiences
during the 1090* s, his political needs and methods after becoming king,
and extremely good fortune with respect to the Scottish royal house, he
was able to transform the scattered outposts of Norman power which Rufus
had left behind into something quite different. When he died in 1135,
the position of the Nonnans in Yorkshire had been consolidated, a Norman
aristocracy had been installed in the border counties, and King David
had taken the first steps in establishing a Norman aristocracy in
Lothian and Cumbria. These develop^nts laid the foundations for the
societies which existed in both the North and in southern Scotland dur-
ing the High Middle Ages, and there vas a unity to their formation.
Unfortunately, however, the connection between these developments has
been obscured by gaps between local studies, English history, and Scot-
tish history. Indeed, this subject provides an appalling example of how
inodern points of view can annihilate the past. Because of this problem
and because the basic factor which allowed Henry to settle Normans in
the Far North lies outside medieval history as it is usually conceived,
it will be necessary to reconstruct the outlines of this development
piece by piece. This will involve leaving certain questions, such as
the curtailment of the northern free-zone, in abeyance for a time, and
it will necessitate, on occasion, studying the same evidence from dif-
ferent perspectives. This may prove somewhat tedious, but since the
demands of "English" and "Scottish" history have succeeded in turning
the question of the North into a malodorous onion, it can only be peeled
layer by layer.
The easiest way to approach the problem initially is on the level
of royal politics. Upon his accessian, Henry I was not immediately
secure. He had only become king through a seizure of the English crown
which nullified his elder brother Robert's right to succeed Rufus, and
he was not popular with the great Norman families with estates in both
England and Normandy, who may have preferred Duke Robert to Henry and
who certainly feared for their lands in the struggle which was to
develop between the two brothers."'"^ This combination of factors was
either dangerous or potentially so until 1106 and to a certain extent
even later, and two of the ways in which Henry tried to strengthen hin.
self were of extreme importance for the North. The more obvious of
these was his marriage. Late in 1100 he took as his wife Maud, the
daughter of Malcolm Canmore and Margaret, Edgar the Atheling's sister.
Usually this marriage has been interpreted on a rather ethereal level.
It has been seen as the symbolic beginning of a reconciliation of Nor-
mans and Anglo-Saxons; or. upon the assumption that Henry was disturbed
by the theoretical weakness of his claim to the throne, it has been
explained as an attempt by Henry to create a link between himself and
Edward the Confessor. Yet it is more likely that the immediate point
of the marriage was diplomatic for it marked an alliance between Henry
and Maud's family, and one need not have recourse to prophesies concern-
ing the return of green trees or the like to explain its utility. The
new king was a shrewd diplomat, and he was acutely conscious of the dan-
gers which could threaten a state from its frontiers. Since the late
1080's he had been lurking around the western marches of Normandy, first
as lord of the Cotentin and later as the protector of Domfront. At
times he had been in close association with Robert of Be Heme, a master
in the art of frontier disruptions ^ and with Hugh the Fat, vicomte of
18Avranches and earl of Chester. Both from experience and probably from
his own dreams, Henry knew the threats to orderly government which could
come from such areas, and his marriage with Maud must be understood in
this context. It insured that Edgar, his most powerful neighbor in
Britain, would not invade the North to recapture Carlisle or to support
Duke Robert, and it performed the same function after Duke Robert was
captured and imprisoned. During his later continental wars, Henry was
not distracted by Scottish invasions as his father and brother had been.
The ^rriage insured that the relationship with the Scottish king which
Rufus had established as the provider of arMes would endure despite the
fact that^it was no longer a real necessity for the sons of Malcolm and
Margaret. 19 When Edgar died in 1107, his younger brother Alexander
became king "with King Henry's consent" but without the intervention of
a Norman army, and he remained at peace with Henry.^^ fact, the
relationship may have become closer. Alexander married one of Henry's
illegitimate daughters, and in 1114 he actually led an army, probably
but not necessarily composed of Scots, in Henry's invasion of Wales.
Very little is known about this unparalleled incident, but it would seem
to have prefigured the nature of English-Scottish relations after 112A.
In that year David, Malcoljn's youngest son, succeeded Alexander, and he,
as will be discussed later, was bound by ties of taste, friendship, and
patronage to Henry I. The result, then, of Henry's marriage to Maud was
to give the North a long period of peace—in so far as kings could give
peace in the North. For thirty-five years there were no Scottish inva-
sions, a circumstance without parallel since 1000, and it was during
these years that Normans settled in the border counties and under King
David in southern Scotland. In fact, it was the latter's cooperation
which made the movement possible because the northern free-zone could
not be reduced without the help of the king of Scots
»
Another of Henry's solutions to his early political problems had,
moreover, a very direct influence on the settlement itself. His
response to the disaffection of the greater Norman nobles was to create
a new nobility. U.at is, a party of nobles who owed their position in
the upper reaches of society to hi.. This tactic was noted at the time
by Orderic Vitalis, who, as a spokesman for the "old" nobility, asserted
that Henry had raised these men from the dust; but despite the fact that
this idea has parsed from Orderic into modern accounts of Henry's reign
as something of a commonplace, the creation of Henry's new nobles has
not yet been the object of the comprehensive investigation which it
needs. ^ general terms, of course, the phenomenon is clear enough.
His new men led kis armies, kept his castles, and ran his government.
He, in turn, regarded them with the spoils of feudal government and with
land. This was a matter of the greatest importance for the North
because in 1100 there was more land above the Humber which could be
granted out as patronage than in any other part of the kingdom. The
border counties were largely unoccupied by Normans; and in Yorkshire,
where William Uje Conqueror had installed his own supporters during the
1070's and 1080's, plenty of land was available from the royal demesne
and forfeitures. To a remarkable degree, the Norman settlement of the
North was the result of Henry giving land to his friends.
In Yorkshire the introduction of Henry's new men amounted to a
minor tenurial revolution. Early in the reign, some of the established
nobles received grants of land and privileges which appear to have been
designed to win their loyalty and were probably local examples of the
favoritism which such already established families as the Giffards,
2 3Clares, and Beauzsonts enjoyed in the south. Robert de Lacy, the lord
of the castlery of Pontefract, for instance, had become sheriff of York-
shire by 1102, axjd around the same time he obtained either the grant of
Bowland and Blackburnshire in Lancashire or the transformation of pre-
existing mense tenures of these lands into tenancies-in-chief .^^ Henry
also gave the soke of Bridlington to Walter de Gant, an important land-
holder in Lincolnshire and the East Riding, and he probably granted the
great soke of Wakefield to William de Warenne, who already held Coinis-
borough and was earl of Surrey. Robert, Walter, and William were all
men whose support was well worth having, and their cultivation by the
king to some extent blurs the line between the "old" and "new" nobility.
It is still clear, however, that the real rewards went predominantly to
men more closely connected to the king. Shortly after Tinchebrai, Henry
gave Robert de Brus some 80 manors from the royal demesne, chiefly in
Claro Wapentake, and another 13 estates which had been part of the
Mortain fee, and between this date (1106) and ca. 1118, Nigel d'Aubigny,
another new man, obtained the forfeited estate of Robert de Stuteville.^^
In Yorkshire this consisted of two large groups of manors, one centered
on Kirkby Malzeard in the West Riding and the other stretching from
27Thirsk east into the Vale of Pickering. These two grants were perhaps
the most striking of Henry's creations, but there were a number of other
instances of his reworking of the tenurial structure of the shire.
Early in the reign, for example, Geoffrey fitz Pain, an important new
man, obtained Warter, which had been royal demesne; and between 1115 and
281118 he was rewarded with the barony of Hunsingoreo The history of
Pontafract, however, provides the most flagrant example of Henry's
devices o The king's initial attempt to win Robert de Lacy's loyalty
apparently failed, and Robert forfeited Pontefract for unknown reasons
at some date between 1109 and 1118. Henry then gave the honor to Hugh
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de la Val, pres«ably to insure his support in northern France; and „hen
the latter died prior to 1129, the king gave Hugh's widow to William
Maltravers. a prominent royal minion, and sold him the estate for a term
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of years. Finally, the three mainstays of Henry's new regime in the
North, Walter Espec, Eustace fitz John, and David, all became important
landholders in Yorkshire. David, who was the youngest son of Malcolm
Canmore, held Hallamshire (Sheffield) .^^ Walter Espec and Eustace fitz
John were Henry's northern justiciars. Walter was given a large barony
around Kirkham and Helinsley; and Eustace, who was the farmer of Aldbor-
ough, Knaresborough, and the escheated honor of Blyth (Tickhill) during
Henry's later years, obtained the lordship of Malton.^^ Even these
examples do not exhaust the list of Henry's changes in the tenurial
structure of the shire for there are a number of other examples of the
king diverting the descent of estates to his own candidates or inserting
subtenants of his choice into established baronies, but the general
dimensions of his introduction of his new men is sufficiently clear. "^^
By 1135 the king had brought into being a group of nobles who owed their
rise to him, rivaled in power the descendants of the Conqueror's barons,
and controlled the government and most of the important castles of the
shire.
Beyond Yorkshire, the impact of Henry's patronage was even more
conq)lete. Apparently the Northumbrian countryside was considered royal
demesne. This was, of course, a legal fiction typical of Norman jus-
tice, but it was useful to Henry who filled the Far North with his sup-
porters. In southern Durham he gave Hartness to Robert de Brus and
probably Greatham to the Bertrams, and above the Tyne he created a line
of baronies running to the Tweed.33
^yne valley and the hills to
the north. Walter de Bolbec, who probably benefited fro. a connection
with the Giffards, received Styford, and in the same region Robert de
Umfcaville obtained Prudhoe which was probably augmented before 1135 by
the grant of the serjeanty of Redesdale.^^ To the east and north, Henry
app^arently gave Mitford to William Bertram or his father, and he may
ha^^ given the neighboring lordship of Bothal to a son of William.
Mitford, Bothal, and Morpeth, which may have been an older lordship,
dominated the lowlands of Northumberland from the Tyne to the Coquet.
Beyond them six new baronies were created. Morwick and Hadestone, which
adjoined the royal demesne at Warkworth, went respectively to Hugh fitz
Eudlo, perhaps the son of Henry's dapifer Eudo, and to Aschantinus de
Worcester, who had custody of the Durham episcopal manors after Ranulf
Flambard's death. North of these fees, Henry established Alnwick, the
greatest of the Northumbrian baronies, for Eustace fitz John and Elling-
ham for Nicholas de Grenville. ^'^ Finally, the king brought Norman set-
tlement to the Tweed. Robert de Muschamp, who may have been the steward
of Walter de Gant, was given Wooler in the Till valley, and Walter Espec
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received Wark on the Twped.
West of the mountains the tenurial structure of the countryside was
also established during Henry's reign, and here again the process itself
represented the endowment of Henry's followers. Probably after 1106,
the king gave the lordship of Carlisle, which encompassed the Vale of
Eden with the Cumbrian lowlands north of the Derwent, to Ranulf Meschin.
Rani?jlf was the son of the vicomte of the Bessin and had led the van of
39Henry's army at Tinchebrai. He, in turn, established two baronies.
le seems
Burgh by Sands and Liddelstrengt:h,on the Galwegian border; and h.
to have tried to install his brother William in Gilsland. This attempt
did not succeed for Gille, the native lord of the area, held out against
the Normans till ca. 1156, but William did not go without land/^ Henry
gave him Copeland (also called Egremont or Allerdale above Derwent) on
the southwestern coast of Cumberland/^ Copeland was the westernmost
menfcer of a string of lordships which ran around the southern side of
the Cumbrian dome and the western side of the Pennines, and these too
all went to Henry's supporters. Furness was part of the honor of Lan-
cashire. Nigel d'Aubigny received Kendale and Burton in Lonsdale, the
lordship created by Rufus for Ivo Taillebois.^^ Skipton passed to
William, Ranulf Meschin's brother, when he married the daughter of
Robert de Rumilly; and the forest of Bowland and Blackburnshire, members
of the castlery of Pontefract, were held successively by Robert de Lacy,
Hugh de la Val, and William Maltravers.^^ Finally Lancashire itself
was given to Stephen of Blois, Henry's greatest political creation, ca.
1120, and it may have belonged to Ranulf Meschin prior to this date,
although this is by no means certain,
Throughout Englan'^'s northernmost counties the creation of a Norman
lamdholding class was primarily the work of Henry I after 1106, and in a
fundamental sense this development is to be understood in terms of the
kin;g*s patronage. Even in Yorkshire where a Norman aristocracy had been
esfcablished during the 1070' s, forfeitures and the abnormal extent of
the royal demesne made it possible for him to install a large group of
his own supporters who represented an intensification in the French
presence in the shire. In the lands beyond, including those parts of
Durha. not held by St. Cuthbert. Henry created t.e territorial aristoc-
racy by granting fiefs to his supporters. Furthermore, Henry's patron-
age was not limited entirely to Normans. Natives played a secondary but
important part in the process, and the first si^ that this would be the.
case comes from a Northumbrian writ of ca. 1103 which reveals that Henry
had replaced Robert Picot, Rufus's sheriff, with two Northumbrians,
Ligulf and Aluric."^^ Subsequent writs and other documents show that
Ligulf administered that part of Northumberland dependent upon Bamburgh,
and Aluric, the part dependent upon Corbridge."^* This rather curious
return to native officials presumably indicates that Henry had decided
that the best way of governing Northumberland in these early years was
through local men, but the system was actually used even after his new
men had come into the area. Around 1118, Aluric and Ligulf were
replaced or followed by Ligulf's son Odard of Banburgh, and he was suc-
ceeded ca. 1133 by his son Adam.^^ The reliance on a line of native
sheriffs long after any obvious need for their collaboration is curious,
and the usage had a parallel in Cumberland where another Odard, appar-
ently the son of Hildred, the farmer (?) of Carlisle, was sheriff in
1130. ^«
The re-emergence of natives in the North was, in fact, a notable
feature of the years between 1100 and 1135, and the king himself even
exhibited a strange and somewhat contradictory taste for northern Anglo-
Saxons. For a period of time during the 1120 's he employed as his con-
fessor Prior Athelwold of Nostell who had originally been lord of Pock-
1 , 49lington in the East Riding, Moreover, Henry took as one of his mis-
tresses the daughter of Forne son of Sigulf , who was apparently a
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Yorkshire
.an; and he both rewarded and employed these northerners.
In 1133 Athelwold became the first bishop of Carlisle.^^ Forne's daugh-
ter eventually vas married to Robert d'Oilli, one of the king's consta-
bles, and Forne himself rose mightily." He was a minister of the king
In Yorkshire during the 1120's and later in Northumberland, and Henry
rewarded him with a small estate in Yorkshire and, more importantly, the
barony of Greystoke in Cumberland. In addition to these lands, Forne
also apparently acquired Coquetdale in Northumberland, Coniscliffe in
southern Durham, and probably large possessions in upper Teesdale from
King Henry. He was, in reality, a Northumbrian "new man," and there
were other examples of the type. Adam son of Swane, for instance, who
was descended from a family which had held land around Pontefract since
before the Conquest, received an extensive lordship east of the Eden in
Cumberland and land in Lancashire from Henry I, and his younger brother
Henry acquired Edenhall and Langwathby in Cumberland. The king's
native sheriffs were also rewarded for their services with land. Henry
gave Gamelsby and Glassanby with other lands in Cumberland to Odard and
Hildred, and he created two baronies in Northumberland, Embleton and
Dilston, for Odard son of Ligulf and Richard son of Aluric.^^ Further-
more, a number of Northumbrian villages, notably a group of nine near
Bamburgh and the vills west of Rothbury which later became the barony of
Hepple, were left in the hands of natives as thanages, and there seems
to have been an analogous group of serjeanties in Cumberland.
Finally—and these were perhaps the most curious grants of all—Henry
reestablished the sons of Cospatric in the North. Cospatric II, the
youngest son of the old earl, received the great serjeanty of Beanly In
Northumberland; and Waltheof, Cospatric Vs second son, obtained Aller-
dale below Derwent in Cumberland.^^ These grants to natives are numer-
ous enough to show that being a native was not a bar in the North to
entering the king's service under Henry I. Some might be tempted to go
on from this to conclude that here was reconciliation between Saxon and
Nor^n in practice, but such an idea would be highly doubtful. Henry
may conceivably have had a personal weakness for natives. His Yorkshire
mistress and his confessor suggest this, and such a predilection would
fit in with a certain type of romanticism concerning the Anglo-Saxon
past which the king's new men sometimes affected. Yet it must be
noted that Henry's native new men usually received definitely second-
rate land. If this was reconciliation, the price was cheap. In fact,
it seems more likely that they were simply useful on the local level and
that by employing them Henry's patronage tapped another source of disaf-
fected men whose gratitude could be relied upon„ The result of Henry's
land grants was, in any case, the creation of a hybrid aristocracy in
the North, and the chief characteristic of these men was that they owed
their fortunes to him. They were his men, whether Anglo-Saxon or Nor-
man, and they were unrivaled from Cheshire and the honor of Tickhill
north. Their establishment represented the territorialization of
Henry's party.
The creation of a Norman landholding class in southern Scotland can
be viewed as an extension of the same process. This was certainly true
chronologically. Normans appeared on both sides of the Tweed during
roughly the same years even though this is usually overlooked because of
the ideological width of the Tweed or on the assumption that there were
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Nor^ns in Northu^erland and Cu^nberland earlier than was actually the
case. Furthermore, King David's reasons for bringing Nonnans into Scot-
land can only he e^lained in terms of his early education and his rela-
tionship with Henry I. David, or David "fitz Malcolm" as he should be
called, was in reality one of Henry's new men, although his high descent
and his eventual accession to the Scottish throne tend to blind Scottish
historians to this. He was born around 1085 and spent only some eight
years in his parents' household before the circle was broken in 1093 by
the death of his parents and Donald Bane's purges. At this time, his
elder brothers and sisters evidently took him to England where he was
reared among the ferman boys of the court.^^ The seriousness and reli-
gious attitudes which he was later to exhibit may go back to his child-
hood with St. Margaret, but in most other respects it was his stay among
the Normans which was of critical importance in the formation of his
character. David spent his adolescence being educated by Normans to be
a Norman, and according to both William of Malmesbury and Orderic
Vi talis, he became one in his tastes and behavior. This, of course,
explains in cultural terms why he was later to surround himself with
Normans, and it has been taken as the chief reason for the coming of the
Normans into Scotland. The Norman Conquest of this kingdom is
explained as a matter of royal taste. Yet this approach, evidently
because it seems a sufficient explanation, has obscured how David first
became important in. Scotland, and this was the work of Henry I. After
his sister's marriage to Henry, David became a member of the royal
household, and he v^tnessed several royal acts. He was, however, impor-
tant because of his sister. He signed as "David the Queen's brother,"
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and no one «as likely to have thought that he ™uld ever become king of
62Scots. Indeed, it was not until he was grown that anyone could have
predicted this. David was the seventh son of Malcolm Cann.ore, and even
though four of his elder brothers had been killed or otherwise elimi-
nated by 1100, probability suggested that one of his two remaining
brothers, Edgar and Alexander, would have a son who would supersede him.
To understand David's relationship with Henry, me must forget the
knowledge that this did not happen. In the early llOO's David was a
young man with no great prospects. This may have recommended him to
Henry, who had spent his own youth in similar circumstances, and in 1107
the king became David's benefactor. In that year King Edgar died, and
he apparently left David either the lordship of southern Scotland or the
royal estates in this region. David, however, «as only put in posses-
sion of this bequest when Henry threatened to send an army against King
Alexander who was reluctant to honor Edgar's wishes. This incident is
hard to explain in terms of Henry's Scottish policy, but unless one
assumes that Maud's demands for justice for her youngest brother were
truly formidable, it means that Henry feared that Alexander could not be
relied upon and had de^-'ded to weaken his power by establishing David
in Lothian and Cumbria. David's first rise in the world probably came
because of his usefulness in keeping the Scots weak.
Between 1107 and 1124 David was Henry's marcher lord in southern
Scotland, and the second great improvement in his fortunes was probably
connected with this fact. On the one hand, he needed sufficient mate-
rial resources to function effectively; and, on the other hand, there
was the necessity of insuring his loyalty. Both problems were solved in
1113 when Henry gave him Maud de Saint-Uz for his wife. She was the
daughter of Earl Waltheof
,
Siward's son. and Judith, William the Con-
queror's niece; and besides these genealogical attractions, she was the
heiress of the earldom of Northampton and the honor of Huntingdon.
David's marriage with Maud made him one of the most important nobles in
England. It also bound him even more closely to Henry and gave him the
lordship of a number of the Normans who would later become important in
Scotland. Henry had, in fact, revived the old pattern of a Northumbrian
earl holding the earldom of Northampton except in this instance the earl
in question ruled the lost province of Lothian. It is also probably no
coincidence that it was during the reign of Henry I that the earliest
stories of how Lothian had been lost to the Scots were inserted into the
chronicles. These accounts, which are contradictory in their details,
carried the inference either that Lothian was a fief of the English
crown or that it had been improperly acquired by the Scots, and they
may have been intended as the basis for a revived English claim of the
province. Alternatively, they may only reflect a feeling at Durham
that Lothian should have been part of England; but, in any case, from
1107 until 1124, David was Henry's man both in a personal and a tenurial
sense. The Normans who accompanied him around Lothian and Cumbria were
predominantly drawn from the earldom of Northampton or from Henry's
66patronage network. These were the men who staffed his government and
received lands in Scotland; and after David became king in 1124, this
pattern persisted until Henry's death in 1135. After that, few Normans
6 7
entered Scotland.
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The value of the ties between David and Henry was not restricted,
however, simply to the maintenance of peace between England and Scotland
or to the provision of David with suitable companions. Henry I's great-
est accomplishment in the North was the containment, division and reduc-
tion of the northern free-zone. It was this which made estates in the
region valuable enough to be granted out as rewards for his supporters
and ended the concentration of the Normans around a few military and
administrative strong points such as Newcastle, Bamburgh, and Carlisle;
and David's cooperation was an important factor in this process. At
first sight, this is not particularly obvious, of course, for in North-
umbria, the eastern margin of the free-zone appears to have been con-
tained by methods which were similar to those enployed further south and
which owed little to Earl David. In Teesdale, Guy de Balliol built
Barnard castle in the early twelfth century, and Brancepath above the
"
68Wear is probably of a comparable date. To the north, Henry created
two new baronies. Styford and Prudhoe, at the mouth of the Tyne gap, and
Robert de Umfraville apparently built a castle at Prudhoe. Further-
more, Norman control was pushed up the North Tyne to its junction with
the Rede. The valley of the latter was given to Robert de Umfraville on
the condition that he close it to robbers, and he accomplished this by
the erection of Elsdon castla. Furthermore, the line of motte-and-
bailey castles between Hexham and the junction of the Rede and the North
Tyne, that is Gunnerton, Wark on Tyne, and Bellingham, presumably also
date from this period. Elsdon and the castles on the Tyne controlled
all the important routes out of the northern fr«e-zone south of Coquet-
dale. The latter was apparently protected by a royal castle at
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Rothbury.^l The upper reaches of the Aln and Beamish were dominated by
Cospatric's serjeanty of Beanly which he held by the tenure of guaran-
teeing the good intentions of outsiders entering Northumberland through
his estates. The valley of the Till was blocked by the barony of Wooler,
which probably had a castle at Wooler, and by W^lter Espec's lordship of
Carham. Walter's castle at Wark-on-Tweed defended an important ford
over the Tweed, and to the east. Bishop Ranulf's new castle of Norham,
which he had explicitly built to protect Norhamshire from raiders, per-
formed a similar function,
These castles along the eastern edge of the free-zone from the Tees
to the Tweed gave the east coast plain a measure of protection against
raids; but in spite of the prominence of this attempt to contain the
effects of the free-zone, it is likely that the most important work was
done in the West. The key to creating peace in the Far North was the
control of communications through the hills, and this was established by
Ranulf Meschin, the lord of Carlisle, and by Earl David. Presumably
Ranulf*s work took precedence chronologically. When he received Cumber-
land, Carlisle was an exposed strong point, but probably by 1120, at
which time he gave up his northern lordship to become earl of Cheshire,
and almost certainly by 1135, Carlisle had been linked with Richmond by
castles at Appleby, Brough, and Bowes, and its communications with Lan-
cashire had been secured by the castle of Burton-in-Lonsdale. ^'^ The for-
mer castles in particular were very important because they controlled
the Vale of Eden-Stainmore route and split the Jennines. Furthermore,
Ranulf blocked the Galwegian border itself with two new baronies. Burgh
by Sands controlled the fords across the Solway which were the most
practical route to the north, and Liddel covered the route around the
edge of the hills.^^ These lordships and castles put the Norn^ns in a
much better position to control movements through the southern part of
the old Cumbrian kingdom, but to be really effective, they needed to be
extended beyond the border. This was earl David»s contribution.
According to local tradition at Glasgow, David had been sent by God to
punish aud restrain the Galwegians, and he accomplished this by creating
around the western flanks of the Scottish part of the free-zone three
large lordships modeled upon Carlisle. He gave Liddesdale to Ranulf
de Soules, Eskdale to Robert Avenel, and Annandaie to Robert de Brus.^^
These military districts covered all the dales between Cumberland and
Annandaie. The latter contained the Galwegians of Nithsdale and pro-
vided the basis for keeping the Roman road to the Clyde open.^^ Eskdale
and Liddesdale dominated the trails leading to Teviotdale and to the
North Tyne. Together these fees split the northern free-zone and made
east-west raids impossible. They were, moreover, matched by a series of
military districts in the north which protected the Midland valley of
Scotland just as the southern lordships shielded Tweeddale and Northum-
berland. David gave Cnnningham to Hugh de Morville and North Kyle and
79Renfrew to Walter fitz Alan.
The effect of the activities of Ranulf Meschin and Earl David was
the fragmentation and containment of the northern free-zone. This was a
necessary condition for the revival of northern society on both the
English and Scottish parts of the east coast plain, and there is a curi-
ous parallel between David's career and the appearance of Normans above
the Tyne. This pattern can only be stated tentatively, of course.
because of the extremely limited nature of the evidence, but it is sug-
gestive nonetheless. There is practically no evidence that Norman land-
holders were established in Northumberland during the first decade of
Henry I's reign. A shadowy "Graffard," who apparently held land around
Tynemouth, is mentioned, and two writs refer to Guy de Balliol. But the
second of these, a writ issued in 1105, strongly suggests that there
were no other important Norman landholders along the Tyne, and beyond
Graffard and Guy, no outside settlers are mentioned except for a myste-
rious colony (?) of Flemings who seem to have been established somewhere
above the Tyne.^^ After King Edgar's death, however, this situation
changed. David vanishes from Henrj^'s charters between 1108 and 1112,
which presumably means that he was spending most of his time in Scot-
land, and at the end of this period two significant pieces of evidence
concernxng Northumberland appear. First, in 1111 Henry removed the
Flemings from the shire; and second, in the same year Robert Muschamp,
the lord of Wooler, is mentioned in a writ.^^ This is a rather suspi-
cious coincidence, and it is repeated later in the 1110' s. From ca.
1116 through 1121 David again fails to attest any of Henry's acts; and
during roughly the same years, ca. 1114-1121 and ca. 1116-1120 respec-
tively, neither Robert de Brus, the future (?) lord of Annandale, nor
83Ranulf Meschin witness a royal charter. The simultaneous absence of
these three men is not likely to have been the result of chance, and it
probably means that during these years they were busy in the West bring-
ing order to the Galwegian march. Furthermore, at the end of this
period, Eustace fitz John, Walter Espec, and Fome son of Sigulf, the
three principal agents of Henry's government in Northumberland, all
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appear above the Tyne, and the same is true of Walter de Bolbec and
Robert de Umfraville.^^ m 1121, moreover. Bishop Ranulf built Norham
castle, and between 1119 and 1124 Berwick and Roxburgh, the first Scot-
tish burghs, appear. Finally, in 1122 King Henry himself came north
and surveyed Cumberland and Northumbria.^^ If the pattern which this
evidence discloses can be relied upon, the attack upon the northern
free-zone was at least contemporaneous with the settlement of Normans ir
Northmnbria and Tweeddale, and it probably preceded the latter. Fur-
thermore, David's activities were clearly central to the whole process,
even though their exact nature remains hidden.
The Norman settlement of the border counties and of southern Scot-
land cannot be explained except in terms of the political needs of Henry
I and his relationship with Earl David. Henry brought the Normans north
either directly or through David, and with the aid of David he created
the conditions which made their settlement possible. The lands of the
old kingdoms of Nor thumbria and Cumbria were settled as a unit. Yet
this conclusion raises a fundamental question which cannot be answered
satisfactorily within the framework of political history. If this chro-
nology is correct, then one must ask why the Normans had not taken lands
in the Far North before 1110. They had come to England to get estates,
to become greater lords than they were; and their behavior in southern
England and elsewhere in Christendom establishes that they had few scru-
ples, and these largely restricted to the Church, which could stand for
long between them and land in the hands of natives. Judged from the
standpoint of what they did elsewhere, their neglect of Northumberland,
Cumberland, and even Scotland till the early twelfth century is an
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enigma. Indeed, this is probably why their late arrival above the Tyne
has been largely overlooked. They should have been there; and despite
the fact that Henry I's diplomatic and political needs provide a con-
vincing explanation of why he gave Normans land in this area, his rea-
sons were not really unusual. Both William the Conqueror and William
Rufus had wanted a quiet North so that they could concentrate their
strength in Normandy, and the need to reward followers with land was not
new in 1100. There is no sign that the Conqueror or Rufus had more
lands at their disposal than men willing to occupy them. The idea that
estates in the region were not very valuable because of the insecure
conditions which prevailed there is more helpful, but it only pushes the
problem back geographically. Why had the Normans not moved into the
hills and mountains of the free-zone before 1100? The cooperation which
Henry received from David was, no doubt, convenient in this endeavor,
but it was not essential. Ranulf Meschin could have pushed into Gallo-
way. No answer to this question is apparent, and this is because the
explanation lies in an unexplored area.
In reconstructing the history of the Norman Conquest it is usual to
concentrate one's atte"*"ion on such subjects as the diplomatic, politi-
cal, and administrative activities of the kings, the question of feudal-
ism, and military history. Normally ecclesiastical history is also
included so that the famous triad of castles, knights, and monks tends
to dominate our conception of the Conquest. This is, of course, inevi-
table because to varying degrees these were the questions which inter-
ested chroniclers or were mentioned in charters. In the case of the
North, this point of view dates back to the 1090' s when a certain Boson,
a knight of Bishop William de St. Calais, is reported to have had a
vision which could be favorably compared with the concluding paragraphs
of many modern works on the Norman Conquest. Boson had the privilege of
witnessing through a vision a supernatural slide-show which revealed
that the significance of the Norman Conquest of the North lay in the
replacement of Northumbrian spearmen on fat horses by armored knights
riding chargers, the substitution of monks for married priests, and the
building of the castle and cathedral at Durham.^^ One might add on the
basis of this research that Boson should also have seen peasants labor-
ing under a more intensive manorial regime to support all this, but his
picture is still strikingly modern. Unfortunately, however, such a
point of view cannot explain why the Normans failed to pass beyond Dur-
ham until late in the life of this perceptive knight because the reason
lies in the mundane. IVelfth-century writers usually took this realm
for granted, and modern accounts of the Normans either ignore the day to
day reality of their lives and in particular the fact that they func-
tioned in terms of an agricultural society or relegate this subject to
generalized discussions of manners and morals or to abstract Domesday
studies. This is unfortunate because the Norman settlement of the North
was a colonizing process; and, as in most such ventures, mundane consid-
erations played an important role in determining its course and scope.
This question has been deferred until now despite its relevance
between 1070 and 1100 because the most important clue to its solution
comes from an obscure corner of Scotland during the reign of King Davidu
As observed earlier, he was responsible for bringing Normans into Scot-
land, but very little evidence on" this subject has survived. To a
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remarkable degree the history of this event is based upon deduct:
fro^ a limited group of charters. In terms of twelfth-century Scottish
history this small body of evidence is regrettable, but in a roundabout
way it is favorable to the present investigation because in Scotland
peripheral information concerning the Normans, which in England receives
little emphasis, stands out clearly. Specifically, settlement patterns
seem to have existed among the Normans who took land in Scotland, and
this phenomenon is most striking in the Southwest. The men whom David
planted around the Galwegian border formed a very interesting group.
Their inflefment showed, in the first place, the importance of David's
possession of Northampton and his connection with Henry I for they
either held land in David's Midland honor or, as in the case of Robert
de Brus, were Henry's new men. Moreover, these men all stemmed from the
sasae region in France, Lower (western) Normandy or the borders of Brit-
tauy, Walter fitz Alan's father was from Dol, and Robert de Brus was
from Brix south of Cherbourg. Morville is near Brix, and Soules (now
Soulles) is in the vicinity of St. Lo. Robert Avenel apparently
o o
belonged to an important family of the Avranchin.
That all these men came from the same area is curious, and it might
be explained as the result of the fact that Henry I's patronage network
89had originally been based on western Normandy. But while this consid-
eration is obviously relevant, David's land grants in eastern Scotland
shcaw that it was not the only factor involved. The Normans to whom he
gave land in Tweeddale, Lothian, and Fife were of diverse origins. A
nuiriber of them, in fact, cannot be traced to northern France at all,
even by conjecture; and of these, William of Lamberton is perhaps the
moat remarkable for he took his „a.e from the village of La^erton near
90Berwick. Others in this group can, at least, be traced to England
although in some instances not by much. Walter de Ridale (Tweeddale)
,
for instance, was from Northumberland, and William de Sommerville (Lan-
narkshire) and Walter of Lindsey (Lothian) cannot be followed south
beyond the castlery of Pontefract and northern Lincolnshire respec-
tively. The other men in this group, Robert Corbet (Teviotdale)
,
Berenger Engaine (Teviotdale), and David Olifart, were from Northampton,
but the origins of their families beyond that point are unknown.^^ The
remaining men came from different parts of northern France. Hugh de
Morville and Robert Avenel, who both held land in western Scotland, also
got land in the east, and Simon fitz Michael (Fife) was a Breton judging
93from his name. Robert de Bourneville (Lothian) apparently came from
near Caen, and Gervais Ridel (Lothian) is said to have stemmed from
Blayne in Guienne prior to Northampton.^^ The rest came from the east.
Richard Comin (Peebleshire) is said to have been from Comines near
Lille, and Geoffrey Melville (Angus?), William Maule (Perths.) , and
Robert de Umfraville (Stirling^), the lord of Prudhoe and Redesdale in
Northumberland, all were eastern Normans. Finally, three dependents
of the Warrenes' from eastern Normandy, Alexander de Saint-Martin, Hugh
Giffard, and Bernard de Balliol, received land in Lothian after the mar-
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riage of Ada de Warenne to David's son Henry, David's Normans in
eastern Scotland formed a heterogeneous group. As in the West, the
importance of the king's connection with Northampton and with King
Henry's friends is noticeable. Yet there was no exclusive concentration
of western Normans in this part of Scotland as there was on the borders
of Galloway, and this discovery makpc; the. loi-^^^a u es e latter arrangement more suspi-
cious than it seemed in isolation.
It might be suggested, of course, that this pattern is accidental,
and it would be difficult to rule out this possibiHty on the basis of
the Scottish evidence which is rather limited with rbspect to the West.
But if the distribution of Normans in Scotland has some meaning and is
not the result of chance, one might expect to find a similar distribu-
tion in the border counties of England; and, if this question is actu-
ally pursued, significant results do emerge. Of the baronies in North-
umberland, three, Hepple, Langley, and Warkworth-Rothbury
, were estab-
lished too late to be considered here.^^ Four of the remainder, Beanly,
Dilston, Embleton, and Gosforth, were held by natives when they first
appeared, and the holders of five other early baronies, Bolam, Bothal,
and Hades tone along with Mitford and Wooler, have not been traced to
Normandy although they were apparently Normans. This group includes
men who took their names from places in England such as Aschantinus de
Worcester and Gilbert of Newcastle, and men with ambiguous names such as
the Bertrams or Robert de Muschamp. Eight men remain after these
deductions, and they were nearly balanced between eastern and western
Normans. Robert de Umfraville (Prudhoe and Redesdale) , Walter de Bolbec
(Styford), and probably Nicholas de Grenville (Ellingham) came from
eastern Norman families, and Guy de Balliol (Bywell) should be grouped
with these men although Bailleul-en-Vimeu was a few miles east of the
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Norman border. Hugh fitz Eudo, on the other hand, stemmed from west
central Normandy, if he really was the son of Eudo de Ria, and there
were two men, Walter Espec (Wark) and Eustace fitz John (Alnwick) whose
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families came from the West.^OO Finally, Herbert de la Val may have
been from the West, although this is by no means certa^.^^^ From the
standpoint of their origins, the Northumbrian barons establish that the
group of men who received land from David in eastern Scotland were not
unusual. The landholders between the Tyne and the Tweed were drawn from
families of both Upper and Lower Normandy with the former in a slight
majority, and they included in their number a substantial group of men
who cannot be traced to Normandy
o
If one turns to Cumberland, however, quite different results emerge
which have a direct bearing on David's western Normans, and this infor-
mation is of critical importance because it shows that the Northumbrian
and eastern Scottish evidence cannot be taken as revealing the composi-
tion of a "normal" Norman landholding class in this part of Britain.
The tenurial structure of Cumberland was the work of Ranulf Meschin and,
after 1120, of Henry I; and they enfiefed a very interesting group of
men. Seven of the men who received land were natives, which, given the
size of the area, was a rather sizable group; and four of the Frenchmen
102cannot be traced to northern France. These men were rather different
from their eastern peers such as Gilbert de Newcastle or David's North-
amptonshire men because in three of the cases, Guy the Hunter, Richard
Redere, and Walter the Chaplain, their obscurity stems from their own
lack of status rather than from their possession of an English place-
name. Furthermore, the fourth man, Thurstan de Reigny, was clearly
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French even though he has not been traced. None of these men has
been shown to have come into Cumberland as the result of secondary immi-
gration, such as certainly took place on the east coast. This is
curious, but the really important point is that there were no Normans at
all from Upper Normandy in Cumberland. Ranulf himself was the heredi-
tary vicomte of the Bessin, and six of the seven men who received land
from him and Henry I were from Lower Normandy and Brittany ^^^^ The only
exception to this was a solitary Fleming, Turgis Brundis, the lord of
Liddel.lO^ Furthermore, this same pattern is discernible just south of
Cumberland. Burton in Lonsdale and Kendale were apparently held succes-
sively by Ivo Taillebois from west-central Normandy and by Nigel
d'Aubigny from western Normandy, and the tenurial history of Skipton in
the Aire gap is similar. Its first lord was Robert de Rumilly who
came from Remilly in Lower Normandy, and its second holder was William
Meschin, lord of Allerdale above Derwent and the brother of Ranulf
Meschinc-'-^'' In Lancashire above the Ribble where most of the country-
side was taken up by honorial demesne manors, thanages, and serjeanties,
the only important lordship was the fee of Lancaster whose first holder,
a certain Gilbert, seems to have been a retainer of William Meschin, and
the only identifiable landholder in Furness during the reign of Henry I
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was Michael le Fleming. The concentration of western Normans in
Scottish Cumbria was not an anomaly. English Cumbria and the region
just to the south were also settled by men from Lower Normandy and Brit-
tany; and the two Flemings, who might be taken as exceptions to this
pattern, have their parallel in Scotland for either King David or his
successor, Malcolm the Maiden, settled a Flemish colony along the head-
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waters of the Clyde above Lanark.
The combination of evidence from the northern counties of England
and from southern Scotland establishes that there was an east-west split
in the settlement of Norn^ns within the region during the reign of Henry
I and David. The lands of the old kingdom of Strathclyde or Cumbria (in
its widest sense) were settled by men from Lower Normandy and Brittany
with some Flemingso Along the east coast plain, on the other hand, a
composite nobility was established which included men from all the for-
mer areas, men whose families can only be traced to southern England,
and Normans from Upper Normandy who probably formed the predominant fac-
tion. Furthermore, the nobility which William the Conqueror installed
in Yorkshire was similar in its composition to the later nobility of
Northumbria and Lothian.^^° This settlement pattern, which appears to
be without exception, is so clear-cut that it must reflect the operation
of some selective factor, and since this distribution of Normans ignores
national boundaries and is not explicable in terms of Henry I's patron-
age, this factor must have been exercised by the Normans themselves who
settled in the region. Indeed, in this selective factor lies the link
between the mundane and the coming of the Normans into the Far North.
At first sight the bizarre arrangement of Normans in the North may
seem to correspond with nothing more significant than the boundaries of
the old kingdom of Strathclyde in the days of its greatest power or, to
the nonromantic, with a north-south line from the headwaters of the Kib-
ble to the Scottish Highlands, but this distribution does have a meaning.
It corresponds with a basic agricultural division of the North which was
reflected in a number of differences between the agricultural systems of
the east coast plain and the West. The characteristics of these regions
were probably complex even in the early twelfth century. They certainly
were later, but for the moment they will be discussed in terms of the
distinction which in the first instance was of ::K,st significance to the
Normans. This was the question of northern cereal production. From
this standpoint, the North was transected by the oat bread line. This
term is entirely a matter of convenience and was chosen in memory of
Samuel Johnson who was of the opinion that oats were only eaten by
horses and Scots. The line itself defined that part of the North in
which spring crops (oats and barley) were predominant over winter cere-
als (wheat and rye), and it was not absolute in the sense that there
were no exceptions to its sway. Nevertheless, it was a fundamencal
division of northern farming, and it can be seen most clearly in the mid
eighteenth century just before the advent of modern transport and the
industrial revolution severed diet from the confines of regional agri-
culture. In the 1760»s Arthur Young, that great apostle of agricultural
improvement, toured the North; and, as was his custom, he wrote an
account of his journey from which it is possible to reconstruct a rough
map of the bread types of the North during this period. ''^ This infor-
mation should not be understood as necessarily applying to the "better"
people on the wrong side of the oat bread line for they belonged in
terms of food to a wider world, nor does it correspond completely with
what was being grown in that "superior" grains which did not appear in
the bread were sometimes grown locally. But the bread types do reveal
the cheap local grains, those grains which did best in the neighborhood.
Such a map is highly instructive. It shows that the consumption of
wheat bread was largely restricted to the southern part of the east
coast plain. North of the Vale of York in Durham and southern Northum-
berland, rye became an important bread grain in the local diet although
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wheat was also used; and from Morpeth on the Wansbeck north, wheat and
rye were both replaced by bread made from a combination of barley and
peas. As mxght be expected so close to Scotland, oatmeal in the form
of porridge also occupied an important place in the Northumbrian diet.^^"^
The really surprising point, however, is that reliance on spring crops
was not confined to northern Northumberland. In the eastern flanks of
the Pennines in Yorkshire oatmeal seems to have been the primary bread
grain, and spring cereals were unrivaled in the West.^^^ In lowland
Cumberland the local bread was made from oats and barley with some rye,
and in Westmorland and Lancashire oat bread or oatcakes (clap bread) was
the common bread. The same was true, of course, in southwestern
Scotland, and the English oat bread area apparently ended in Cheshire,
although there was another zone of barley bread running down towards
Newcastle-under-Lyme west of the Pennines. "^'^ Arthur Young's journals
show that the North was divided by a line which ran from the Wansbeck
south through the hills into the West Riding, and to the north and west
of this line the usual bread grains were oats and barley. This distri-
bution of bread types is quite significant; and it can be confirmed by
the Board of Agriculture reports of the early nineteenth century which
show Northumberland divided between a northern area of barley-peas bread
and a southern rye area and the West still in general confirmed in its
taste for oat bread.
The oat bread line had probably cut across the North since prehis-
toric times. This is not to say that the situation in the mid eigh-
teenth century can be carried backwards without alteration, of course.
The exact location of the line had undoubtedly shifted from time to time
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with fluctuations in the cUmate, developments in agricultural practice,
and changes in taste. Such minor alterations are shown by the fact that
in 1698 Celia Fiennes, another journal-writing traveler, did not encoun-
ter clap bread until she had penetrated Amounderness as far as Garstang
or by the probability that northern Lancashire was in an area of barley
bread in the sixteenth century. There were also favored areas beyond
the line in the East where wheat could be grown in the Middle Ages, and
from the late sixteenth century spring wheat was occasionally grown in
the West.^^° Furthermore, it is clear that winter wheat was grown on a
limited basis in Lancashire before this.^^^ But these are the excep-
tions which are inevitable in agriculture. F. J. Singleton has col-
lected evidence which illustrates the reliance of the agricultural sys-
tem in Lancashire on spring crops, principally on oats, from the eigh-
teenth back to the thirteenth century, and he has shown that the struc-
ture of the field system there was based on their growth. "''^^
Singleton's research, in fact, supplies a surprisingly direct link
between conditions in Arthur Young's time and those of the High Middle
Ages; and to a certain extent, the same correspondence can be found in
the East. A portion of the Lay Subsidy Roll for 25 Edward I dealing
with the West Riding has survived, and it discloses in enough detail
what crops were being grown in the countryside south of the Aire and to
a lesser extent around Ripon to make possible the construction of a crop
123
sequence map (see Map 9 ) . This map reveals that the cultivation of
wheat was limited to the lower parts of the area, generally to land
below 250 feet and to the valley floor of the Calder. On either side of
the zone in which wheat was grown, there were belts of villages in which
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Map 9. Crop Sequences in the West Riding in 129 7
rye took the place of wheat; and finally, on the higher ground towards
the west there were a number of vills where only oats were grown. This
is remarkable proof of the age of the distribution of bread types as
they were revealed in the eighteenth century, and it is probably a cor-
rect assumption that in the thirteenth century, the oat bread line con-
tinued on to the north through the edge of the Pennines just as it did
later. To the east of the line there is, of course, little need to
establish the importance of wheat and rye. The Lay Subsidy shows their
cultivation in the late thirteenth century, and they are accounted for
in the pipe rolls of Henry III and John.^^^ In Durham where the growxng
of wheat cannot, perhaps, be assumed so lightly, it is known that the
episcopal demesne manors yielded 2 ,065* quarters of wheat and 5 , 236* quar-
ters of oats in 1211, and Boldon Book shows that wheat was produced on
125these manors in the 1180* s. Finally, the oldest fairly general evi-
dence which throws any light on this question, Henry II 's pipe roll for
1172, apparently reflects the oat bread line. In that year the king
sent 200 skeps of wheat and 100 skeps of oats to Ireland from Yorkshire.
From Northumberland, however, he could only dispatch 300 loads of oats
1 OA
and from Cumberland, 200 loads of oats.
This does not necessarily mean that no wheat was grown in Northum-
berland and Cumberland in 1172, but it is good evidence that there was
no surplus of this grain which could be sent out of these shires. And
this should not be particularly surprising. Both areas were beyond the
"economic" or large—scale limit of wheat cultivation as defined by Ho
Dudley Stamp. According to Stamp, these limits are the 60-degree iso-
127
therm for July in the north and the 30-inch rainfall line in the west.
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Currently Durham and Lancashire are on the edge of the area marked off
by these criteria. The 60-degree isotherm runs in a southwest tending
arc through northern Yorkshire, and the 30-inch rainfall line stretch
north-south across the eastern slopes of the Pemines. Lowland York-
shire is mostly within these limits, and eastern Durham is just on th
other side of the line in terms of temperature but not from the stand-
point of moisture. Much of the Pennines are excluded on either ground.
In the West, Lancashire and Westmorland are mostly below the 60-degree
isotherm for July but only barely, and all of the area, especially to
the east and northeast, receives more than 30 inches of precipitation
T 128yearly.
There is a remarkable correspondence between Stamp's criteria for
wheat cultivation and the historical oat bread line, and this is quite
understandable. Wheat can be grown, to be sure, north of Stamp's Jim-
its, but it becomes an undependable crop liable to an alternation of
good yields and poor except in a few favored spots which lie mainly on
129the very eastern margins of Scotland. It is this problem of depend-
ability—or "economic" production—which is the basis for the similarity
of the eighteenth-cenf'^y bread types and the crop distributions in the
Middle Ages. The common local breads of the 1760' s were the cheap
breads made from grain which grew well under local conditions. These
were not necessarily the only crops which could be grown in the neigh-
borhood if one were prepared to take risks; and, of course, it was
exactly "risks" which the medieval peasant could not afford to take.
For him, crop failures meant ruin and starvation. The northern peasant
had to grow crops which could be expected to do well year after year,
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#nd this necessity produced the crop sequences which have b
tered. Rye^ endure the cold better than wheat. Barley can be grown
further north than rye, and oats will withstand ^re n>oisture than
^ther barley or rye.^^O p,,,^^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^.^^^^^ ^^^^
northern peasant's criteria for growing wheat prior to 1066 were clos
to Stamps
s theoretical requirements than to either the eighteenth-
century distribution of bread types or the situation which existed in the
twelfth century. Despite the general similarity of shire custom through-
put the North, there were some important differences between its demands
in Yorkshire and Northumbria which seem to reflect the pre-Norman oat
bread line. In Yorkshire, for example, the old grain renders of the
shire—in so far as their composition can be reconstructed—apparently
were made up of oats and corn, presumably either rye or wheat. Above
the Tees, on the other hand, these renders consisted of oats and bcrley
either in their raw state or as malt and meal, and it is probably a fair
inference from this that the Northumbrian peasants did not normally grow
wheat for had they done so, these grains almost certainly would have
132been Included in their dues. The number of boon-plowings required of
peasants each year poi s in the same direction. In Yorkshire peasants
usually had to do two free days of plowing a year, one in the fall and
133
another in the springe In Northumberland, however, they did one
plowing a year at oat seed time, and in Durham the oldest tradition
134
required plowing only once a year. Both Northumbrian grain renders
and boon-plowings indicate that the oat bread line had run somewhere
through southern Durham or northern Yorkshire during Anglo-Saxon times,
and there is evidence that it had at least one outlier in Yorkshire. In
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the reign of Him^ the Conqueror, Holdemess Is said to have yielded
nothing but oats.^^^
The question of the oat bread Une is inrportant for understanding
the Norman Conquest of the North for the simplest reason: The Normans
came to England for land-but not just for any land. This is what we
forget as members of an industrialized society which is separated from
the countryside by supermarkets and a commercial system of food distri-
bution which blurs regional differences. In the eleventh and twelfth
centuries such differences determined what most men ate, and this was of
direct concern to nobles because they had specific expectations with
respect to food. Nobility was expressed and enjoyed in a standard of
living, and despite the fact that this aspect of noble status if often
lost sight of in favor of other questions such as lordship or judicial
privileges, in the settlement of new lands it was a matter of the first
136importance. A noble standard of living was both a question of taste
and a matter of status; and, as it always is with status, there were
requirements. For one thing, wine was important. R. Dion has shown
that good wine was an important symbol of nobility and that the neces-
sity of serving wine to one's guests and dependents led to the extension
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of viniculture in France. The consumption of venison which had been
killed by one's own hand was probably another such symbol, and the right
kind of bread certainly was.
For the French nobility in general this meant bread made from wheat
1 TO
(frumentum) , and the Normans were no exception to this rule. It is,
in fact, doubtful whether they ate any other type of bread or, at least,
thought that they should. In the lists of provisions for royal castles
wheat and wine occupied the place of honor, and when Richard fitz Nigel
wrote his account of how the old royal farm had come to be paid in money
rather than in produce, he assumed that the only bread grain which it
had yielded had been wheat. The assumption is, of course, question-
able, but it did reflect Norman feeling on what the farm should have
provided. In the early Norman maintenance allotments bread made from
wheat occupied a dominant position, and the meaning of such allotments
in Norman society stands out clearly in the rules which governed the
royal court under Henry I.^^° At court, all bread was made from wheat.
In Henry »s reign a bushel of wheat, or as the Normans called it, "a
bushel of Rouen," yielded three grades of bread. In order of descending
fineness one could obtain from each bushel 40 lord's simnel loaves, 140
salted simnel loaves, and 260 ordinary loaves, and the type of bread
which members of the royal court received each day depended upon their
,
141 ^rank. The chancellor, for example, was given "1 lord's simnel loaf,
and 2 salted simnel loaves, and 1 sextary of clear wine, and 1 sextary
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of ordinary wine." The steward, however, obtained only "2 salted
simnel loaves, and 1 sextary of ordinary wine," and the various service
personnel of the court were given something called "customary food"
which presumably consisted of ordinary loaves and ordinary wine.
With the companaticum (side dishes of meat, poultry, and fish), these
allotments constituted the diet of the nobles at the court, and they
illustrate two very important points concerning the Norman nobility.
First, despite their wealth, bread was the primary item in their daily
diet; and second, the quality of one's bread was a symbol of personal
status.
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Ihere was a direct connection between this aspect of nobility and
regional agriculture. Indeed, this was the basis for the settlement
patterns which were discovered in the North. William the Conqueror's
followers hoped to be rewarded with land, but land which did not grow
wheat, and particularly land where wheat could not be grown was of lit-
tle use to them. Such acres would not make them greater nobles. In
southern and central England this was not, of course, a serious problem
because within these areas the land and its produce met the expectations
of the Normans, but in other parts of the British Isles this was not
necessarily the case. To illustrate this point in general, one need
only recall Gerald of Wales' description of Ireland:
The land is fruitful and rich in its fertile soil and plenti-ful harvests. Crops abound in the fields and flocks on the moun-tains.
... The island is, however, richer in pastures than in
crops, and in grass rather than grain. The crons give great prom-ise m the Dlade, even more in the straw, but less in the ear. Forhere the grains of wheat are shrivelled and small, and can scarcelybe separated from the chaff by any winnowing fan. The plains are
well clothed with grass.
. . . Only the granaries are without
wealth. What is bom and comes forth in the spring and is nour-ished in the summer ... can scarcely be reaDed in the harvest
because of unceasing rain.^^^
In other words, Ireland was a pleasing land except for the fact that
wheat did poorly there, and this single consideration clouded Gerald's
view of the island.
It might be objected, of course, that Gerald was the spokesman for
a later generation of Normans and that such considerations did not
restrain the Conqueror's rude barons, but in the north there is evidence
which shows that this was a matter of fundamental importance from the
beginning. The Norman settlement of the North cannot be explained with-
out reference to the question of what kind of land the Normans wanted.
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In tarns of literary evidence, this point is made explicitly in a story
concerning Odo of Champagne, the third husband of William the Conqueror's
sister Adelaide. William apparently gave him Holderness which had been
forfeited by Drogo, its first holder, late in the Conqueror's reign.
Shortly afterwards, however, Odo and Adelaide had a son, and Odo was soon
petitioning the Conqueror for more land„ According to the story, his
reason was very simple. Odo disliked Holderness because it produced
nothing but oats, and he wanted some wheat bearing land so that he could
feed the child. William is said to have agreed to the request. This
story is admittedly late, but it probably represents an authentic family
tradition of the lords of Holderness who were descended from Odoo^^^ And
even if Odo's reputed aversion to feeding his son oatcakes is not histor-
ical, there is other evidence which shows that the attitude itself did
exist among the Norman nobles who settled above the Humber and that it
restricted their settlement.
The clearest proof of this comes from Ilbert de Lacy's castlery of
Pontefract in the West Riding. It constituted a nearly solid block of
territory which stretched from the fens west of the Ouse up into the Pen-
nines; and due to uniq"-^ circumstances, the actual distribution of Norman
settlement within his fee stands out clearly. First of all, Domesday
consistently names the Anglo-Saxon undertenants who held of Ilbert,
information not usually available elsewhere, and second, Pontefract lay
just to the north and at some points inside the area covered by the late
146thirteenth-century crop sequence. This conjunction makes it possible
to compare the latter with the populated estates belonging to Ilbert, and
such a comparison reveals an important phenomenono In 1086, Ilbert 's
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Map 10. The populated estates of Ilbert de Lacy
Norman undertenants only held manors in the central part of the castlery,
almost exclusively on land below 250 feet, and their manors corresponded
closely with the area within which wheat was grown at the time of the
crop sequence. On either side of this central block of estates, the
villages were either held by natives, or they were held directly by
Ilbert and contained no demesne land. These peripheral strips corre-
sponded generally with the areas in which rye and oats were later grown.
What had happened is clear. Ilbert and his vassals had only taken
direct possession of that part of the castlery in which wheat either was
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being grown or could be grown, and they had left the less desirable land
to Anglo-Saxons
.
Within the castlery of Pontefract, Norman settlement did not cross
the oat bread line during the reign of William the Conqueror because the
land to the west was unattractive and valueless to Ilbert's men, and the
same was true all along the eastern flanks of the Pennines in Yorkshire,
although in most other areas it is impossible to tell whether there was
a band of Anglo-Saxon lords to the west of the Normans as there was in
147
Ilbert's fee. Probably this was a common phenomenon, however, for
some signs of a similar pattern can be found in William de Percy's
estates south of Ripon and in Richmond, and an arrangement of almost
exactly the same type is visible in the description of Henry de Ferrers'
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estates in Derbyshire (see Map 11) . Despite the clarity of this pat-
tern, it does not represent the only reaction of Normans to the oat
bread lineo In a sense it is an exaggerated example of what happened
for around the Pennines the Normans were faced with poor soil and rap-
idly increasing elevation which brought in its train an ever decreasing
.149
growing season and increasing ram.
Elsewhere the oat bread line did not bring Norman settlement to an
immediate stop. Roger of Poitou, for instance, is said to have disliked
Lancashire, which is understandable since it was probably an oat bread
area, but he managed to attract a few Normans into the region. ine
details of his enfiefments, however, indicate that this was a difficult
process in which he was none too successful. In 1086 Roger's Norman
tenants formed only a small group which numbered fifteen men if no two
of them had the same narae.-'"^-'' With two exceptions, they were obscure
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Map 11. Henry de Ferrers' Estates in Derbyshire
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knights of no standing, and they all settled south of the Ribble. Fur-
thermore, it is likely that most of them gave up their lands and left.-""^^
Lancashire was, in fact, so unattractive to Normans that Roger was
forced to rely heavily on natives. Nineteen natives were holding land
south of the Ribble in 1086, and there were probably others who are hid-
den by the incomplete nature of Domesday's description of Lancashire. ''"^"^
By 1094 a hybrid aristocracy unquestionably existed in this area, and
the early thirteenth-century surveys reveal that a large number of than-
ages had survived the coming of the Normans into Lancashire. These
thanes held, moreover, by fee farm, and this probably means, as Jolliffe
has suggested, that Roger of Poitou simply terminated the old renders
and works of the shire in favor of rents because the former were value-
Less to hxm.
In Lancashire Norman settlement faded out, as it were, between the
Ribble and the Mersey rather than coming to an abrupt stop as it did
around the Pennines, and something rather similar happened in Northum-
bria, Durham was probably on the very southern edge of the oat bread
area—or barley bread area—in the late eleventh century if the later
grain renders of the bondage vills accurately represent agricultural
production prior to the Conquest. Nevertheless, Nomians were estab-
lished in this area before 1100, and their settlement was apparently
made feasible by changing the manorial structure of Durham. Bishop
Walcher, it will be rememoered, was responsible for radically expanding
demesne farming in a number of St. Cuthbert's villages and for imposing
week-work on the peasants of these villages; and although this can be
explained as a straightforward act of economic exploitation, it is
in
e
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likely that it also represented an attempt by the bishop to obtain
direct control over what the peasants were growing. ''"^^ This is sug-
gested by the fact that at the time of Boldon Book, wheat production
Durham was almost entirely confined to the demesnes of those villages
which had been manorialized by Walcher. Furthermore, even at this lat
date most of the unmanorialized vills were either administered by drengs
or were farmed by their inhabitants."*^^
In general, the first wave of Norman settlement in the North went
to the oat bread line— to the limit of dependable wheat cultivation as
expressed in peasant breads. In southern Lancashire and Durham, the
Normans may actually have crossed the line somewhat, but in both of
these border areas wheat could be grown even though it had not played an
important role in peasant agriculture prior to the Conquest, Moreover,
in these areas the Normans altered the old manorial system of the North.
In Lancashire the shire system was scrapped, as it were; and in Durham
the element of demesne farming was intensified. These changes, although
different in their specifics, both represented attempts to improve local
traditions of peasant agriculture which were unacceptable to the Normans.
Where wheat could not be grown, the Normans did not take lands, and
this was one of the basic reasons for their weakness in the North
between 1070 and 1100. This factor kept Normans out of the free-zone
which occupied the most intractable part of the oat bread area, and it
shielded northern Lancashire, the Vale of Eden, and the Cumbrian low-
lands from their settlement. Estates in these regions held little value
for Normans, and their reluctance to establish themselves on the other
side of the oat bread line was the chief reason why they had difficulty
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controlling the free- zone. During the reigns of William the Conqueror
and William Rufus, the southern free-zone was contained by castleries,
but it was not occupied. In Yorkshire where the east coast plain could
support a numerous baronage, this policy had some success, and in Durham
which was fairly well protected against raids from the West by the mass
of the northern Pennines, it also worked. Yet beyond these limits, Nor-
man power remained tenuous until after 1100. Rufus was unable to con-
solidate his hold of Carlisle by the establishment of a local baronage,
and this failure combined with the inability of the Normans to penetrate
the free-zone restricted Norman, settlement in Northumberland.
There was land above the Tyne which was worth having from the point
of view of the Normans. Wheat can be grown as an aristocratic crop
north of Durham, especially in the Merse, Lothian, and the coastal
fringe of southeastern Scotland proper. "'"^^ The only difficulty with its
cultivation in the dry parts of this region is the danger of occasional
failures, a threat which kept peasants from growing it but which did not
restrain nobles if they were sufficiently determined. This the Normans
were; and there was, therefore, no insurmountable barrier in terms of
wheat to Norman settle*^-^nt above the Tyne. One simply had to be pre-
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pared to pay a very high price for it in certain years. Of course,
in realistic terms this consideration may not have been too important.
As it existed, peasant agriculture undoubtedly produced unappealing
crops; and, given the preponderance of renders in kind over labor dues
in Northumbria, the introduction of the cultivation of wheat would have
been difficult unless one were prepared to follow Walcher's example.
This consideration notwithstanding, the real bar to Norman settlement in
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Northmnbria was the insecurity of the east coast plain vis-a-vis the
free-zone. Above the Tyne this plain becomes progressively narrower and
more exposed. It is backed by the hills of the northern free-zone all
the way to Tweeddale, and beyond this break, the coastal plain of
Lothian is similarly confined by the eastern extension of the southern
highlands. In agricultural terms—and these were the terms which inter-
ested the Normans— the Far North consisted of this restricted plain, and
as long as the northern free-zone and the West were unsubdued, the agri-
cultural communities of the coastal plain were of little value. Indeed,
if one is to believe some of the miracles attributed to St. Oswin of
Tynemouth, the countryside of southern Northumberland was so poor in the
late eleventh century that Norman armies could not feed themselves
there, and this was apparently true not only of southern Northumberland
159but of Lothian and Tweeddale as well. King £dgar is known to have
given away two deserted villages in the latter area and to have extended
material aid to the recipients for their redevelopment, terms which
strongly suggest a small and inqsoverished population in the general
area. In addition to this, several of the Anglo-Saxon and Norman expe-
ditions against Scotla^'^ in the eleventh century were accompanied by
fleets whose purpose was presumably to carry supplies. '''^^ This was cer-
tainly the case in 1091. When Rufus lost his grain fleet in that year,
a number of his knights and horses died of hunger in Lothian or Northum-
V 1 161herland.
During the reign of Henry I this problem was solved—or at least
greatly reduced. He and King David installed a Norman aristocracy in
Cumberland and eastern Galloway who began the work of establishing law
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and order on the local level and sealing in the Galwegians. In terms of
the previous discussion of the Norman preference for wheat producing
land, this extension of Norman settlement may sean mysterious, if not
contradictory; but in fact there was a simple explanation for why Henry
and David could achieve what had escaped William the Conqueror and Rufus.
On a practical level the nobility of northern France was not entirely
homogeneous in its criteria for land. There are signs that this was the
case among the men who took land along the northern fringe of the king-
dom during the reign of the Conqueror, and it was within this context
that Henry I and his new men had special significance for the North.
There had been a political split in the Norman Bofaility in the reign of
William the Conqueror, at least in the sense that the nobility of Lower
Normandy had not benefited from the distribution of English lands to the
same extent as the nobles of Upper Normandy; and presumably it was this
which led Henry to cultivate men from the former area in the days before
16 2
he became king. In Lower Normandy there was disaffection which he
could turn to his own advantage. Once he was king, the fact that his
political debts and his patronage network were based on this area had
important consequences for the North because western Normans and their
neighbors in Brittany had wider standards with respect to land than did
the great men of the east. It was not a matter of their not sharing the
same concepts of nobility. They too valued wheat highly as an article
of food and as a symbol of their status. Their numerous grants of
yearly gifts of wheat to the monasteries of the area prove this conclu-
sively, but they also illustrate another point. These gifts, examples
of wheat being used as money, and tenures based on the yearly payment of
365
a stated quantity of wheat show that while this grain was highly prized,
163it was also rare. Indeed, there is literary evidence to this effect.
Prior to the Conquest, the bishopric of Coutances was so poor that Bis-
hop Geoffrey's household had to subsist on black bread, and this was not
due sin5)ly to an absence of estates. In terms of cereal production,
much of Lower Normandy and the adjacent section of Brittany was poor
land, and the common bread grains were rye and oats. Because of
their poverty, nobles from this region were more flexible than nobles
from Upper Normandy. They would take land which would not grow wheat.
Furthermore, it is likely that ssany nobles from the region were
anxious to obtain estates elsewhere and that they knew the value of land
in the oat bread area. In a general sense, the Breton massif and its
eastern extension, the lands which later bore the Norman bocage, were
poor lands. They are wet, and the soil is generally acid, leached, and
infertile."^^^ It would seem, in fact, that they were so poor in places
that their agricultural system would not support all the local nobles.
During this period many Bretons becaiae mercenary soldiers because of the
poverty of western Brittany; and according to Orderic Vi talis, Robert
Guiscard and his followers left the Cotentin for the same reason. "^^^ In
many instances, then, it is likely that western Normans and Bretons had
compelling reason to leave home, and they were probably peculiarly fit-
ted, moreover, to deal with the oat bread area. In his account of
William the Conqueror's early invasion of Brittany, William de Poitiers
says that the Bretons normally ate little bread and that they relied
principally for their livelihood on their herds and flocks rather than
upon agriculture. Furthermore, William had to withdraw from Brittany on
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this occasion because he could not find enough wheat to feed his army.""-^^
These were, of course, conditions reminiscent of the North, and to a
lesser degree they applied to western Normandy. Both the higher parts
of Brittany and the Norman bocage were areas of infield-outfield farm-
ing. Peasant labor dues were light, and livestock raising was very
. 169important. These were conditions which were very similar to those
found in northwestern England and western Scotland, and the fact that
Henry's new men were familiar with such an agricultural system, at least
in principle, meant that they could utilize land worthless to an eastern
Noman.
The relevance of this is obvious. Henry's new men would take land
which the first generation of Norman nobles had despised. This is the
meaning of the fact that no eastern Normans settled in Cumberland and
western Scotland, What the Lower Normans and Bretons would not take
could be given to Flemings who were accustomed to rye and oat bread and
who were concerned, in any case, with raising sheep The residue, in
northern England at least, went to Henry's Anglo-Saxons. Thus one
returns in the end to the original point, although with more precision.
Peace with Scotland and the establishment of a French aristocracy above
Durham and Lancashire were a direct result of Henry's politics. For his
own reasons, he brought to England a group of men who were able to
breach the oat bread line. Norman settlement of the east coast plain
from the Tyne to the Forth followed.
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CONCLUSION
By 1135, the year of Henry I's death, the great theme which has
united this study, that is, the destruction of northern society and its
rebuilding, was complete in its essentials. There were, of course,
unfinished tasks, but in most respects the North of the High Middle Ages
had come into existence by this date. The region's old problems had
been largely solved, and the northern barons faced new difficulties such
as the Galwegians' reaction to the intensification of Lowland culture
which the Norman settlement represented or the question of the political
relationship between Norman Scotland and Norman England. We have, in
fact, reached a familiar world, a world whose birth has been dated too
early, misunderstood, or simply taken blithely for granted because of
the way in which eleventh and twelfth-century English history has been
written.
Court-centered history is not an adequate medium for recovering the
past, even in England. When written from a regional point of view, the
history of the North between 1000 and 1135 assumes a different shape
than that found in accounts which inexorably advance reign by reign
with
the deeds and worries ol a southern king as their focus.
The findings
of this study show that the latter approach has obscured
the nature and
continuity of the North's problems, distorted the accomplishments
of
several kings, and even failed to notice a number of
important develop-
ments in northern history. In particular, the
prominence normally
accorded the Norman Conquest, that great child of
court history follow-
ing its inherent trend towards biography, needs
to be modified and the
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concept itself expanded as it concerns the North. The idea that the
Conquest was a primary causative factor which had completed its work by
1070 has artificially severed the post 1066 history of the North from
what went before and beclouded the history of the Norman settlement of
the North. To reduce the matter to basics, the idea that the northern
thanes resisted the Conquest because it was a conquest being carried out
by Normans, and the assumption that once the former were crushed in the
reprehensible but effective harrying Norman settlement immediately fol-
lowed, are false. Before 1066 the North had, in fact, been changing in
the direction it later followed. After that date it was a number of
years before the old northern world passed away entirely, William the
Conqueror notwithstanding, and many more before Norman power was firmly
established throughout the North.
During the first eighty years covered by this study, northern
political history was dominated by a clash between the regional nobility
and the kings. In the most general terms, this conflict was the result
of the kings' attempts to govern the North and the northerners' progres-
sively more desperate efforts to resist the king or his agents. There
was little real correspondence between the self-interest of the two par-
ties. The North was poor, politically and fiscally privileged, and in
need of defense. It was also, however, remote from the Anglo-Saxon
kings* center of power and interest, and they were concerned with it
only as a source of danger to their authority or as a means of
maintain-
ing the equilibrium of the kingdom's political system. Between 1000
and
1066 the North was ruled by setting the northerners against
each other
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and by unpopular earls whose power was bolstered by the earldom of North-
amp ton.
By the fall of 1066, the opposition which such measures had aroused
above the Humber had become so powerful that the bond between the north-
ern nobility and the king had nearly dissolved, and this is of great
importance in understanding the course of the Conquest. The northerners
had no way of knowing that William the Bastard and his mercenaries repre-
sented the wave of the future, and they reacted to him not as a new phe-
nomenon that had radically altered the political order but rather in
accordance with the lessons of their past. Every king since 1000 had
oppressed either Northumbria or York. Ethelred had controlled the Danes
of York with the Northumbrians. Cnut had reversed the relationship, and
Edward the Confessor had governed the North through Siward who had been
unpopular in Northumbria and through Tostig whose rule had provoked the
great northern revolt of 1065. With these precedents, the northern
thanes had every reason to expect the worst from William simply because
he was king; and he, unfortunately, lived up to their fears. His
appointments, gelds, and confiscations were reminiscent of Tostig's rule
and clear evidence that he would ignore the traditional ruling families
of the North and trample on the area's privileges. When combined with
his castles, these measures provoked the revolts of 1067, 1068, and
1069. In these insurrections, the northerners employed the tactics
which had worked for them in the past: surprise attacks aimed at
destroying the agents of southern government. Northern resistance
to
the Conquest was an extension of the regional nobility's
pre-Conquest
resistance to the king, and its object was to reject William's authority.
383
not to undo the Conquest. William, however, did not understand this;
and when the northern revolt merged with the Danish invasion in the fall
of 1069, he destroyed the immediate threat to his power which the latter
represented and solved the old problem of resentment in Yorkshire to
West Saxon rule by the harrying. Despite the prominence of this event
in most accounts of the Conquest, however, it did not give the Normans
control of the North. Rather, it activated the free-zone which made the
redevelopment of Yorkshire a slow process, and this in turn was a seri-
ous barrier to the extension of Norman power beyond York. For ten years
the Conqueror was forced to govern Northumbria through a succession of
natives, and this policy had little success because the nobles above the
Tees had not been cowed by the harrying. True to their past, they
answered new Norman outrages by revolts in 1074-75 and 1080, and the
last of these led William to destroy the Northumbrian nobility.
In a political sense, this was the end of the Norman Conquest of
the North. It was also the last episode in a conflict which stretched
back to the early eleventh century and perhaps into earlier times, but
a conception of the Conquest which turns on the elimination of the old
nobility between the Humber and the Tweed is incomplete. Until after
1100, Norman power in the North was weak because the Normans did
not
immediately spread to the old limits of the Anglo-Saxon kingdom or into
the Northwest. The establishment of the new territorial
aristocracy was
not the substitution of one group of nobles for another. It
was in
reality a colonization with two stages; and during the first
of these,
the expectations of William's followers determined the
scope and nature
of the Conquest quite as much as their king's
victories. The Norman
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nobles wished to transplant their culture to England, and in an impor-
tant respect they were unable to do this in parts of the North. In
their culture bread made from wheat was a primary sign of nobility, and
the corollary of this was that land which would not grow wheat was lit-
tle esteemed. Of course, in the North wheat either would not grow or
did poorly in several areas, and this directly limited the extent of
Norman settlement. William's men took estates in Yorkshire, Durham, and
southern Lancashire. Moreover, in the first two of these shires, they
exploited the desperate conditions produced by the harrying to impose on
the peasants a more rigorous nanorial regime than the one in force
before 1066, and at least in part their objective was to establish a
system which would give them control over what the peasants planted.
Where wheat could not be growa, the Normans did not settle. This
explains why William I and William II had to contain the free-zone
rather than conquer it, and why Cumberland and Northumberland remained
without territorial aristocracies after 1092 and 1080 respectively. The
first was on the wrong side of the oat bread line, and the second was
too vulnerable to depredations from the West to be worth settling.
Finally, the fact that the border counties were unoccupied was one of
the principal factors which forced the Conqueror and Rufus to deal
with
the Scots by means of diplomacy and intervention in their
internal
affairs.
Between 1070 and 1100, the Norman Conquest of the North
was impeded
by the culture of the barons of Upper Normandy,
who were the most
trusted and rewarded of the Conqueror's followers,
and this barrier was
not removed until a shift in Norman politics
occurred. When settlement
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pushed forward after ca, 1106, it encompassed the border counties and
southern Scotland as well because these areas could best be occupied
together. That this was accomplished was the Normans' most important
contribution to the North. For political reasons King Henry brought to
England a group of western Normans and Bretons who were willing to take
lands on the other side of the oat bread line, and he established these
men in northwestern England and through Earl David in Galloway. Their
settlement shielded the East from the Galwegians and closed the routes
through the hills; and once this was done, Norman nobles pushed up the
east coast plain from the Tyne to the Forth and even into Fife.
As a concept the Norman Conquest usually consists of two parts, the
establishment of effective Norman power and a radical break with the
past or a turning point; and in terms of these criteria, the movement
which brought Normans to the Tweed and beyond marked the true end of the
Conquest of the North. This colonization fundamentally altered the
region. In a negative sense, the problems which would complicate the
future stemmed directly from the nature of the second stage of settle-
ment. In the West this was not a spontaneous migration. It was the
establishment of a specific group of men. King Henry's supporters, and
they were only numerous enough to contain the Galwegians, not to
conquer
all Galloway. This was a serious shortcoming because the
Galwegians
reacted to foreign penetration of their land in a violent
fashion.
Before 1135 southwestern Scotland became the seat of an
anti-dynastic
and—given the nature of David's rule~anti-foreign revolt which
was the
harbinger of several later revolts, and during the
invasions of Stephen's
reign, the Galwegians came out of the hills to
torture and kill the
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Lowlanders of the North whose increasing strength threatened their
world.''" Furthermore, the willingness of Henry's followers to take land
in the West was largely a function of their poverty, and there is one
piece of evidence which shows that they did not automatically pass on
2
their taste for the West to their wealthier descendants. Throughout
the rest of the century, in fact, the marcher lords of Galloway had to
be continuously replenished by newcomers. Finally, for the next two
centuries Anglo-Scottish relations would be bedeviled by the fact that
3
the border divided a single nobility.
These problems notwithstanding, however, it is difficult to exag-
gerate the positive results of the second stage of colonization. Had
isolated Norman barons pioneered in Northumberland and Lothian, they
probably could only have recreated the depressed conditions which had
existed there before 1066, but by subjugating the West, the Normans
revived a set of circumstances not seen since the years when Northum-
brian power was at its peak. The security thus gained was the basis for
the redevelopment of the old Northumbrian lands on both sides of the
border. Even before 1135, Henry's new men began to fill the North with
burghs and monasteries, and King David was engaged in the same task in
Lothian and Tweeddale. Moreover, the taming of the free-zone made it
possible for the monks and nobles to send their sheep into the hills,
a
most fortuitous circumstance given the industrial complex which
was
emerging in Flanders in this period. These developments need
to be
investigated both in the light of the reduction of the
free-zone and
from the standpoint of their function in Norman colonization
of the
North, but in general terms they clearly amounted
to nothing less than
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the successful transplanting of Norman culture to the lands between the
Htunber and the Forth.
It was in creating the peaceful conditions which made this possible
that the Normans surpassed their imnediate predecessors and even the
Romans who had not been able to master the Northwest for long, but the
triumphs of the second period of Norman colonization also have an ironic
element. The Normans did not, in fact, surpass the pre-Viking Northum-
brians. For a time they, too, had mastered both the East and part of
the West, and their culture had flowered until their kingdom was laid
in ruins by the Danes in Yorkshire and the Norwegians in the West. The
North did not recover from the effects of these depredations until
Henry's supporters breached the oat bread line, and it is here that one
encounters a curious phenomenon. Norman colonization of the North was
to some extent a reverse migration, or perhaps one should say that it
followed an old pattern. Recent research has found that Danes from
eastern England played a major role in the Scandinavian colonization of
Upper Normandy and that Norwegians from the Irish Sea littoral were dom-
inant in the settlement of Lower Normandy.^ It was the descendants of
the latter who supported Henry I against the Upper Norman establishment
and tamed the West„-,and the significance of this is not limited solely
to its irony. The repetition of this pattern suggests that the
impor-
tance of the oat bread line (or at least the cultural divisions
with
which it corresponded) was not limited to the episode of medieval
colo-
nization studied in this paper and that this factor must be
considered
in any attempt to explain the distribution of Scandinavian
settlement in
Britain and in Ireland too, for that matter.
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CONCLUSION
After the initial failure of the revolt of Angus, the earl of
Moray, and Malcolm Macheth in 1130, the latter apparently fled to the
Southwest and continued his revolt. Usually it is assumed, of course,
that this second part of the revolt took place in Moray or Ross, Ritchie,
Normans in Scotland
, pp. 230-32; but this is apparently incorrect. King
David was unable to put down the revolt until 1134, and he was only suc-
cessful in that year because he obtained Norman aid. Walter Espec sum-
moned the northern barons to Carlisle and gathered a fleet, and these
preparations induced the rebels to surrender, Aelred of Rievaulx "De
Standardo," p. 193. How a Norman expeditionary force in Carlisle could
so intimidate rebels in Moray or Ross that they would capitulate without
a battle defies the imagination, but the difficulty vanishes if one
assumes that the rebels were in the Southwest. On the Galwegians, see
ibid
., pp. 187-88.
2
After the Battle of the Standard, Robert de Brus the elder
"imprisoned" his son Robert in Annandale for siding with the Scots, and
the latter is known to have complained over the fact that wheat could
not be grown in the area, see Ritchie, Normans in Scotland , p. 278.
3
See Holt, The Northerners
, pp. 208-10.
Musset , Les invasions
, pp. 257-60.
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